"With this nomination, our foreign policy again risks sending the message that it is better to be an intractable enemy than a cooperative, loyal US ally"

The only way to "engage" Syria is with a bayonet.

Achieving peace through talking is better than through war.

Achieving peace with the threat of war is better than with war too.

When Iraq was invaded to boost the ego of Blair and his less intelligent accomplice GW ("I am a War President") Bush, Iran wanted dialogue when it saw the few days it took to get to Baghdad.

The response of the stupid fools in power in America was to say "we don't negotiate with evil". I bet the same leaders don't see themselves as evil when they betray their wives and negotiate the clothing of their secretaries and interns... Or maybe they don't see the dividends from defense manufacturing investments as evil so want to see war and death because it is better for their bank balance. I'm sure they see providing a good education for their own children as good even if the money comes from sending their compatriot's children to die in foreign theaters of war.

It seems that as a result of not negotiating with evil we are set to have nuclear Iran and a consequence of millions of dead.

Sometimes negotiating with evil is a good idea because it may just avoid a much greater evil.

There is no need to woo in an attempt to win Syria. The sanctions are working well; the Syrians now have exactly three planes in their airline that work, and the last thing that should be done is to allow them to buy new ones, whether American or European with American parts. Besides, how does one know that what is bought by Syria will not go to Iran? In other words, if you want to have those "crippling sanctions" on Iran the sanctions also have to be on Syria which is Iran's only state ally (Hezbollah is a non-state ally).

The Americans keep overlooking the main thing, possibly the only thing to keep in mind, when it comes to Syria: it is an Alawite dictatorship. The Alawites, syncretistic (with a cult of Mary) as is not surprising given how long Christianity managed to hold on in Syria-Lebanon (and boosted by the protection, for a while, of the French), ended up as the masters of Syria because they formed a military caste, and from their use, by the French, as one of the units in the Troupes Speciales (there were also Armenians and Druse), and then their slow takeover of the officer corps, and then to political power with the seizure of that power by an Air Force officer, Hafez al-Assad, the Alawites have managed, though they constitute only 12% of the population, to rule Syria.

The Sunni Arabs would, if they only got the chance, slit their throats, and the Alawite generals know this. But so far they have gone along with the rash decision of Bashir Al-Assad to throw in his lot with Iran. It's a decision he will regret, because the Islamic Republic of Iran likely will not last, given its present behavior, and whatever follows it will be distinctly unfriendly to those who were friendly to the previous regime. But the Alawites know they cannot be recognized as full-fledged Muslims by the unforgiving Sunnis. A few years ago they sought, and obtained, a ruling from some Iranian Shi'a authority, declaring them to be true Muslims. That the Alawites felt the need for this ruling is telling. They are scared silly of the Ikhwan, and it's been nearly 30 years since Hafez Al-Assad brought the army into Homa to level the city, and kill, some say 20,000, some say more. The troops were told to shoot down instantly anyone who shouted "Allahu Akbar." This came after repeated attacks inside Syria, including the mowing down of an entire graduating class of Alawites from the military academy. These things are overlooked in Washington, where Syria becomes merely an ectoplasmic shape (to use J. B. Kelly's amusing phrase), discussed with great authority and solemnity by those who have little, sometimes no idea, of what explains the Alawite rise and might explain its fall, and why Alawite generals could be appealed to, behind the back, or over the head, of Bashir Al-Assad, to make sure that they understand several things:

1) the American government would like, if possible, to keep the Alawites in control of the Syrian Army because it is now understood that they, the Alawites, for their own reasons, protect the Christians in Iraq

2) the American government, however, will not be against an overthrow of the Alawites if they continue to ally themselves with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

3) Bashir al-Assad has lost all sense of what the Alawite position, and real interest, is -- that real interest is in staying alive, and to stay alive, they have to keep their power in the army.

4) the Alawite officers should think carefully about what would happen if the Iranian regime were so weakened that it might disappear, to be replaced by another regime far friendlier to the United States and far less friendly to Syria.

5) it has been nearly 30 years since the lesson was given to the Ikhwan. Lessons wear off. Sometimes they wear off in ten years, or twenty. Sometimes it takes as long as thirty -- more than a generation. But they do wear off.

6) Something to think about. Il faut reflechir.

"With this nomination, our foreign policy again risks sending the message that it is better to be an intractable enemy than a cooperative, loyal US ally"
............................

Actually, this dates back at least as far as Obama's bowing obsequiously to the Saudi tyrant, while having his wife give the Queen of England a patronizing pat on the shoulder.

It has played out in ways large and small ever since. Obama disparages American citizens, takes our democratic allies for granted, and does all he can to "reach out" to those who actively seek our destruction.

And are we getting anything in return from Syria for this olive branch? This is one of the problems--we make concessions without expecting anything back upfront. We gave up missile shields in Eastern Europe without getting Russian commitment for sanctions against Iran.

It's not "bilateral" if one party is giving away all its leverage with nothing in return. It's what I would call unilateralism in drag.

The only reason anyone is able to 'negotiate' with Syria is because the Israelis 'negotiated' not so very long ago, by turning Syria's incipient nuclear project into a smoking hole in the ground.

And since we're discussing Syria, a memo to Israel: *no matter what*, do not surrender the military high ground.

The Golan Heights - if I recall correctly, the toponym, 'Golan', is Hebrew - are part of the traditional ancestral land of Israel, territory of the tribe of Dan.

They are also military high ground.

They *must* remain under Israel's control. They are non-negotiable.

Syria wants them, but Syria should be told No, No, and again, No.