A few days ago - on February 3 - this news item appeared:
TAMPA, Florida (Reuters) - A military strike on Iran could have the unintended consequence of stirring nationalist sentiment to the benefit of Tehran's hard-line government, U.S. General David Petraeus told Reuters...."It's possible (a strike) could be used to play to nationalist tendencies," Petraeus, head of the U.S. Central Command region, which includes Iran, said in an interview this week.
"There is certainly a history, in other countries, of fairly autocratic regimes almost creating incidents that inflame nationalist sentiment. So that could be among the many different, second, third, or even fourth order effects (of a strike)."
Now there are many in the American government who will do, who are doing, what they can to avoid facing up to their responsibility to deal - forcefully, and at long last - with the nuclear project of not Iran, but the Islamic Republic of Iran. They have various ways of preventing action.
One of those ways was the report by some C.I.A. analysts, one of whose conclusions were made still more malevolently misleading by the misinterpretation of what they said, who claimed that the Iranians had stopped work on their nuclear project. In fact, the stopping of that work, if it took place at all, only took place for a very short time just after the invasion of Iraq, when all bets were off as to what those crazy Americans might do next. That report has been shredded this way and that, not least by governments in Europe - such as those of France and Great Britain - whose security services may be better informed, through human intelligence, than those of the Americans. And of course the Israelis, who may be the best informed of all, never accepted the conclusion, not of "the C.I.A." but, rather, of a few "C.I.A. analysts." These are different things.
That's argument number one, which no one can conceivably believe now: that the Islamic Republic of Iran has stopped working on its nuclear project, and there are no signs of its having re-started. Utter nonsense, and seen now as utter nonsense - but time has passed for that "seeing now as utter nonsense" to be widely shared, and in that time, the centrifuges whirr, the scientists confabulate, and the nuclear project marches on in Iran.
The second argument against action is that favored by Secretary Gates. It goes like this: we can't possibly destroy completely Iran's nuclear project, and they will simply start up again what we did manage to destroy, so all we are buying is a few years. And therefore, it's just not worth it.
Let's take that remark, phrase by phrase. First of all, it is instinct with defeatism: we can't "possibly destroy the nuclear project." Is he so sure? How does he know? Does he know exactly where everything is located, and what are the key components, and what are not? Does he know what targets are supposedly not to be hit - are there some? - because "too many civilians" (how many, exactly?) would be hurt?
And when he says that the Iran government would simply start up again, on what basis is this assertion made? When Israel bombed the Osiraq Reactor in 1981, did Saddam Hussein set right to work to rebuild his nuclear project, or was he discouraged and disheartened? Did he not, in fact, abandon the effort for twenty full years, though he was as ruthless and aggressive as a Middle East Muslim ruler could be? Might not the fact of a Western power's willingness to attack have the effect of demonstrating to the Islamic Republic of Iran that further attacks are perfectly possible? And aren't they possible? Is the United States, is Israel, is any combination of Western powers, allowed exactly one attack and then never ever again to try anything further? And what would you be thinking, if you were in the government of the Islamic Republic? Might you be asking yourself if it is worth it, does it make sense, to try to rebuild the program?
The program itself was always based on the assumption that the Iranians, through their natural guile, would be able to bob and weave and make offers and take back offers, and threaten that the gates of hell would open and in the next sentence offer to show everything and to comply with this and with that. And through all of this blague - so solemnly analyzed in the media and the chanceries of the Western world - the Islamic Republic of Iran kept steadily on, building, building, building what it needed to make, in the end, its bombs and also, don't forget, the missiles to deliver them far and then still farther.
No, the C.I.A. analysts were wrong, and are now, by general agreement, understood to have been wrong in their facts, wrong in their analysis, and tendentious in their conclusions.
The Gatesian insistence that any attack will be useless because it will not completely succeed, is wrong in this case. There is no evidence to support it, but mere supposition, based on a deep unwillingness to plan for, and then execute, such an attack. It's merely a case of appeasement being made palatable - palatable in the first place to those who have decided that if "sanctions" do not work, then the only other course is...acceptance of this fantastic development, a development that cannot be allowed, but that is, apparently, going to be allowed.
We have only to look at Pakistan, which like Iran smiled and lied, and promised, as it steadily worked away, basing its efforts on the plans stolen from Western labs by that light-fingered metallurgist, A. Q. Khan (wrongly described as a "nuclear scientist"). Why are we not able to suppress the Taliban? Oh, because of the aid and comfort and refuge offered by Pakistan, which after all was the father of the Taliban; it was in Pakistan that the Taliban was born, and nurtured, and raised up, and then escorted back into Afghanistan by Pakistanis, civilian and military. It was Pakistan that provided diplomatic and other forms of support for the Taliban, and would have continued to do so without any reservations had not the Americans suddenly shown, in the fall of 2001, that they weren't going to tolerate the Taliban anymore. And the government of Pakistan will pretend to fight the Taliban in some places, and in other places really will fight it if the interests of the Pakistani military and of the zamindars are threatened - as in the Swat Valley. But it does not intend to cut off the places of refuge for the Afghan Taliban, and will try to limit the attacks of American forces on the Taliban in Pakistan.
But the Americans don't dare, apparently, to get tough with Pakistan. Oh, they go out to Karachi and Islamabad. They express, with the decibels possibly mounting, their "displeasure" and their "unhappiness." Then the Pakistanis give the Americans an earful about how "you abandoned us twenty years ago" (utter nonsense). And the Americans, or at least Secretary Gates, forgetting what the Pakistani government actually did in those twenty years (with the Taliban, and with its nuclear project), apparently accepts this uncritically and vows publicly that "we will not abandon you again," when he should be handing them a list of the past half-century of American aid, of all kinds, to Pakistan, and an accompanying list of all the ways that Pakistan has repeatedly deceived and betrayed America, and then turn on his heels, metaphorically, and not stay for an answer.
Why are we worried about offending Pakistan, which will have to be offended if American goals in Afghanistan are to be met? Because Pakistan has nuclear weapons. It was allowed, through American and other Western negligence, to acquire the knowhow, and to be funded with foreign aid that provided the freeing-up of the billions necessary to build those bombs. And that is why the Americans think they have to keep the government and above all the military in Pakistan semi-satisfied, have to keep Pakistan from sinking to its natural level, have to keep it all afloat - for how long? Forever? - with American billions and American solicitousness. All because Pakistan, you see, now has nuclear weapons, and we don't know what might happen to those weapons if the government of Pakistan collapses, and it becomes - that fashionable and not very helpful phrase - a "failed state."
Surely the experience with Pakistan should be so deeply engraved in the minds of American policymakers that they should wish never to have that experience repeated. But here they are, making excuses for not taking action against a regime that, if anything, is ten times more malevolent than the regime in Islamabad, and far more unstable. Iran's variant of Islam is Twelver-Shi'ism, with the Hidden Imam soon to appear, and all of that. Need we go into it? Isn't it enough to call it millenarian, or chiliastic, or use one of those other big words that means they actually look forward to hastening the return of the Hidden Mahdi by bringing death and chaos and destruction everywhere? And is it impossible for rational Western man to understand one simple thing, that some people in this world, believe it or not, are not Western rational men? Cf. Adolf Hitler -- who if he could have, would have allowed the total destruction of Germany, would have brought the whole thing crashing down, and so would those raised up under Nazi rule who were the true-blue fanatics and last-ditch defenders of the regime. A sane foreign policy requires an understanding that not everyone does a cost-benefit analysis. Not everyone in the world is, as the American government now is, Marxist - that is, believing that economic well-being, or the desire for economic well-being, in the end determines human actions. Not in Tehran it doesn't. And not with some others - why, do you know there are people who are right now going around the world blowing themselves up, and considering themselves to be acting in their own self-interest by doing so? Not something that Marx, or Engels, or that other Marxist outpost, the editorial page of the New York Times, would grasp. But we who do not believe that everything in the world is mere epiphenomenon, and economics underlies it all, can better grasp the nature of what Eric Hoffer famously analyzed as "The True Believer."
Now let's go back to General Petraeus. Let's refresh our memories. In Tampa on February 3, he said that a military strike on Iran could have unintended consequences. When you say something could have unintended consequences, who could disagree? Of course, an attack on Iran's nuclear project would be used by the regime to try to obtain support. But I will now claim just the opposite: that the only way to weaken the Islamic Republic of Iran, the monstrous regime that is not going to fall, despite all the hoopla of just a month or two ago, is through an attack on the cherished nuclear project. Now on what basis do I make that claim?
First, the sentimental belief that lots of demonstrators on the streets of Teheran meant that the regime would surely fall is a product of media hype, of deep desire that grades into belief. I don't think that there are many inside Iran today who think that the fall of the regime will come soon, and I think there are those (Abbas Kierostami, for example) who do not think the regime will fall at all, because these, the most worldly of the dissidents, who have seen the world, do not confuse media coverage with the real balance of power in Iran. And if today it's the dissidents in Iran, then the next day it's Haiti, and after Haiti, it's something else. The media are fickle, and the regime in Iran knows that if it behaves with sufficient ruthlessness, it can continue to stand, and to execute, and murder informally as well. It is not soft, not as soft as the Shah's regime was in 1978, when Khomeini's minions started to act up, aided naively by the secular and leftist opposition. We should not confuse what we think should happen with what will happen.
And those who talk of how an attack on the nuclear project might lead to a rally-round-the-flag moment should ask themselves how long that moment will last, and how widespread will be? Will not the humiliation of the regime, its chief geopolitical project now lying in expensive ruin, not in the end weaken it in the eyes of everyone inside Iran? What happened when Nasser lost the Six-Day War? Did everyone rally round him, beyond the first week or first month? He was broken. It was the end of his swagger and swank, the end of all that grandiose nonsense. What about Idi Amin after the Israeli attack at Entebbe? Oh, he went on, for another few years, with more of his bemedalled fantasies, making himself the King of this and the Emperor of that. But essentially, that event on July 4, 1976, showed that he could be dealt with, and severely, by the application of military force from a real power, and he did not recover. How about the attack on the Osiraq Reactor? Did all those Kurds and Shi'a who hated Saddam Hussein now rally round him? Oh, I'm sure there were declarations all over the place about Zionist perfidy, and warnings of the terrible retribution that would still be coming, but what happened? No more nuclear project for the next two decades. Imagine if Israel had not attacked, and that Iraq had acquired nuclear weapons, and then - then - marched on Kuwait.
Of course no Iranian dissident, inside Iran certainly, and very likely outside Iran, will openly state that he wishes to see an attack on Iran's nuclear project. Why open yourself to charges that you are a "traitor" to Iran, a traitor to Iranian nationalism, if not to the regime? Iranians, we are told, are famously proud and nationalistic - and we want them to be nationalistic, because Iranian nationalism is certainly a force that works against Islam, if Islam is properly perceived as a vehicle of Arab supremacism. Some may have difficulty recognizing what you and I can see more easily, which is that Iran cannot have nuclear weapons under this regime, or under any regime. Why? Well, in the 1970s Henry Kissinger talked of giving nuclear technology to the Shah. Imagine that the Shah had acquired it, and Iran had had a nuclear arsenal when Khomeini came to power. It might have happened. The American government, being led by a hopeless Carter and a hapless Brzezinski and a quasi-apologist for the new order in Iran, one Gary Sick, would not have recognized Khomeini - did not recognize him - as a problem sufficient to require American intervention to seize such nuclear weapons. And the same thing remains true today. Even if this regime were to fall, and were replaced, say, by a mild-mannered monarchy, with the son of the Shah on the throne and a parliamentary democracy that harkened back to the 1906 Constitution, there would still be the problem of the primitive masses in Iran who do not read Aziz Nafisi, do not watch the films of Kierostami, and for whom Islam is everything. And they will always outnumber the advanced Iranians, and if a Khomeini can replace the Shah, and a Khomenist regime possibly be replaced by the son of the Shah, then the son of the Shah, we also know, could be replaced by a metaphorical "son of Khomeini." So while Iran may be encouraged to have nuclear power plants, with Western aid and Western supervision, it cannot be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons.
When General Petraeus says that some regimes have been known to manufacture incidents so as to encourage nationalism, he may be thinking of such things as the Reichstag Fire that the Nazis caused themselves. But while that fire allowed them to instigate still harsher measures of suppression of dissidents, it did not cause any anti-Nazis within Germany to rally to the Nazi banner. When the Germans manufactured an incident at the Polish border, with German troops dressed as Polish soldiers attacking a German radio-station, in order to "justify" the invasion of Poland, there was no change on the part of anti-Nazi Germans anywhere; they remained adamantly anti-Nazi.
The evidence suggests that it is the attainment of nuclear weapons that will cause the Islamic Republic of Iran to be able to suppress the movement for its overthrow. It will be able to show to the Iranian masses: Look what we achieved. The whole world tried to stop us, and we fooled them, we prevented them, we scared them, we tricked them, we delayed them, we did this and we did that. And now Iran is a Nuclear Power. Look on our greatness. Look on your greatness. Look at Iran's greatness. There are tens of millions of people, all over Iran, who will respond to that. These are the people whose sons join the Revolutionary Guards, and go into the army. There are many of them.
But if that project lies in ruins, or partial ruin, and if the regime has nothing to show for it all, all those sanctions, all that economic misery, all those billions and all that human effort spent or squandered on that nuclear project, just how long will the regime last? How long will those in Iran, including the primitive masses, be impressed by the choices made by the regime and those who rule?
General Petraeus is an intelligent man, and he surely is willing to look at history. He should do so. He may be the one who can overcome those who belong to the camp of appeasement, disguised as a plausible realism - the Gatesian "they'll just build it all up again" - if only he would take the time to sit, and think not only about everything under Central Command, but about the entire world. For it is the entire world that faces the menace of Islam, and the many different kinds of weapons that the adherents of Islam use as their instruments of Jihad. He may be able to figure it out. Just.
I don't doubt that a strike would kindle a nationalistic response inside Iran, but it would also inspire and embolden some of the regime's opponents.
It was reported after WWII that Allied bombing of German cities steeled the resolve of the German populace, rather than demoralized them. While the preferred demoralization didn't occur, in fact if indeed the opposite occurred, SO WHAT???? Should we have limited our actions to leafleting or dropping candies? HELL NO - they needed to be sent back to the stone age and thank God we had the political will to do it. What will it take to get our will up in this case - a first strike by Iran??
ACtually, it was always assumed that the bombing of German cities did not break morale. But recent studies of the effects of Bomber Harris's campaign suggest the opposite: that those bombing raids did break German morale. And certainly the bombs away over Hiroshima and Nagasaki are what caused the Japanese to surrender, thereby saving the million lives that were expected to be involved in the alternative, had Japan not unconditionally surrendered: an American invasion of the home islands.
I argue that one has to consider the effect on the Iranian population not only of a short bombing (not "invasion") of nuclear sites, with some, but not very much, civilian casualties, as compared to the position of the regime that now rules Iran, and tortures and torments so many, if that regime manages to acquire nuclear weapons in the face of near-universal opposition, and near-universal pusillanimity and confusion as well.
I agree bombing the Iranian facilities might strengthen nationalistic sentiment and give the regime a boost- in the short term. However, if we include their domestic security forces in the bombing campaign, and weaken their ability to suppress the "resistance movement", we open a window of opportunity for the protesters to act and perhaps overthrow the unpopular Islamic goverment.
A military strike on Iran could have the unintended consequence of stirring nationalist sentiment to the benefit of Tehran's hard-line government
True but in normal nations.
In dictatorships though, military defeat is the worst thing that can happen. A military defeat, could just as easily rally the nation against the mullahs, as they would have been shown to be weak, unable to defend the nation. Being seen to be weak is the very worst thing that can happen to a dictatorial regime.
But there are other reasons why Iran has to be stopped.
1. If we do not then Israel will have to, with all that means in the ME.
2. The Sunni Arabs are worried stiff. If Iran acquires nukes, then the Saudis will buy several nukes, off the shelf from Pakistan. This will start a nuclear race in the ME - next stop Armageddon.
3. We are in a war, and our intervention "over there" is the only horse we have in the race.
This horse is the only one likely to bring home the bacon.
Instead of worrying about the “unexpected consequences” of destroying irans nuclear facilities, some of these military leaders under Obama should be worrying about the certain consequences of nuclear proliferation by islamic states such as iran. Any resulting scenario imaginable would guarantee the absolute decent for perpetuity into the irreversable loss of any sense of security for the Globe but especial for the West, including our very families and our children. It would be a game changer, a new world paradigm, the beginning of the end, and this is description is bland to the actual future we will be destined to face.
To chance this from happening versus the option of targeting nuclear and offensive weapons in iran is totally insane. Petraus should start exercising less his legs and begin stretching his mind a little bit more. Unfortunately as a good soldier he remains loyal to the commander in chief, Barak Hussain, who has demonstrated many times before a greater sympathy towards the enemy than that America who’s pastor dammed over and over again.
If you think the current admin is going to do anything against Iran to stop their nuke program then you probably think that the program is for peaceful purposes. It's sad to say but the world never learns and we will unfortunatley only deal with this when the stakes and losses will be much higher. People are essentially (at least in this country) bleeding-heart fools and I'm hard pressed to find a time in history when it was any more evident than today. It's only a matter of time before the lid flies off this pressure cooker.
If we are going to carry out airstrikes on iran, it shouldn’t be on their nuclear plants. At first.
Using our navy, air force and missiles [maybe even a few of our allies] we should start by taking out irans military bases and command and control [radar, communications etc.]. Our navy and air force are more than capable of carrying out those strikes at the same time. We should also go after their government; with the technology we have it wouldn’t be that hard to know where they are at and target them. Then after irans government and military are destroyed [and I do mean destroyed, no half measures] then we can go after the nuclear targets if we choose to.
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Hugh,
I have to admit I have not once posted here despite being a quite a avid follower of yours, Robert's, and the other author's excellent articles. Most likely that refrain is due to the fact I almost always agree with everything stated. However to my surprise I found something I did not agree with. My disagreement is with the tactic of using a military strike to take out Iran's nuclear sites. A few years ago I would have said yes but after the rise of the Green Movement I would have to say no.
It is now my firm belief that the best long term strategy lies in supporting the Green Movement to effect regime change. Some may think this is naive but I would ask them to take into consideration the following points:
1) The current regime while still controlling the agents of force is in quite a precarious situation
2) The majority of the Iranian population is under the age of 35 and almost all do not share the apocalyptic vision of the regime
3) The Green Movement itself has taken on a nationalistic hue often at time causing issues with its leaders because of their desire to separate religion from the state
4) The economy is in shambles
5) Mark Hibbs, whom I believe you’re aware of, has stated recently Iran's lack of progress is most likely due to the fact they lack the expertise and technology to finish the job
6) The overwhelming majority of the clergy are actually in favor of the people not the regime
7) The regime is having to implement vast purges in the Pasdaran, Basiji, Gov't, IRIB/Media, and the educational establishment because so many have come out in support of the people
8) The simple fact the majority of Iranians wants this regime gone
When you take this all into context you have to ask yourself what long term strategy would a military strike serve? At best it will be a delay and hopefully it won't lead to a resurgence of popularity for the regime. At worst it would invigorate the regime, give them the pretext to brutally eliminate the Green Movement, allow the regime to ultimately hold onto power once again, and the nuclear issue while delayed will only crop up again. While I believe were picking our poison with whomever is in power I would have to believe the priority of the reform movement is the people's rights not nuclear weapons at this time.
In summary I can best sum this up with a quote from my best friend’s mom who is here from Tehran "Don't they get it? The regime wants a strike or nasty sanctions because it is what they need to stay in power!" Appreciate your thoughts and if want some good analysis on the situation in Iran visit www.enduringamerica.com.
Thx
Bill
Winston Churchill The Second World War Volume III:
…Governments & peoples do not always take rational decisions. Sometimes they take mad decisions, or one set of people get control who compel all others to obey & aid them in folly…However sincerely we try to put ourselves in another person’s situation, we cannot allow for processes of the human mind & imagination to which reason offers no key.
Madness is however an affliction which in war carries with it the advantage of SURPRISE.
I very much doubt Petraeus' projection.
I don't recall reading about a sudden resurgence of Japanese patriotism and will to fight after we incinerated HIroshima and Nagasaki.
In any case, a sense of national identity would be a positive thing in Persia if it could be arranged. In fact, if we could knock out the nukes and inspire national feeling among the Persians we would be killing two birds with one stone, a double win.
The fact is that we have a serious problem with the super-national appeal of jihaddism.
The "ummah" encompasses and supersedes nationality and the national welfare in the mohammedan mind, and this notion supports their general disregard for material well being.
It would work very much in our favor for people who cared about the well being of the Persian nation to be in charge of Persia, rather than the suicidal other-worldly nuts that are running the place now.
The problem, I submit, to those who, like Bill above, think we must do nothing that will interfere with the onward and presumably inexorable march of the Iranian dissidents, is that that inexorable march may be quite a Long March, may take quite a bit of time, and furthermore, I am not nearly as sanguine as some of those he refers to.
I cannot accept, without much more evidence, the following asserionts:
1) that "[t]he overwhelming majority of the clergy are actually in favor of the people not the regime
2) that the "regime is having to implement vast purges in the Pasdaran, Basiji, Gov't, IRIB/Media, and the educational establishment because so many have come out in support of the people"
3) that "simple fact the majority of Iranians wants this regime gone"
Some of the most worldly people in Iran, those who wish the regime gone, do not share the view that will soon be overthrown, or collapse, without some sharp blow from outside, but for obvious reasons I can't name them.
We tend to think that Right Will Triumph, and that it will do on a time-table of our making or at least wishing.
We can't wait, we can't take the chance, that the regime will fall in a few months or within the year. The nuclear project is proceeding at full speed.
I repeat: if the Iranians acquire nuclear weapons, and perhaps prove to the world they have them by "testing" one in the Iranian desert, then what? Are you so sure those whom you call "the people" of Iran will still stand against the regime? I think there are plenty of those among "the people" in Iran who are as hopelessly primitive as one can imagine, and who will be thrilled by such a display, and they outnumber, I'm afraid, the Iranians we all think of as swell people, though some of that swellness may, up close, begin to show that our assumptions may need re-thinking.
I wrote at another site about Iran's nuclear project and found that one well-known Iranian dissident in this country, Amil Imani, took issue with me. You may find his remarks of interest, and even, possibly, the article by me that provoked his dissent.
The link is here:
http://www.newenglishreview.org/custpage.cfm/frm/54592/sec_id/54592
Amil Imani’s comments are at the bottom.
Of most interest to me is his insistence that Iranians, even dissidents, are so nationalistic that they, too, will rally around the Islamic Republic of Iran if its nuclear project is attacked.
Here’s what he wrote:
“You have no understanding or appreciation of the Shia's sense of martyrdom that can cause a huge problem for Israel, the U.S. the gulf states and the world. Even those Iranians who are not Muslims are fierce nationalists and devotees of the rallying cry -- cho Iran nabashad tane man naba--without Iran, I prefer to be dead--Tens and hundreds of thousands will rally around the Mullahs and volunteer for mass suicide and bombing missions. They will take the Middle East down with them as they go down themselves. They will destroy or severely damage all the oil facilities in the Gulf area, not caring what happens to their own life and livelihood.”
If “even those Iranians who are not Muslims are fierce nainotalists and devotees of the rallying cry – cho Iran nabashad tane man naba…” and “tens and hundreds of thousands will rally around the Mullahs and volunteer for mass suicide and bombing missions” then I suggest that is not an argument against an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities but, rather, suggests just how important such an attack may be. Remember, that if the Shah had, with American help (Kissinger was ready to extend such help) acquired nuclear weapons, those weapons would then have fallen into the hands of Khomeini, with consequences you can think about. And as I noted previously, if the Shah of Iran’s son can follow the spiritual “sons” of Khomeini, and be the ruler of an Iran with nuclear weapons, why can’t, in the whirligig of time, the Shah of Iran’s son be followed by a spiritual “son” or “grandson” of Khomeini” who will then inherit those weapons? I regret to say that no Muslim country, including Iran, can be allowed under any regime to acquire nuclear weapons, because Islam is a permanent presence, force, and menace to Infidels. That may be difficult for Iranian “nationalists” – the kind who would rally “round the Mullahs” – to hear, might outrage them, but it is a truth that has to be understood, in the West, and in Iran, among the nicest possible dissidents.
Amil Imani never refused a statement of mine, but did concentrate on what he saw as my dangerously seductive rhetorical powers.
He wrote as part of his comment on that piece:
“You are, admittedly, very articulate and persuasive. You are equally a most dangerous and short-sighted man. I fervently hope that no one falls for your dangerously deadly advocacy. Got to give the sanctions a chance. I still firmly believe that following this person's advice is a sure way to ignite a fire that can potentially set a chain reaction of scorching, if not consuming, the region and even the world.”
“Got to give the sanctions a chance” – how long, exactly? Another year? We don’t have a year.
I remain convinced that the American government must assume its responsibilities as a world power and attack the nuclear facilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and I also remain convinced that after a short interval, that will lead inexorably to the downfall of that monstrous regime.
I think the General knows that a "strike" will not be the end of the matter and that Gates doesn't have the stomach for the reality of it's effects. While our president has no will to do anything what so ever.
As for Sanctions- well, the worked out really really well with Iraq now didn't they. The bribes, the blackmail, the black market. Even the lofty UN was unwilling to sanction action against their favorite henchman. How many of those rhetorical reprimands were there? 17 was it? Where Saddam was bad but don't worry about it. We have your back on a cash and carry basis.
A "strike" is just a part of a larger campaign.
Ironic isn't it? That Wilson and Roosevelt gave us the vehicle where Iran will win the moral high ground. We all know the UN will never sanction anything but sanctions.
We all know, the head honcho, loves his Useless Nations the perfect vehicle for inaction if ever there was one.
Hugh,
Thank you for the response. I did read your linked article and it provided some background that helped me understand your position better. I agree with the premise but am torn over the urgency of it. I am just not convinced the regime is in a position to make a weapon at this time for a myriad of reasons. The question then becomes what information do we have to make an educated decision.
While the information I provided looks promising it still is mostly unverifiable as you noted. In essence we are then running on "hope" that the issue will resolve itself not knowing all the facts. As we all know hope is not a strategy and ironically I almost always choose action over hope. This hope vs. action is my dilemma. What to do?
I simply believe the action to strike should be delayed to give the events time to unfold in Iran. For me the military option is not a year away but a just a five to six months. With this time we then give the reform movement a chance to affect a more permanent solution to the nuclear issue. While this is "hope" I believe it a high reward bet with little cost. This is not the Iran we saw a year ago but a dynamically changed one.
Thx
Bill
If we bomb and disable the facility, even temporarily, they get a short term boost in nationalism. If we don't, they get a long-temr boost in nationalism when they go nuclear. Gates & Patraeus know that we have an appeasement oriented Nevil Chamberlain in the White House and are acting accordingly. What a bunch of weak kneed moral cowards. I can hear the word, "Peace in our time..." ringing in the Pentagon now.
I would like to make two points.
First, I don't see to much sense in worrying about the possible negative reaction of the Iranian population. We have already tried to win the hearts and minds of the people of Iraq and Afganistan; it has only led to more uselessly shed American blood. They hate us now as much as they hated us before, which is exactly as much as the population of every Muslim country hates us, regardless of whether it is in the state of war with us or is listed among our allies. Let's just make ourselves safe and let them enjoy hating us for that. Keep in mind that the opponents of Ahmadinejad's regime are not necesserily our allies. They are Muslims, and Muslims will hate us no matter what — unless, of course, the entire history of Islam has so far been completely misinterpreted.
Second, striking the Iranian nuclear facilities cannot guarantee any serious success: some of them may be less vulnerable to conventional arms; Russia and China may be willing to help Iran rebuild after the strike; etc. I believe we should leave their nuclear facilities alone and destroy instead what cannot be rebuilt no matter what. I am talking about two types of targets: the leaders of the regime and the cultural treasures of the country. After all, if someone points a gun at you and you are armed, you don't try to shoot the gun or the hand that holds it: you go for the head or the center of mass, or, even better, both. Obliterating the blocks in Tehran where the high level government officials live, turning the "holy" city of Qum into a pile of smoking rubble, with a clear promise to repeat as needed, would most certainly turn Iran into a peaceful country. After that, it's going to be much easier for us to survive their hatred.
But what US administration is going to have the guts to do what's right?
PBS had a show last night on the WW2 bombing of Germany. There was much discussion about the immorality of it all. But interestingly, they gave the last word to a writer or historian who said in effect "For America and the Allies, the greatest immorality would have been to lose".
The bombing of German cities did work, did damage Nazi and German morale. The idea became accepted that those campaigns were ineffective, or even worked to strengthen German resolve, and thus Bomber Harris was to be condemned. But recent studies suggest the opposite -- that he, and Churchill who backed him to the hilt, were right to engage in bombing of German cities.
Agreed. I just thought it interesting that PBS conducted the usual moral "debate", then ended with a quote that unarguably justified it all. Please let me rephrase it for today: "For the West, the greatest immorality will be to lose". We should remember it.
There's one thing I'll take into consideration. The regime has the guns and millions of thugs who are only too willing to use them on the few who want change for the better. That makes the regime practically invulnerable to any opposition that might be lurking within Iran - not to mention the vicelike grip Islam has on that country. The mad ayatollahs have only to slander Jews and Israel to turn their opponents attention away from them, because their opponents have one overriding thing in common with their savage overlords - virulent antisemitism and infidel-hatred. If the Revolutionary Guards are like the SS, then the Basiji must be like the SA - inhuman, marauding criminally-minded thugs who beat up and murder opponents of the regime without pity and with extreme cruelty. The only way that regime can be toppled is by the use of superior firepower to destroy the Revolutionary Guards, the Basiji thugs, the murderlusting and misogynistic ayatollahs and Monkeyman himself, plus the forcible weaning off Islam.
Never underestimate the power of the Dark Side of Da Force. What does it matter if Iranians are "nationalistic"? After 30 years of carrying around them Destroy the Great Satan signs, who cares? Does Gen. Betrayus want to try the Neville Chamberlain act again, or does the U.S. have the balls to shut Iran's nuclear program down forever? See my site for my complete plan for winning the war on radical Islam. It doesn't rely on what backward Sharia-observing Iranian Shiites think. http://go.to/islamhistory
Speaking of the Neville Chamberlain act, see this NYT op-ed claiming that it would be good for the U.S. if Iran gets nukes because it will scare the Sunni nations into accepting our nuclear protective umbrella in exchange for giving up their autocratic govts., Schick Intution Plus, Free Your Skin?
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/opinion/09lowther.html
No Gas, No Navy, No Air Force, No Electricity, No Plumbing, No Leadership. Fewer worries.
Obama is Commander in Chief , there will be NO bombing. What's more , no one would DARE advise bombing to Obama, that would be a career killer. The Norwegians though could give the mullahs a Noble peace prize to coerce peaceful use of the technology. Obama could arrange that!