Iran: Well, yes, we do have a secret second nuke plant

"I heard Obama say (on a TV appearance) that he planned to have IAEA "investigate" the Iranian nuclear plants...whoo hoo, like the Iranians are going to cooperate..."

You realize that the head of the IAEA is named Mohammad? Right? I Think that Iran will cooperate with the IAEA, because the head of the IAEA is a fucking Muslem!

Its like sending a Nazi to inspect a concentration camp!

SNAFU

Sure mikey, an agreement with a Muslem is about as binding as spaghetti noodle hand cuffs.

Its totaly out of the realm of possabilities that Iran is LIEING! We all know that Muslems are exempt from telling the truth when it comes to Muslem security right?

When Iran nukes the "second set of thugs" America is next. Possibly first. look at all the new terror plots in America. Whats your spin on that?

Peace? No Abdullah, we both know that there will be no peace untill the Mahdi brings "justice" to the world, right?
Stop pretending. We know what your "religion says about peace. There will be none.

WRONG, Mikey. The NPT only allows the proliferation of nuclear materials if they are a) declared and able to be inspected and b) of a size / volume / level of enrichment commensurate with *peaceful* energy uses.

Iran is in violation of not 1, not 2, but 3 sets of UN sanctions already for refusing to comply with the existing rules of the Treaty, and the recent discovery is that it has built a second, secret facility underground, which is too small to produce sufficient energy for the country.

The clear implication is that a small facility HIDDEN underground is for the sole purpose of further enriching the authorised uranium from the official facility, in order to create nuclear weapons to carry out Ahmadinnerjacket's repeated threat to destroy Israel. Iran is not a stable democracy, so even if it was amassing nuclear materials within the rules, it wouldn't be wise AT ALL to allow it to continue.

Ergo, Iran lies. Muslims lie. Get informed or butt out, please.

Dude,

Mikey IS informed. He just chooses to be on the wrong side of the truth. He interpretes things to support his story. He likes to sidestep, and deflect, so that the truth stays hidden from the eyes of the uninformed. I realy do think that most of the time he believes that he is telling the truth. But lets be honest here...

What you said is exactaly true.

Muslems lie.

GYMGAL: IF we have known for almost a year, "why all the hand wringing today?"

Here is your answer, The Thug in Chief, was attempting to beat Obama to the punch. Apparently, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad found out that Obama planned to announce the findings of US, British, and French intelligence that they had a second plant to produce weapons grade nuclear material. Thus he and the beaming Mullahs decided to upstage Obama and control and shape the press coverage.

You know that when the IAEA comes to inspect, they will announce the plant only produces Baby Formula!

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/25/AR2009092500289_pf.html

A senior administration official said U.S. intelligence has worked closely with British and French counterparts. Over the course of the year... Obama ordered that the information be put together into a comprehensive presentation so that by September the United States would be "in position where we could actually do a detailed, credible brief about this particular facility."

Until they received news Tuesday of the Iranian letter to the IAEA, officials said, they had not yet determined when and where they would use the information. They said they were uncertain how Iran found out about their plans but that the letter appeared to be an attempt to preempt any U.S. disclosure.

(Who leaked the information to Iran? Could it be the IAEA could be feeding the Iranians secret information? Read the next paragraph, could administration personnel at a high level be leaking information to Iranian agents?)

"On Tuesday evening, Obama decided he would reveal the intelligence to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at a previously-scheduled meeting on Wednesday. U.S. officials also briefed the IAEA in Vienna..."

Ahmadinejad dismissed the accusations from Obama and the other leaders.

"This does not mean we must inform Mr. Obama's administration of every facility that we have," he told Time. It "simply adds to the list of issues [over] which the United States owes the Iranian nation an apology. . . . Rest assured that this will be the case. We do everything transparently."

In a statement, the Russian government said the new uranium enrichment plant "violates decisions of the United Nations Security Council." It said the IAEA "must investigate this site immediately, and Iran must cooperate with this investigation." The Kremlin also urged Iran to "provide proof of its commitment to a peaceful nuclear program" by a scheduled meeting next week between representatives of Iran and six world powers: the United States, Russia, China, Britain France and Germany.

China said it hoped the IAEA would deal with the issue in accordance with its mandate and called for negotiation with Iran, rather than punishment.

You're right, I was just trying to give him the benefit of the doubt that he might actually be ignorant about the NPT, giving him a false sense of sanctimonious outrage...just because Iran is a signatory doesn't mean it has carte blanche to gain as much nuclear material as possible, which is what he was implying.

Poor ol' Mikey probably doesn't know that states sign the Treaty as Nuclear Weapon States or Non-Nuclear Weapon States, with different conditions for each. Iran is most certainly NOT an authorised Nuclear Weapon State, and with bloody good reason too. NWS are forbidden from selling materials to Non-NWS (Russia, we're looking at you...), and all nuclear activity must be carefully regulated, which Iran has consistently obstructed and lied about.

Muslims always seem to bring up the "Well Israel has nukes so why can't its neighbours?" argument. Israel hasn't signed the NPT, either as a NWS, because that would leave it open to an attack with impunity (countries with nukes are allowed to use said nukes against other countries possessing nukes, in the interests of global "security", but apparently it's considered bad form to nuke a non-nuke country :S), or as a Non-NWS, because if it claimed to not have nukes, countries like Iran would attack it anyway because they'd think it would be too weak to defend itself.
That's why they've never said, and never will say, for definite if they have nukes or not, because it makes it too much of a gamble for their enemies in either case - the ambiguity of their situation is integral for stability in the Middle East. It's not simply a case of their being the US's ally so they can do what they want.

And that's why we stay out of international law...can't be doing with all the headaches lol.

"...the IAEA Board of Governors, acting under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, found in a rare non-consensus decision with 12 abstentions that these failures constituted non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement..."

This finding under Article XII.C was illegal.
There are two types of safeguards agreements. There are those that relate to and grew out of the IAEA Statute, such as INFCIRC/66 safeguards, (1) and there are those that relate to the Non-proliferation treaty (NPT), which are the INFCIRC/153 safeguards. (2)
The first types of safeguards, INFCIRC/66 safeguards, are provided for in Article III.A.5 of the IAEA Statute. These safeguards are applied “with respect to any Agency project, or other arrangement where the Agency is requested by the parties concerned to apply safeguards.” (3) Article XII.C of the Statute defines non-compliance as diverting nuclear material, violating health and safety regulations, or violating any other conditions, of a “project prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or States concerned.” Agency safeguards, then, relate only to established Agency projects, and they do not contain provisions for stopping nuclear proliferation if it is done without Agency assistance. (4)
The second types of safeguards are NPT safeguards, or INFCIRC/153 safeguards, which are provided for in Article III of the NPT. (5) These safeguards are fundamentally different than INFCIRC/66 safeguards (6). Because they relate to “all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities” of a State, (NPT, Article III) these safeguards are designed to detect nonproliferation under all circumstances, even if it is outside of an Agency project. For this reason NPT safeguards are also known as “full scope” safeguards. The triggering mechanism for non-compliance with NPT safeguards can be found in Article 19, which states that referral to the Security Council will occur if the Board “is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” (7)

The IAEA found Iran in non-compliance under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. The IAEA Statute, however, relates to INFCIRC/66 safeguards, which only relate to Agency projects.
The error made by the IAEA is that Iran has not been accused of any violations in relation to any IAEA project, and any claims of Iranian non-compliance under Article XII.C of the Statute have absolutely no legal basis. (8) In fact, only India, Israel, and Pakistan are currently operating under INFCIRC/66 safeguards under the IAEA Statute, and a finding of non-compliance under Article XII.C of the Statute would only be legal for these three states. (9) For any States that are a party to the NPT, a finding of non-compliance can only legally be made under INFCIRC/153 safeguards.

Non-compliance is an inability to “verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” (Article 19) The reason the IAEA did not find Iran non-complaint with respect to their INFCIRC/153 safeguards is that the IAEA was able to verify that Iran did not divert nuclear material, and they have made this finding repeatedly. (10) Therefore, Iran was not non-compliant under their INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreement. The IAEA knew that a finding of non-compliance under INFCIRC/153 safeguards would have been grossly illegal, so instead they found Iran non-compliant with Article XII.C of the Statute. Although this is still illegal, it is less obvious to those unfamiliar with safeguards.

It is clear that the IAEA realizes that finding Iran non-compliant under Article XII.C of the Statute is illegal as well. If it were legal, the IAEA would simply have found Iran “non compliant under Article XII.C of the Statute.” Instead they stated that Iran’s actions “constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute.” Adding the phrase “in the context” shows that they do not believe their finding is truly valid. Iranian non-compliance “in the context” of Article XII.C means that Iran is in non-compliance with that Article only if it is “reinterpreted” to mean something that it does not actually say. (11)

1) The text of INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 can be found here:
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf66r2.shtml
2) Nearly all safeguards agreements under the NPT between individual nations and the IAEA follow INFCIRC/153. All references to safeguards will refer to this standard:
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc153.pdf
See this link in relation to all quotes of NPT-type safeguards agreements.
3) See Aticle XII.A the IAEA Statute:
iaea.org/About/statute_text.html
See article XI for a description of what an “Agency Project” is.
See this link in relation to all quotes of the IAEA Statute.
4) “The IAEA Statute does not contain provisions to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons if those weapons are being built without Agency assistance.”
Susan Carmody, “Fifth Annual Philip D. Reed Memorial Issue: Notes: Balancing Collective Security and National Sovereignty: Does the United Nations Have the Right to Inspect North Korea’s Nuclear Facilities?” Fordham International Law Journal, 18 Fordham Int’l L.J. 229, 1994. Also see Documents on Disarmament, Volume 1, 1945-1959, pages ix-x, as cited in above.
Also, see the statement:
“Indigeneously-developed nuclear technology & activities are not subjected to international are surveillance or control [under INFCIRC/66 safeguards]”
Jamal Khaer Ibrahim, (Director, Planning & International Relations Division, Malayian Nuclear Agency), “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”: presentation given at the National Convention on Nuclear & Radioactive Safety, Security & Safeguards, 10 Dec. 2007, page 34, available here:
aelb.gov.my/events/nc2007dok/pdf/S4/Topic1.pdf
5) See this link for a copy of the NPT:
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf
6) For statements regarding this difference, see:
“Since INFCIRC 66 safeguards are intended to verify obligations that particular facilities and material are not used for military purposes, not comprehensive nonproliferation obligations such as those in the NPT, its safeguards are focused on the particular facilities and material in question, rather than applying to all nuclear material in peaceful activities, as in the case of INFCIRC 153.”
Matthew Bunn, “International Safeguards: Summarizing ‘Traditional’ and ‘New’ Measures,” Lecture Notes, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Open Course Ware (ocw.mit.edu). Article here:
ocw.mit.edu/NR/rdonlyres/Nuclear-Engineering/22-812JSpring2004/A88D2643-5744-4760-961C-D2859A1457A1/0/lec16notes.pdf
Also, see:
“The fundamental difference between the INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 & INFCIRC/153 systems is that the INFCIRC/153 system, as provided for under Article III.1 of the NPT, requires the application of IAEA safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory or under the jurisdiction and control of NPT NNWS Parties. Thus, the INFCIRC/153 system is also known as a Full-Scope or Comprehensive Safeguards System and differs from the INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 safeguards, where indigeneously-developed nuclear technology & activities are not subjected to international are surveillance or control.”
Jamal Khaer Ibrahim, (Director, Planning & International Relations Division, Malayian Nuclear Agency), “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”: presentation given at the National Convention on Nuclear & Radioactive Safety, Security & Safeguards, 10 Dec. 2007, page 34, available here:
aelb.gov.my/events/nc2007dok/pdf/S4/Topic1.pdf
Also, see:
“The first such agreement was concluded between the IAEA and Japan in 1959, but the agency did not adopt a comprehensive safeguards system until 1965. Now set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2, this system of safeguards was to be applied, upon request, to individual nuclear activities within a state and to all activities receiving IAEA assistance. INFCIRC/66 safeguards apply to individual plants, shipments of nuclear fuel, or supply agreements between states supplying nuclear fuel or technology and states importing it, and they are the basis for nearly all agreements between the IAEA and states that are not party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which entered into force in 1970, extended the scope of the IAEA’s safeguards activities. By joining the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states (e.g., all those except the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China) commit themselves to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or explosive devices, and to submit to IAEA safeguards. Instead of applying only to selected nuclear activities on request, however, safeguards under the NPT—known as full-scope safeguards—are required of non-nuclear-weapon states on all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities within their territory or under their control. To accommodate this new mission, the IAEA developed INFCIRC/153, a more comprehensive model safeguards agreement encompassing every aspect of a state’s nuclear fuel cycle except the initial mining and milling of uranium ore.”
US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, “Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency”, OTA-ISS-615, April 1995, page 27, available here:
princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1995/9530/953004.PDF
Also, see:
“In the case of NNWS parties to the NPT, ‘comprehensive’ (sometimes referred to as ‘full-scope’) safeguards agreements based on the model agreement (INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) cover all of a State’s nuclear material and activities…Another type of safeguards agreement, modeled on Agency document INFCIRC/66 Rev.2, is ‘item specific’ and covers individual nuclear facilities, specific items of equipment, or specific nuclear material.”
disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/nptbi.html
7) “The NPT Safeguards compliance assessment mechanism is comprised of two components. The triggering clause, contained in Article 19 of the Safeguards Agreement, contains the criteria for findings of non-compliance. The reporting clause, contained in Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, contains the procedures for handling cases of non-compliance and the authority for reporting cases to the U.N. Security Council.
As the triggering mechanism, Article 19 of the Safeguards Agreement grants the Agency authority to judge and enforce compliance with its provisions:
‘If the Board upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the [IAEA] Statute...’
Per its authority under the Safeguards Agreement, the Board may only report a state to the Security Council if it finds that, based on the report from the Director General, the Board cannot be assured that the state has not diverted nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes. These provisions make clear that the only relevant consideration behind a finding of non-compliance in the context of safeguards is the diversion of nuclear materials for military purposes. Any other breach of the Safeguards Agreement can only amount to non-compliance as far as it affects the Board's ability to verify that there has been no diversion.”
Michael Spies, American University International Law Review, “Symposium: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: A Legal Framework in Crisis? Essay: Iran and the Limits of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime,” 2007
8) “The language of the Board's finding is not consistent with the relevant provision of the IAEA Statute. Operative paragraph 1 of the resolution finds Iran's past breaches of its NPT Safeguards, as detailed in a two-year old Agency report, to "constitute non-compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute." Noted above, a finding of non-compliance, as the term is used in Article XII.C, pertains to circumstances when nuclear material provided in an Agency project has been diverted for military purposes, health and safety violations, or any other condition of an Agency project proscribed by agreement. Although Iran has several ongoing projects of the IAEA, including assistance in preparations for the nuclear power plant at Bushehr, the IAEA has not accused Iran of diverting nuclear material from any project. Nor has Iran been accused of any safety and health violations or of any other infraction of any condition stipulated in any agreement pertaining to an IAEA project. Therefore, the finding of non-compliance made by the Board is vague and has no basis in the IAEA Statute.”
Michael Spies, American University International Law Review, “Symposium: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: A Legal Framework in Crisis? Essay: Iran and the Limits of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime,” 2007
9) “As of 31 December 2006, safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 were
implemented at a number of facilities in India, Israel and Pakistan.”
IAEA Safeguards Statement for 2006
iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es2006.pdf
10) See paragraph 112 of GOV/2004/67:
“All the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities.”
fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/iaea1104.pdf
Also see paragraph 51 of GOV/2005/67:
“As indicated to the Board in November 2004, all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities.”
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-67.pdf
11) When a treaty says something other than what a party wants it to say, the party will often “reinterpret” the treaty and twist its language in order to construct a new meaning. This is illegal. The US has a history of doing this, the most famous example of which is Judge Abraham Sofaer’s reinterpretation of the ABM treaty during the Reagan administration. See:
Emily K. Penney, “COMMENT: Is that Legal?: The United States’ Unilateral Withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,” Catholic University Law Review, 51 Cath. U.L. Rev. 1287, Summer 2002
See also:
David A. Koplow. “Arms Control Treaty Reinterpretation: Article: Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of Arms Control Treaties,” University of Pennsylavania Law Review, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1353, May 1989
See also:
Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “Commentary: Testing and Development of ‘Exotic’ Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper,” Harvard Law Review, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1956, June 1986

dave742,

Would you prefer we treat Iran like the Eliot Ness treated Al Capone?

Currently the world knows that a moslem state who regularly bullies, threatens and ill treats its own people has lied to the International Community about its nuclear intentions.

Once the pathetic dance of diplomacy ends we will begin the after-party of extirpation.

“In November 2003 IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported that Iran had repeatedly and over an extended period failed to meet its safeguards obligations, including by failing to declare its uranium enrichment program.”

Yes. There is a procedure to follow when this happens. Another case where a country violated its safeguards agreement was North Korea in 1993. Even though the IAEA acted illegally in that case as well and breached their Safeguards agreement with the DPRK (61), the procedure used to refer the DPRK to the Security Council did follow the applicable laws, and comparing this to the Iranian case will illustrate the illegal actions the IAEA has taken against Iran. Before comparing the DPRK and Iran cases, it is important to understand the meaning of Articles 71-77, and Articles 18 and 19 of the safeguards agreement.

When issues arise concerning violations of safeguards agreements by member states, the IAEA may take the following steps, which ultimately lead to the referral of the states to the Security Council.

Step 1) The IAEA may call for a Special Inspection: There are three types of inspections available to the IAEA. The first are called ad hoc inspections, which relate to the period just after a Safeguards Agreement comes into force, and the purpose of which is to verify the information contained in the initial report provided to the IAEA. These inspections are provided for in Article 71. The second types are called regular inspections, which are the routine inspections that are run in order to verify reports, status of nuclear materials, etc. These are provided for in Article 72. Article 76 states that for regular inspections, “the inspectors shall have access only to the strategic points specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.” Subsidiary Arrangements are provided for in Paragraphs 39 and 40, and contain the details as to how the safeguards agreement will be applied in a particular country. These details include the monitoring of “strategic points,” where inflows and outflows of nuclear material can be measured and verified by the IAEA. For a regular inspection, access outside of these “strategic points” is not allowed.
The third types are called special inspections, and may be used if “information obtained from routine inspections is not adequate for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities.” These are provided for in Article 73. The scope of special inspections are contained in Article 77. Article 77(a) says that the IAEA may “make inspections in addition to the routine inspections provided for in Articles 78-82.” Articles 78-82 outline the “frequency and intensity of routine inspections.” Although Article 77(a) says that the frequency of the regular inspections may increase in a special inspection, it says nothing about increasing the areas of access allowed in regular inspections. Article 77(b) does address issues relating to access, and says that the IAEA may “obtain access…to information or locations in addition to those specified in Article 76.” In light of what was said about Article 76 above, this means access to information outside of the “strategic points” agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements. This additional access, however, must be “in agreement with [the member state].” If the IAEA and the member state cannot agree to the details of this additional access, the issue will then be resolved “in accordance with Articles 21 and 22,” which involves a discussion of the issue before the Board or arbitration.

Step 2) The IAEA may decide that an issue is “essential and urgent”: Article 77, which discusses Special Inspections, introduces the next step available to the IAEA if Special Inspections do not resolve a problem. It says that if an action by the member state is considered to be “essential and urgent,” then “Article 18 shall apply.”
Articles 18 and 19 fall under the heading “Measures in Relation to Verification of Don-Diversion.” These are the articles that relate to possible measures that the IAEA can take in relation to diversion issues. Article 18 says that if the Board “decides that an action by [the member state] is essential and urgent to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons,” then the Board may “call upon” the member state to “take the required action without delay.” Special Inspections involve minor issues that can possibly be resolved with additional inspections, but “essential and urgent” issues relate to “verification of non-diversion,” which is much more serious. The “exclusive purpose” (Article 1) of safeguards is to verify that “special fissionable material” is “not diverted to nuclear weapons,” and if an issue relating to diversion is identified, it is “essential and urgent” that it be resolved. If it is not, it will lead to the matter being referred to the Security Council via Article 19.

Step 3) Article 19 states that if the IAEA “is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded,” then the board “may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute.” The reports in Article XII of the Statute are made to “all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.” The two articles need to be read together to be understood correctly, because “paragraph 19 connects paragraph 18 to Article XII(C).” (62) If the “essential and urgent” issues of Article 18 cannot be resolved, then the board will “not be able to verify that there has been no diversion,” and, according to Article 19, they “may then make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII.” It is through unresolved “essential and urgent” issues that a member state gets referred to the Security Council. There are two possible ways that these “essential and urgent” issues can remain unresolved. Either the IAEA investigates the “essential and urgent” issues and does not come up with satisfactory results, or the particular nation does not allow the IAEA to investigate the issues to begin with.

Now we can look at the DPRK issue. The Safeguards agreement between the DPRK and the IAEA went into force on April 10, 1992 and ad hoc inspections to confirm the initial report began in May of 1992. (63) Beginning in July of 1992, “inconsistencies began to emerge” between the information obtained from the IAEA inspections and the data supplied by the DPRK. (See note 61 about these “inconsistencies”). Over the next 7 months, the IAEA attempted to obtain additional information and access to two sites for further inspection. The DPRK did not cooperate with either request.
Due to the fact that the IAEA was unable to address these inconsistencies, on Feb. 9, 1993, the IAEA took Step 1 above and requested a “special inspection”. Over the next two weeks no further progress was made and therefore the Board proceeded to Step 2 by passing a resolution (64) deciding that it was “essential and urgent” for the DPRK to provide additional information and to provide access to two additional sites. The resolution was passed on Feb. 25, 1993, and gave the DPRK an additional month to respond. Instead of responding positively, on March 12, the DPRK gave a 90 day notice that it was withdrawing from the NPT. (65) On March 18, the IAEA adopted another resolution (66) notifying the DPRK that the Safeguards agreement remained in force in spite of the DPRK notice of withdrawal. The next day the Director General informed the DPRK that unless they cooperated within the next two weeks, he would have “no choice but to report non-compliance when the Board met again on 31 March.” (67) On March 31, the Director General reported to the BOG that “as of now, the DPRK continues to be in non-compliance with Articles 18, 73, 77 and Article 71 of the Safeguards Agreement. This is because it continues to deny access both to the additional information and locations requested by the Director General on 9 February 1993 and determined by the Board to be essential and urgent to ensure verification of compliance with INFCIRC/403 (Articles 18, 73 and 77) and also to deny the access required for the purpose of ad hoc inspections (Article 71). As a result, the Agency is unable to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.” (68) It was the Director General who determined non-compliance and reported the non-compliance to the Board, and the specific reasons were given for the non-compliance finding. The non-compliance finding was reached because the DPRK was given one month to resolve the “essential and urgent” issues, and those issues were not addressed by the DPRK. Therefore, after the one month deadline the DG found the DPRK non-compliant and, as a result, declared that the Agency was unable to verify that there was no diversion.
Article 19 says that if the Board “is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded,” then they “may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute,” and this is exactly what the Board did. The day after the Director General reported to the Board that the DPRK was non-complaint and as a result he was “unable to verify that there has been no diversion,” the Board passed a resolution (69) finding that “the DPRK is in non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency” and also found that “pursuant to Article 19 of the Agreement, that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the terms of the Safeguards Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” As a result, they decided, “as required by Article XII.C of the Statute and in accordance with Article 19 of the Agreement, to report the DPRK's non-compliance and the Agency's inability to verify non-diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded, to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.” The resolution of the Board followed Article 19 to the letter.
Because the report was made to “all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations,” the General Assembly was able to act on the report by issuing a resolution (which passed by a vote of 140-1, with North Korea as the only dissenting vote (70)) that “urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cooperate immediately with the Agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement.” (71)

The path to Security Council referral is as follows: Serious issues arise that bring into doubt the question of non-diversion, the “sole purpose” of safeguards. Because the issues relate to non-diversion, they are deemed “essential and urgent,” and need to be resolved promptly. A deadline is given, and if the state does not resolve the issues within that time, then the Director General decides that the state is in non-compliance. The non-compliance finding is made because the “essential and urgent” issues remain unresolved. Once the state is found non-complaint, the Board may decide that it is unable to verify non-diversion, and the state is then referred to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Let’s compare this to what happened with Iran. On 6 June 2003 the Director General released a report stating the Iran “failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement,” (72) and another DG report on 26 August 2003 (73) provided an update on the original report. On 12 September 2003, the BOG passed a resolution (74) based on these reports that decided it was “essential and urgent in order to ensure IAEA verification of non-diversion of nuclear material” that Iran takes certain actions by the end of October of that year. This is similar to the BOG resolution passed on 25 Feb. 1993 (75) against the DPRK which decided that it was “essential and urgent in order to resolve differences and to ensure verification of compliance with [their safeguards agreement]” that the DPRK take certain actions within one month.
Up to this point the situation is very similar to that of the DPRK. In both cases issues arose that brought into doubt the question of non-diversion. (The issues brought up in the Iran case are without justification just as in the DPRK case, but we are concentrating on the procedures here and not the facts that they are based on). In both cases these issues were declared by the Board to be “essential and urgent” under Article 18, and in both cases a deadline was given for the issue to be resolved. The Board was slightly more lenient with Iran than with the DPRK, because they gave Iran 6 weeks to resolve the issues, and the DPRK was given only one month. How generous.
A decision by the Board deciding, in accordance with Article 18, that certain actions are “essential and urgent” is critical, because if these issues are not addressed satisfactorily, then the Board will likely find, in accordance with Article 19, that it “is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded.” The DPRK did not respond to their “essential and urgent” issues, and as a result they were found to be non-compliant and referred to the Security Council in accordance with Article 19 just over one month later. So what happened in the case of Iran? Unlike the DPRK, the IAEA stated that in response to the “essential and urgent” request, “Iran [showed] active cooperation and openness. This is evidenced, in particular, by Iran’s granting to the Agency unrestricted access to all locations the Agency requested to visit; by the provision of information and clarifications in relation to the origin of imported equipment and components; and by making individuals available for interviews.” The IAEA then stated that “this [was] a welcome development.” (76) As a result of Iran’s cooperation the IAEA was able to resolve the “essential and urgent” issues. On 26 November 2003 the IAEA reported that “Iran has taken the specific actions deemed essential and urgent and requested of it in paragraph 4 of the Resolution adopted by the Board on 12 September 2003 (GOV/2003/69)” (77) The IAEA also stated that “there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons program.”
Unlike the DPRK case, Iran cooperated fully with the request for information to the “essential and urgent” issues, and those issues were resolved. Therefore, no referral to the Security Council was warranted at the time, and no referral was made at the time. The only way a referral to the Security Council can be made legally is if a request for “essential and urgent” information is ignored or if the issues cannot be resolved. Because the “essential and urgent: issues were resolved, a referral to the Security Council cannot be legally made until more “essential and urgent “ issues arise. Only if Iran were not able to resolve any new issues could a legal referral be made. After this incident in 2003, however, no other decision has been made requiring Iran to provide “essential and urgent” information, and therefore the referral to the Security Council that did occur is illegal because it did not follow Articles 18 and 19 of the safeguards agreement, which is the only legal route for referral to the Security Council.

61) The DPRK Safeguards Agreement entered into force on April 10, 1992, and the DPRK filed an initial report on nuclear material subject to safeguards on May 4, 1992. According to the summary contained in INFCIRC/419 (fas.org/news/un/dprk/inf419.html), after the ad hoc inspections started in May, “inconsistencies” between the DPRK declarations and the inspector’s findings began to emerge in July, 1992. It is doubtful, however, that there were really any inconsistencies. On July 22, 1992, a hearing was held by the House Foreign Affairs Committee titled “North Korean Nuclear Program,” where IAEA Director Hans Blix testified on the ongoing inspections. At that point the IAEA inspectors had already “gone to the installations which [the DPRK has] declared in the original inventory,” and were also “taken to some places which were also not in the original inventory.” According to Blix’ testimony, the IAEA had questions about why the DPRK was building what they called a “radio-chemical laboratory,” which the IAEA called a reprocessing plant. The DPRK said it would be for waste disposal as part of a closed fuel cycle, which is completely reasonable, but Blix was suspicious that other reasons were initially given. Regardless of his suspicions, the building of the facility was completely legal, and involved no “inconsistencies.” Blix also wondered whether the core of their 5 Megawatt reactor was the original core. This also was not an “inconsistency,” and the question would have been resolved on future routine inspections. Blix said himself that “there is no sign they have been devoting themselves to an enrichment program” and that there is no evidence of the DPRK cooperating with others on their nuclear program. Regarding uranium, Blix said that “we have not established any differences between or discrepancies between the inventory and what we have seen and verified so far.” Blix did not identify a single problem at the hearing, and it is doubtful there was any.
The IAEA’s illegal actions began on February 9, 1993, when the IAEA began to ask for access to two buildings at the Nyongbyon Nuclear Research Centre based on information from satellite photos obtained from the US (this request was reiterated in the BOG Resolution of Feb. 25, 1993, see GOV/2636) (Interestingly, it was not long before this that the US was confronted with a similar situation when negotiating the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention. At issue was a provision for “anytime, anywhere” on-site inspections with no right of refusal, which is similar to what the DPRK was being asked to submit to. When the Soviet Union decided to accept the idea of these types of inspections, it was the west, including the US, who said that these types of inspections would pose grave risks to sensitive facilities. Therefore, in 1991, the US, UK, Japan and Australia “formally proposed less intrusive inspections than those that the Soviet Union had supported.” See: “Recommended Text for Article IX – Challenge Inspection” UN Conference on Disarmament, CD/CW/WP.352, 15 July 1991, quoted in “Co-operative Security and the CWC: A Comparison of the Chemical and Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Regimes,” in Contemporary Security Policy, V. 15, No. 3, 1994, p. 30-57, by Jessica Eve Stern. The US supports the idea of other nations being subjected o these types of inspections, but not their own.)
This was illegal and a breach of the Safeguards Agreement by the IAEA for two reasons. The first related to the fact that information was submitted to the IAEA by a third party. Details on how information is to be submitted to the IAEA by signatory States is given throughout the safeguards agreement (especially paragraph 8), but nowhere in the safeguards agreement are there provisions for the gathering of information by the IAEA from third parties. The IAEA Statute does contain details on the submission of information by member states in Article VIII, but this information relates only “to the nature and peaceful uses of atomic energy,” and not to nuclear weapons programs. Accepting and acting on information supplied by a third party was illegal. The Director General first presented the idea of using third party intelligence to the BOG on November 12, 1991 (see GOV/2554) by proposing that a two person team be created in order to compile and verify this type of information. There was widespread opposition to the idea (for example, Mr Lavina of the Philippines said that the idea was “cynically encouraging espionage” and was “in danger of promoting transgressions against the sovereignty of states,” and as a result, “on the legal plane, [the idea] would not only violate the Statute but also international law.” (see paragraphs 16 and 18 of GOV/OR/770)). Because of the opposition, the “proposal was scrapped” (The Independent, “UN Agency Tightens Rules for Nuclear Inspection,” Feb.29, 1992 by Michael Wise). Even though his idea was rejected by the Board, the Director General used deceptive language to make it appear to the outside world that it actually had been accepted. At the BOG meeting, the “summing up” of the meeting said that the Board “further reaffirmed the Agency’s rights to obtain and to have access to additional information and locations in accordance with the Agency’s Statute and all comprehensive safeguards agreements.” (see paragraph 48 of GOV/OR/776, also referred to in paragraph 4 of GC(36)/1017, available here: iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC36/GC36Documents/English/gc36-1017_en.pdf). This part of the summing up was included in a press release issued by the Director General on
26 February 1992 (PR 92/12, 26 February 1992). In response to the press release, articles appeared saying that the Board approved the use of third party information (see, for example, AP, “UN Agency’s Board Agrees to Toughen Inspection Programs,” Feb, 27, 1992 by Mark J. Porubcansky). The Board, however, had not accepted the idea of using third party information, and had specifically rejected the only proposal made to do so. The reason for the confusion is in the wording of the statement, which said that the Board “reaffirmed the Agency’s rights to obtain and to have access to additional information and locations in accordance with the Agency’s Statute and all comprehensive safeguards agreements.” This statement basically says that the Board made no changes at all, because “reaffirming the Agency’s rights” means that the Agency’s rights remained unchanged. The key to understanding the situation is to know what the Agency’s rights were before they were “reaffirmed” by the Board, and by not detailing this, the statement makes it appear as though the Board agreed to the use of third party information. The reality, however, is that third party information was not allowed before the BOG meeting, and reaffirming the Agency as having “access to additional information…in accordance with the Agency’s Statute” simply means that third party information was not allowed after the meeting as well. The deception in this wording was pointed out by Mr. Villain XIIII of Belgium at the BOG meeting, who said that the summary did not “[reflect] the opinions expressed” in the meeting but instead “artificially [obliterated] their substance.” He said that the summing up “made no reference to a very important point, namely the Agency’s access to information which could indicate the need for a special inspection.” He was concerned that “the Agency might act upon doubtful, arbitrary or biased information and …that the State against which the information was directed might not have any opportunity to refute it or to justify itself.” He said that although “there was a reference [in the summing up] to the Agency’s right to have access to additional information…that wording [was] taken from paragraph 73 of document INFCIRC/153, [and] referred to the quite different situation when during an inspection, Agency officials felt that they needed additional information or access to additional information. What [the Director General] had in mind, however, was initial information which could trigger a special inspection, and failure to include a reference to that might create uncertainties about the future conduct of special inspections” (see GOV/OR/776, paragraphs 52, 52 and 55). The Belgian representative likely realized that the wording was specifically designed to “create uncertainties about the future conduct of special inspections.”
It was not until the BOG passed resolution GC(39)/RES/17 on September 18, 1995 that the use of third party information become legal (see the statement: “these so-called ‘Part 1’ measures, agreed in 1995, included…arrangements to give the Agency access to national intelligence information, ” in David Fischer, “Verifying Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament” in VERTIC Verification yearbook 2000, available here: vertic.org/assets/VY00_Fischer.pdf) In that 1995 resolution the BOG “[endorsed]…the first part of the measures it has proposed” and “[requested] the Director General to implement at an early date the measures outlined in Part 1 of document GOV/2807.”(see number 3 and 5 of the resolution, available here: iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC39/GC39Resolutions/English/gc39res-17_en.pdf). The Part 1 measures that were introduced under the 93+2 program for strengthening safeguards included “improved analysis of information,” which included access to third party information (see GOV/2807, paragraph 22, available here: iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC39/GC39Documents/English/gc39-17_en.pdf). Although these measures were passed, there were many reservations about the legality of several of the proposed Part 1 measures, including those relating to third party information. Mr. Ahmad from Pakistan expressed concern that “such third-party information could, for many reasons, be biased; the Agency should not be seen to adjust its response according to the perception of certain powerful States” and Mr. Saburido of Cuba said that “recourse to data from intelligence sources should be explicitly excluded.” In response to legality questions, the Director General stated that “acceptance of the recommendations…did not imply endorsement of the specific measures described in the document or the legal interpretation given.” (see reference containing GOV/2807 above for all above quotes.) Access to third party information was endorsed by the BOG, then, even though this measure was illegal with respect to 153-type safeguards. That it is incompatible is clear when the legal justification for it is considered. The IAEA justified access to third party information under paragraph 90 of the 153 safeguard agreement (see chart in Annex 1 of GOV/2863). This is a bad joke, since nothing in paragraph 90 can be construed as relating to third party information, unless you have brain damage.
When the IAEA used third party information in early 1993 against North Korea, it was 2 and a half years before the practice gained any form of legality. Therefore, even an international lawyer who felt that the DPRK should have agreed to the special inspection in spite of the use of third party information had to admit that the IAEA “breached its safeguards agreement with North Korea by using third party intelligence without Pyongyang’s prior agreement.” (Susan Carmody, “Balancing Collective Security and National Sovereignty: Does the United Nations Have the Right to Inspect North Korea’s Nuclear Facilities?” Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 18, 1994.)
The second reason the IAEA action was a breach of the safeguards agreement relates to the fact that the IAEA wanted access to the buildings in Nyongbyon to search for evidence of an undeclared weapons program. There is absolutely nothing in 153-type safeguards agreements that allows for measures to detect undeclared programs. Paragraph 1 of the safeguards agreement states that safeguards will be applied to all “fissionable material” in all “peaceful activities,” for the purpose of verifying that “such material is not diverted.” That’s it. The “exclusive” purpose of safeguards is to ensure that nuclear material being used in peaceful activities is not diverted to nuclear weapons. There is no provision to look for undeclared activities in 153-type safeguards agreements. (“The Agency cannot safeguard materials which have not been declared, or which cannot be found. It cannot become an espionage agency.” Lyn Parker, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4, “International Safeguards Against the Diversion of Nuclear Materials to Non-Peaceful Uses,” Oct. 1978, p.722)
Above, it was mentioned how deceptive language was used to make it appear to some that a new agreement had been reached regarding special inspections (“the Board…reaffirmed the Agency’s rights to undertake special inspections…”). Similar deceptive language was used in the DG press release of 26 February 1992 (see ref above) in respect to allowing access to undeclared sights during a special inspection, even though there was no decision by the Board to do so. That these Board statements reflected no change in Agency’s rights was recognized by some. A West European IAEA ambassador, for example, remarked that “we had expectations and now we are rolling back to something which amounts to very little,” and a different Western delegate said the statement was little more than “a gesture to demonstrate that the board is doing something.” (The Independent, “Atomic agency told to tighten controls,” 25 February 1992 by Micahel Wise). In reality, nothing was said at this meeting.
It was not until the additional protocol was approved by the BOG in May of 1997 that it became legal to search undeclared facilities. Lawyers state the fact repeatedly: “Until the adoption of the Additional Protocol in 1997, the IAEA did not have the authority to inspect undeclared facilities.” (Natasha Bajema and Mary Beth Nikitin, “The Future of International Regimes: Organizations and Practices: Assessing Nuclear Maturity: Determining Which States Should Have Access to What Nuclear Technology,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Volume 28, Summer, 2004). A similar statement: “[The Additional Protocol] expanded the IAEA's authority to detect undeclared enrichment and reprocessing activities in a state.” (David S. Jonas, “The New US Approach to the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty: Will Deletion of a Verification Regime Provide a Way Out of the Wilderness?” Florida Journal of International Law, Volume 18, August, 2006.) Nevertheless, the IAEA tried to claim in the DPRK case that it did have the right to inspect these two undeclared facilities. According to the Vienna Convention on Treaties, any ambiguities in a treaty can be resolved by looking at the negotiating history of the treaty, so let’s do that. Mohammed Shaker was a member of the Egyptian delegation to the Eighteen Member Disarmament Committee during the NPT negotiations. He states very clearly in his 3-volume treatise on the NPT negotiating history that “the NPT safeguards are not intended to detect hidden nuclear weapons or clandestine production of such weapons.” (Shaker, “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation 1959 to 1979,” Volume 2, p.710.) William C. Foster was the principal negotiator for the US. In a hearing before the Senate, Foster was asked to explain the NPT. In that hearing, Senator Claiborne Pell asked Foster: “will the [IAEA] inspection be restricted only to the declared peaceful nuclear facilities or will they also apply to the undeclared or clandestine facilities?” Mr. Foster replied: “The IAEA inspection would only be as to declared.” (Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Congress, 2nd session, “Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons”.) This issue simply cannot be more clear. The IAEA breached the safeguards treaty by asking to inspect these buildings over 4 years before it was legal to do anything remotely close to this. Actually, even under the additional protocol, searching undeclared facilities is limited to performing “location-specific environmental sampling” (see article 5.c of INFCIRC/540),which involves taking air, water, vegetation, soil or smear samples and analyzing them for radioactivity. Even if the DPRK had travelled forward in time and signed the Additional Protocol, the demand to search buildings in an undeclared location would still be illegal. This type of search can only be performed if the state voluntarily agrees to it.
The IAEA, then, breached the safeguards agreement with the DPRK in at least two ways.
62) David Sloss, “I’s Not Broken, So Don’t Fix It: The International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards System and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” Virginia Journal of International Law, Summer, 1995, 35 Va. J. Int’l L.
63) A summary of events is included in INFCIRC/419: fas.org/news/un/dprk/inf419.html
64) GOV/2636: fas.org/news/un/dprk/inf419.html#annex3
65) fas.org/news/un/dprk/inf419.html#annex7
66) GOV/2639: fas.org/news/un/dprk/inf419.html#annex10
67) GOV/2643, March 30, 1993, Paragraph 11
68) GOV/2643, paragraph 12
69) GOV/2645: securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Iran%20GOV2645.pdf
70) The Washington Times, “N. Korean Retaliation Feared Over Sanctions,” November 2, 1993 by Michael Breen
71) A/RES/48/14, November 1, 1993: un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r014.htm
72) GOV/2003/40: iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf
73) GOV/2003/63: iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-63.pdf
74) GOV/2003/69: iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-69.pdf
75) GOV/2636: fas.org/news/un/dprk/inf419.html#annex3
76) Paragraph 50 of GOV/2003/75:
iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf
For more detail of the positive actions taken by Iran, see section b(4) of Annex 2 (page 34) titled “Statements of Non-Aligned Movements” in INFCIRC/657: iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc657.pdf
And see also the Chronology in Section B of GOV/2003/75
77) GOV/2003/81: iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-81.pdf

Yes, go ahead and make your inane comments. I am sure that is all you are capable of. But when pulsar182 makes a comment that makes it appear that what the IAEA has done to Iran is legal, I will respond. Obviously, I have shown his statements to be unsupportable. Out of the IAEA, the US, and Iran, only one party has not violated the NPT. That is Iran. Go ahead and support your bombings, but please do so out of ignorance and stupidity. Please do not try to pretend it is legal, or moral.

"It has less to do with the IAEA and more to do with U.N. Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803 etc."

Maybe you can't read. The referral to the Security Council was illegal. Iran has no obligation to listen to a illegal order.

Pulsar,

Iran is in complete compliance. That is what Dave proved.

What you and others fear is not actionable unless a clear violation is noted. It has not been noted.

Every nation signatory to the NPT that is in compliance and not violation has the right to do what Iran is doing. Period.

Peace
Abdullah

"It has less to do with the IAEA and more to do with U.N. Resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803 etc."

Maybe you can't read. The referral to the Security Council was illegal. Iran has no obligation to listen to a illegal order.

"why did they comply, albeit in an incomplete and fabricated form?"

Good faith. Eventually, their good faith wore out, now they will do nothing above the letter of the law until the IAEA also starts acting in good faith.

"Iran has no right to develop nuclear arms."
You are correct. And they are not.

All dave742s hastily cut-and-pasted pages of pointless information prove is that the IAEA is utterly toothless and has no legal or moral credibility in the international arena.

It is hopelessly compromised, not least because its head, Mohamed al-Bareidi failed to publicise knowledge of Iran's nuclear activities for several years, most likely because he's sympathetic to Iran's aims.
It has no authority, merely the ability to submit reports to the UN General Assembly and Security Council, the latter of which is the only authority that can (and should) act when there are clear violations of the provisions and principles of the NPT that state that it is NOT in the interests of global security for states to be surreptitiously building nuclear facilities and lying through their teeth about it. Particularly at the same time as parroting bellicose rhetoric about what they want to do to their enemies, when all the stable democracies of the world are making concerted efforts to scale back their nuclear capabilities.

No matter how you muslims try to dress it up, there is no way Iran is simply trying to gain nuclear power for peaceful energy purposes, and if it gains weapons, then we are all (especially its immediate muslim neighbours) at a far greater risk than we are with any of the other countries who currently possess nukes and - surprise - haven't felt the need to use them. The sooner you accept this, and I appreciate it must be a bitter pill to swallow, but the cleaner your consciences will be.

Your projection bias is pathetic...I hold nothing against Jewish people.

Your problems and your hangups are your own...not mine.

I only have and take issue with Orientalist knuckle dragging religious bigots...that and agressive occupation forces...any occupation forces...that is the root to all modern conflict...period.

Honorable people deserve respect and have it from me...they know me and I know them...we work together to establish and further peace.

Peace
Abdullah

"why did they comply, albeit in an incomplete and fabricated form?"

Good faith. Eventually, their good faith wore out, now they will do nothing above the letter of the law until the IAEA also starts acting in good faith.

"Iran has no right to develop nuclear arms."
You are correct. And they are not.

Dave742: Good faith. Eventually, their good faith wore out, now they will do nothing above the letter of the law until the IAEA also starts acting in good faith.

I really admire the glib way lies come to you. The indicators regarding the centrifuges and other devices that Iran are hiding have no civilian use. Given this obvious fact how would you proceed? Wait until a sworn enemy (Iran's statement) has what they need in place or stop it before it can start?

Me: "Iran has no right to develop nuclear arms."
Dave742: You are correct. And they are not.

Only the most deluded of people who say they are NOT trying to build a nuclear bomb. There has been an active spy (codenamed 'Sinbad') who passed information to the BND including pictures of tunnel drilling machines, details of secret deposits, and new documents about progress in developing delivery systems technology for nuclear warheads.

The Iranians have been caught out and now stand accused on the International stage.

They, like all moslems, underestimate the kufr and overestimate the power allah can exert. As allah is a figment of a psychotic, child molesting, opportunistic desert bandit from the 7th century I doubt he'll be helping any time soon.

In case you're in any way confused, Dave and AM, I am calling you both liars. You represent your cult well.

And today fools are legion.