In FrontPage this morning I discuss the recent increase of aid to Pakistan:
Last Thursday the Senate voted to triple the amount of non-military aid to Pakistan to $1.5 billion annually. The money is supposed to go to build democracy and aid anti-terror efforts. “We should make clear to the people of Pakistan,” explained Senator Richard Lugar, “that our interests are focused on democracy, pluralism, stability, and the fight against terrorism. If Pakistan is to break its debilitating cycle of instability, it will need to achieve progress on fighting corruption, delivering government services, and promoting broad based economic growth.”
This all sounds great, until one looks at the post-9/11 record of dealings between the United States and Pakistan. Last September, the New York Times reported that “after the attacks of Sept. 11, President Pervez Musharraf threw his lot in with the United States. Pakistan has helped track down Al Qaeda suspects, launched a series of attacks against militants inside the tribal areas — a new offensive got under way just weeks ago — and given many assurances of devotion to the antiterrorist cause. For such efforts, Musharraf and the Pakistani government have been paid handsomely, receiving more than $10 billion in American money since 2001.” However, “the survival of Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders has depended on a double game: assuring the United States that they were vigorously repressing Islamic militants — and in some cases actually doing so — while simultaneously tolerating and assisting the same militants.”
What has changed in Pakistan since then? Not much. Musharraf is gone, but much of the rest of the Pakistani leadership is the same, and above all, the core attitudes that led to the double game being conducted in the first place have not changed. One fundamental assumption that all too many Pakistani officials hold is that when something goes wrong with society, it is because the people have faltered in their fidelity to Islam, and only renewed religious fervor can solve the problem and restore prosperity to the nation and health to the society. This assumption militates against the idea that any amount of American aid will significantly alter the situation in Pakistan, or lessen popular support for the Islamic jihad of the Taliban and allied groups. For the Americans will always, no matter how much money they lavish upon the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, be infidels. The solution to Pakistan’s problems will not be seen as lying with them, but with a renewed commitment to Islam….