"If I were a Muslim, I'd probably be a jihadist. The thing that drives these guys -- a sense of adventure, wanting to be part of the moment, wanting to be in the big movement of history that's happening now -- that's the same thing that drives me, you know?" -- David Kilcullen, senior counterinsurgency adviser to Gen. David Petraeus, senior commander in Iraq
The "impressive" and "brilliant" (first in his class in military school in Australia) Lt. Col. David Kilcullen should be asked a number of questions about his all-purpose, one-size-more-or-less- fits-all (after a little softening of the boots-on-the-ground leather) "rules of counterinsurgency." He should be questioned about how and why he thinks the insurrection in Malaya, or that in Greece, are like that in Iraq. He might tell us who in those "insurgencies" played the role of the Sunnis, or rather of the two main Sunni groups, which yesterday collaborated with each other and yet today are apparently at daggers drawn, and which tomorrow might yet collaborate against the Shi'a, and which in any case are, all of them, against the Infidel Americans (though the "Anbar tribes" of which we hear so much are happy to pocket American aid).
And he might tell us who in those "insurgencies" played the role of the Shi'a, or rather of the different groups of Shi'a -- of Moqtada al-Sadr, and of Hakim of SCIRI, and Maliki of the Da'wa Party. And he then might tell us who, in Greece or Malaya or Aden or Kenya or East Timor or wherever it is that provides him with the "data" for his "counterinsurgency" ideas, played the role of the Kurds, who though Muslim are more grateful and reliable for American purposes than any of the Arab groups.
And then one might ask Lt. Col. David Kilcullen, he of the impressive strine accent (any accent but an American one can woo and win the easily-impressed likes of Condoleeza Rice), if he sees anything that might distinguish Iraq otherwise from his "counterinsurgency" "laws" and "rules" and "lessons." For example, what is the significance of the existence of Shi'a Iran on one side of Iraq, along its longest border, and of states (Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the U.A.E., Egypt, even Syria -- which is 70% Sunni though the Alawites are not, and Sunni Muslims as well as most Shi'a do not regard them even as real Muslims, given their cult of Mary) dominated by or largely peopled by Sunni Arabs on the other side? Does the ability of both sides to aid their co-religionists, and their keen awareness of the need to do so, not give pause to Lt. Col. David Kilcullen and to those who are impressed with him?
Do they not see beyond Iraq to a larger war, a war not simply with what Lt. Col. David Kilcullen has described as "a kook in a room" whom we must prevent from having mass appeal? Jihad already has, and always will have, "mass appeal" to Muslims. And Bin Laden is not a "kook"; Khomeini was not a "kook"; Nasrallah is not a "kook"; the leaders of the Ikhwan, wherever the Ikhwan has its many cells, are not "kooks" -- they are perfectly traditional Muslims, who choose to act on the central duty of Jihad by direct participation, rather than offering other kinds of support, such as promoting Da'wa in the Western world, or buying up Western hirelings, or merely contributing their mite to demographic conquest and a slow undoing of Infidel legal and political institutions. The enemy is Jihad, or more bluntly, the supremacist Belief-System that Lt. Col. David Kilcullen self-assuredly think she knows quite enough of, when he knows dangerously little. And that little, that ignorance of Islam, and of the ethnic and sectarian fissures in Iraq, explains the fiasco to date.
Final question: who, in all those other "insurgencies" from which the Kilcullens of this world and those who are impressed by them draw their "laws," played the role of the Chaldeans, and the Assyrians, the people who are, like the Mandeans and Yazidis, the ones who have fled, or are fleeing, or are being killed, because Islam, you see...is Islam? The Kilcullens of this world and those who are impressed by them do not see the complete picture, of which Iraq is only a part. Nor do they see the need in Iraq to end with a result that justifies the colossal investment, that is, a result that will guarantee further divisions and demoralizations within the camp of Islamic supremacism.
Here’s McCullen’s paper.
http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/Publications/complex_warfighting.pdf
His premise is that Globalization and the dominance of the United States are the cause of the problem. Beyond that, he really doesn’t say anything new. No mention of global Jihad. Lots of definitions for aspects of land warfare that sound like new buzz-words for old concepts. Versatility, ability, orchestration, decision superiority, and robustness have replaced decentralized control, total quality leadership, results based whatever, blah, blah, blah.
Lots of words with little controversy, substance, or teeth. I can see how he would appeal to Condoleezza Rice and the Bush administration. McCullen’s ideas are limited and safe.
If I were a Christian, I'd probably be a Chrusader. The thing that drove those guys -- a sense of adventure, wanting to be part of the moment, wanting to be in the big movement of history that's happening now -- that's the same thing that drives me, you know.
Glad to know the general considers himself a pawn of fate, unable to distinguish between the superficial "exciting" activities of a homicidal death cult and our necessary struggle in defense of human liberty.
Par for this chirping swamp.
Good commercial for al-Qaeda, too.
This guy should be busted and retired as a harmful flapjaw.
Bad for morale and bad as a representative of our side.
(Too many of these shoot from the hip "thinkers" can only prolong this fight with their wishful parallels ["I kill, and they kill, ergo, we're equals."] that are a potentially fatal- misunderstanding of the enemy.)
To paraphrase another flapjaw:
"You don't go to war with the enemy you wished you had, but the enemy you've got."
It hasn't quite penetrated their skulls yet.
(Too busy cover their other end.)
'a sense of adventure'
Utterly, jaw-droppingly purblind. Australians would recognize this countryman of theirs as a common type; the 'educated idiot'.
Actually Kilcullen has emphasized the significant differences between the "classic" insurgencies (Algeria, Cyprus, etc) and the current one in the dar al-islam. Here:
www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen1.pdf
Peter
The apt anaology is Vietnam but worse. An enemy who can afford(or in this case actually wants) to take losses.
He can, and will expend many lives to each one of yours he kills. Each time an allied soldier does something it's open to endless press scrutiny and debate. Each time an enemy soldier does something nobody on either side cares.
The enemy has no qualms about killing his own people, using torture and intimidation, everytime the allies do something even slightly wrong it's all over the papers.
A porus border, from which the enemy can constantly regroup and reinforce, but which the allies apparently find impossible to secure.
Constant political meddling in the military process(america has a long history of this).
No clear goals for the army, a strategy built of shifting sands, that changes depending on the press: negotiations with Iran, Syria anybody?
Luke warm support at home, constantly reinforced by the military failures.
Imagine Vietnam with myriad enemies, all fighting each other, whilst also fighting the allies. Fighting a shifting alliance of tribes and factions and beliefs against a total backdrop of complete anarchy.
Your bombs and weapons count for nothing, for each blow is against an idea, a cloud, that shifts and changes to circumstances, as breath in the wind.
Imagine hell.
I wrote before that in Australian parlance...........
This man is a dickhead.
Good lord, where do we find these people, and why do we put them in positions of power, where their decisions can cause the deaths of so many?
Hugh said above: 'The "impressive" and "brilliant" (first in his class in military school in Australia) Lt. Col. David Kilcullen should be asked a number of questions ...'
Hugh - With all due respect, why don't you ask him? He's a busy guy but he makes the occasional blog post at SMJ (http://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php).
The Army and Marines have been given the mission of temporarily pacifying Iraq, apparently without striking the adjacent terrorist "safe havens" of Syria and Iran. The tactic chosen by Petraeus and Kilcullen to accomplish this mission is counter-insurgency (CI) doctrine. If you believe that CI doctrine should be modified when dealing with Muslim areas you should specify the modifications you’d make. On the other had, if you think it’s futile to try to apply CI doctrine in Muslim areas I’d like to see your argument for that position.
But CI is a tactic in Iraq. It isn’t U.S. grand strategy. The failure of U.S. strategy to address the larger problem of Jihad (and especially Iranian Jihad with WMDs) is the fault of the administration, not the folks on the ground in Iraq who have the challenge of trying to make bricks with very little straw.
That being said, although I've turned to JW and you frequently in recent years because JW is an almost unique resource on the Jihad (a subject mostly ignored by security intellectuals"), I don't understand how it is that JW and Fitzgerald would have the U.S. both withdraw from Iraq ("Iraq the tar baby") and remove the threat of Iranian WMDs.
As I understand it, your suggested policy is to withdraw from Iraq, adopt a policy of containment for the entire Muslim world including attempting to prevent their import of advanced technology with weapons applications, and nibble at the Muslim periphery (Sudan, Balkans). I don’t see how that addresses the Iranian WMD threat and I don’t see such an ambitious containment working.
One can criticize President Bush all day long (and I often do) but at least his policy has the virtue of possibly preserving Iraq as a platform from which to conduct a serious action against Iran (another virtue is that it is making a Kurdish political entity possible).
In closing, I think it would be stimulating and useful to read a full on-line discussion on these issues featuring members of the various currents of the counter-Jihad stream. Perhaps Glazov of Frontpage Magazine would host such a discussion featuring yourself, Spencer, and or Diana West (she wrote a similar critique of Kilcullen on Friday) against Kilcullen (if he’s busy how about John Nagl [http://www.amazon.com/Learning-Eat-Soup-Knife-Counterinsurgency/dp/0226567702], or another prominent disciple of Galula [http://www.amazon.com/Counterinsurgency-Warfare-Theory-Practice-Classics/dp/0275993035/ref=pd_sxp_grid_pt_0_1/103-8819573-3412650] ) along with, perhaps Michael Ledeen.
Such a discussion would also have the virtue of bringing the JW worldview to the attention of mid-level folks in the military and security communities. I served 10 years as a federal agent and am currently an embedded advisor to an infantry Brigade Combat Team. There are some folks out there who are aware of and promote JW (for example, an FBI Academy instructor I know who has included Spencer titles on his reading list), but it’s often a tough sell. I recently spent a good deal of time trying to get something by Spencer on the BCT reading list.
Regards,
MarcH said
If that is now the mission goal, it was never announced publicly. "Pacifying Iraq" is a mighty big goal; with a little knowledge of Islamic doctrine and Middle Eastern politics and demographics, one might even say an unrealistic goal, or an unattainable goal. Which is not a denigration of the ability of our troops. They can only work with what they've got; one cannot make a purse from a sow's ear. The Iraqis (and other regional partners) have fairly conclusively proven that they are not interested in building a pacified pluralistic nation.
Again, it goes back to defining the goal. In Iraq, we have verified that there are no WMD's that could be used against us or our allies. Coalition troops have toppled Saddam and his sons, and displaced the Baathists. The Iraqi infrastructure has been rebuilt at U.S. taxpayers' expense. That would seem to be "mission complete" in many peoples' minds. If the goal now is "pacifying Iraq", it seems worthy of at least a healthy debate in a democratic republic such as ours as to whether "pacifying Iraq" is in the best interests of the U.S. And if so, whether the cost (in lives, materials, money) to us is worth the possible benefits.
Hugh argues very persuasively that there would be many advantages to allow Iraq to not be pacified by Coalition troops.
The goal in Iraq is murky at best. The goal in keeping WMD's out of the hands of the Iranian mullahs should be self-evident. The benefits to U.S. citizens of denying Iranians nuclear weapons is much clearer than offering Iraqis a "pacified Iraq".
Criticism of current Iraqi policy is focused on one thing: the re-allocation of our limited resources in ways that will maximize their effectiveness. It's not about surrender or "cutting-and-running". It's about getting back to the basics of protecting U.S. citizens, and away from trying to spread democracy and peace to people who have proven they want neither.
Special_guest (SG),
Here are my replies to a few of your points:
1.
SG: "If that (temporary pacification of Iraq) is now the mission goal, it was never announced publicly".
MarcH: I think the goal of temporary pacification (or “security” if you prefer that term) of Iraq is fairly clear from the 2007 State of the Union speech of President Bush and from the 01/2007 testimony of LGEN Petraeus before Congress (http://www.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom1/FrontPage%20Stories/Petraeus%20Supports%20Troop%20Increase%20in%20Confirmation%20Hearing.aspx).
2. Iranian WMDs - you didn't respond to what I think was the central point of my comment: how does one act to remove the threat of Iranian WMDs w/o a U.S. presence in Iraq? Even if you can construct some sort of "Rube Goldberg" plan to attempt this w/o bases in adjacent countries wouldn't it be a lot easier with bases in Iraq (and Afghanistan)?
3. Hugh makes a good point that it may be helpful to the U.S to generate certain centrifugal forces in the Muslim world. I agree with this point, but shouldn't we seek to generate these forces at place and times that will most assist our most important objectives?
I would argue that our most important objective at this time is to act to remove the threat of the Iranian WMD program.
Here are some examples of how our presence in Iraq has fostered centrifugal trends in Iran (although we certainly haven't done enough to encourage or exploit these trends).
* There has been significant recent media coverage concerning Shia groups in Iraq and even in Iran turning away from the Iranian establishment and towards Al-Sistani in Najaf. To the extent that this movement weakens the Iranian establishment it can be helpful to us.
* Our invasion and continued presence has fostered a Kurdish political entity in northern Iraq. This may evolve into a separate Kurdish state, but in any case in it increases centrifugal forces among the Kurds in Iran (and also Syria, see the recent Caroline Glick column).
4. SG: " ... with a little knowledge of Islamic doctrine and Middle Eastern politics and demographics, one might even say an unrealistic goal, or an unattainable goal."
Well, we poor ignorant folks in the field without even a "little knowledge" will have to muddle along without experts like you. But do you really want to stick to the position that it's not possible for western troops to use a variety of methods, including but not limited to force, to maintain themselves in Muslim regions for long periods of time in order to accomplish significant objectives?