The dhimmis: guilty people

When Islamic apologists insist that dhimmis were a "protected" group, it would be wise to inquire as to whom they were being "protected" from.

How is it that Robert can find these stories, but the NY Daily News can't ? Guess it's just easier to smear Pam Geller, instead of doing a little research.

http://schnellmann.org/taqiyyah.html
Outwitt the Opponent through Taqiyyah

http://newstime.co.nz/2010/goody-two-shoes%e2%84%a2-and-liar-emily-maitlis-bbc-will-get-living-in-dhimmitude.html
Goody two-shoes™ and LIAR Emily Maitlis,
TV host of the BBC,
will get living in dhimmitude of Islam according to the word of Allah Q 9:29

“Muammad and His Cult” Page 166, about paying jizyah (protection tax only for Jews & Christians) “… this is how the mafia operates”

"El-Gohary said he wants to show the world how Christians are treated in Egypt. "My main driving force is I want to prove to people the amount of persecution that Muslim converts and Christians face here, and that the persecution has been going on for 1,400 years," he said...."

After 1400 years, the world still does not want to know...
Unbelievable.

Another 'tenet of Islam' the Obama Administration and all the west respects. This is 2010 and we're so smart we're stupid.

Thanks for addressing this Robert.

Also from T. P. Hughes’ A Dictionary of Islam,

1) "ZIMMAH. , pl. zinam, from the root zamm, "to blame." A compact, covenant, or contract, a league or treaty, any engagement or obligation, because the breaking thereof necessitates blame; and a right or due, for the neglect of which one is to be blamed. [...]"

and

2) "ZIMMI. , a member of the Ahlu 'z-Zimmah, a non Muslim subject of a Muslim government, belonging to the Jewish, Christian, or Sabean creed. who, for the payment of a poll— or capitation-tax, enjoys security of his person and property in a Muhammadan country. [...]"

Note: Zimmah = dhimma, zimmi = dhimmi.

The T. P. Hughes dictionary is available free online courtesy of Answering-Islam, see their Index to Islam. The section on the zimmi goes into considerable detail.

The fact that two words share a grammatical (phonlogical or phonetic) root does not mean that they share the same meaning, but in this case the meaning of zimmi and zimmah are directly related since zimmis are defined as members of the zimmah. In Robert's statement in the Politically Incorrect guide (p. 49), he is referring not to covenants generally but to the use of the Arabic word dhimmi (or dhimmis) in Islamic law as it refers to People of the Scripture and others who were subjugated under Islamic law.

The Quran itself in numerous places refers to the disbelief of Muhammad, Allah, and the Quran as the worst crime (6:21, 6:144, 6:157, 7:37, 10:17, 11:18-19, 18:15, 18:57, 29:68, 32:22, 39:32, 61:7). It literally refers to those who reject the Muhammad, Allah, and the Quran as "guilty" (Pickthall's translation, and others) (e.g., 7:40, 45:31, 74:41, 83:29, 6:147, 54:47).

From the following passage, I'm get the distinct impression that "Allah" considers the People of the Book, and anyone else who rejects the Quran and the messenger (Muhammad), as guilty of something rather serious.

9:29-9:33. "Fight against such of those who have been given the Scripture as believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, and forbid not that which Allah hath forbidden by His messenger, and follow not the Religion of Truth, until they pay the tribute readily, being brought low. And the Jews say: Ezra is the son of Allah, and the Christians say: The Messiah is the son of Allah. That is their saying with their mouths. They imitate the saying of those who disbelieved of old. Allah (Himself) fighteth against them. How perverse are they! They have taken as lords beside Allah their rabbis and their monks and the Messiah son of Mary, when they were bidden to worship only One God. There is no God save Him. Be He Glorified from all that they ascribe as partner (unto Him)! Fain would they put out the light of Allah with their mouths, but Allah disdaineth (aught) save that He shall perfect His light, however much the disbelievers are averse. He it is Who hath sent His messenger with the guidance and the Religion of Truth, that He may cause it to prevail over all religion, however much the idolaters may be averse."

pardon my typo above, "I get the distinct impression..."

As for the punishment for the above-mentioned "guilty" parties (all non-Muslims who disbelieve the Quran and Muhammad), it is not only to be delivered in hell by Allah in the hereafter, but also in this world (e.g., 13:34, 39:25-39:26, 3:56, 22:9). The Quran states that disbelievers will be tormented in this life (13:33-34), they will not escape in the earth (11:20), and that they are cursed by Allah, angels, and men (3:87-88). All humankind (34:28) is expected to obey the message of Muhammad (e.g., 7:157-158, 4:80), and if they don't, Muslims are expected to administer "justice," Allah's punishments, on earth (2:251, 9:14, 9:52, 57:25, 5:32-33).

With all of this in mind, when we turn to the Hadith and Sira, it becomes clearer how Muhammad and his followers reportedly punished the non-Muslims in this world. The invasion and conquering of the Khaybar Jews marks an early form of punishment of the "guilty" non-Muslims, who were subjected to an early form of the dhimma as imposed on non-Muslims by Muhammad.

What follows below in italics are some quoted sections from Muslim jurists cited in Bostom's (2005) edited volume.

The Legacy of Jihad, p. 261. From The Jihad or Holy War According to the Malikite School. Edmund Fagnan.

14… The dhimmi is punished if he “…manifests his religious opinions, if he speaks in a disrespectful manner…”
15… “The protection agreement is breached…when he insults a prophet using expressions permitted by his faith, such as the following which has been reported: ‘He is not the prophet, God did not send him—the Qur’an was not revealed to him—he’s the author of it—Jesus created Muhammad—Muhammad is a poor man: he tells you that he is in paradise, but why, then, could he not defend himself from the biting dogs?’21 The guilty party [in this last case] is put to death if he does not convert.”

The Jihad or Holy War According to the Malikite School. Edmund Fagan. In Andrew Bostom (2005), The Legacy of Jihad. pp. 251-266.
15. Breach of the head tax contract.
“The fate of the tributary who flees to an enemy country and is recaptured [is determined by the imam]; more particularly, he can be reduced to slavery, as long as his flight was not provoked by abusive acts, since in this case he is regarded as being guilty of highway robbery. If a band [of converted infidels] apostatizes and indulges in highway robbery, the individuals who make up the group are treated as [Muslim] apostates.”

The Legacy of Jihad, p. 207. From Shara ‘i’ u ‘l-Islam. Al-Hilli (d. 1277).
“The six conditions to which the infidel tributaries must be subjected are as follows:
…193 A tributary who blasphemes the prophet must be put to death.”
194. A tributary who speaks irreverently about the memory of the Prophet incurs a corporal punishment only, if the terms of the treaty did not include a prohibition of this act.5”
Note 5: “5. Otherwise, the treaty can be dissolved, since it has been violated.”

From Shara ‘i’ u l-Islam, by Al-Hilli (d. 1277), pp. 205-212. in Bostom, The Legacy of Jihad. (This refers to various laws and provisions for dhimmis by the thirteenth-century Shia jurist and scholar, Al-Muhaqqiq Al-Hilli).

“167. Some infidels are permitted to retain the privilege of practicing their religion, in return for a tribute; they are Jews, the Christians, and those whose revealed scripture is of doubtful authenticity, that is, the guebres [Zoroastrians]. Any infidel other than those who profess one of the above-mentioned religions must be compelled to embrace Islam.”
[brackets added]
“[...] 177. When an infidel slave has been set free, he can be compelled to leave Muslim territory or else pay the tribute.”
“[...] 181. An infidel minor, upon attaining maturity, must be compelled to embrace Islam or else to be subjected to the tribute; if he refuses, he is to be reckoned as an enemy and treated as such.”
“222. The infidel woman captive or refugee who has embraced Islam must not be returned, even if she apostatizes, since her conversion brought her into the bosom of Islam.”
“230. An infidel who embraces a religion not recognized by his coreligionists must be prevented from doing so and compelled to choose between Islam and death.”
“234. An infidel who performs publicly an act that is not forbidden by his religion but which is prohibited by the precepts of Islam must be punished according to the precepts of Muslim law with respect to a Muslim.”

K of K note: The section above also states a provision that a non-Muslim woman is to be held captive by Muslim state, even if she, after having embraced Islam, had apostatized.

I apologize for my absence from the front lines for anyone who cares. I have been preoccupied with a new book.
Download the first public edition of this book for free, titled ‘Muhammad and the Koran: The Twin Towers of Islamic Imperialism’ for editing, criticism, support, correction, negation or whatever. Before I make it available globally I need some reviews.
Even if you do not want to be an editor, their should be some valuable new insights and the affirmation of common knowledge here at Jihad Watch that will help strengthen the cause.
I will thank you now for those who participate later.
The title fits the upcoming rally to prevent the absurdity of a mosque at ground zero.
http://www.lulu.com/content/paperback-book/muhammad-and-the-koran-the-twin-towers-of-islamic-imperialism/8280026

My heart broke as I read this story. How I wish I could help these dear people.

An author at Loonwatch, Danios, was the one who claimed that Robert was either lying or ignorant for noting that dhimmi means protected and guilty. That claim has been dealt with above by Robert, and I have added my two cents.

Another claim made by Danios was that there is at least one example of an Islamic authority that refuted the dhimma in its entirety and advocated that Muslims and non-Muslims live as equals into perpetuity. (This was purportedly contrary to a claim Spencer had made, i.e., to the effect that no Islamic authority had ever advocated this). First of all, this is an impossible challenge for a Muslim who also believes in the account of the Last Day as provided in the Quran and the Hadith, where non-Muslims will be punished for being non-Muslims. To meet the challenge, the Muslim authority would have to reject this belief, yet the Quran is clear enough that believers must believe in the Last Day.

Secondly, the Muslim authority would have to reject much of the Quran. The Quran indicates that Muslims are better than non-Muslims (e.g., 98:6-7), and indicates clearly that the believers and disbelievers are "not alike," or "not equal" (e.g., 32:18). Indeed, the Quran states:
95:4 "Surely We created man of the best stature
95:5 Then we reduced him to the lowest of the low,
95:6 Save those who believe and do good works, and theirs is a reward unfailing"

Thus, to bring non-Muslims up from the level of "the lowest of the low," as established by Allah the creator and sustainer of life and human society, a Muslim reformer seeking equality between non-Muslims and Muslims would seem to be going against Allah's creation and His policy spelled out in the Quran.

But it is possible that a Muslim authority could reject or reinterpret these aspects of the Quran, and argue that Muslims and non-Muslims should be treated equally in the law and in society. Danios at Loonwatch claimed to have found such an example, citing secondary authors who used the word "equal" etc. to refer to the status proposed for non-Muslims living under Ottoman rule in the 19th century. (Danios cited another example, but it suffers from the same ambiguity). The problems with what Danios presents may be more obvious to some of us here than they are to Danios and his readers, who are less inclined to look at Islam with a critical perspective: How exactly is this "equality" defined in real terms and implemented? What does it entail? What are some concrete examples of this equality? We must ask, because we have seen altogether too many instances in which Islam apologists talk to western non-Muslims using terms like "justice," "fairness," "equality," "freedom," etc., when it turns out that non-Muslims have different ideas about what these terms mean. And even if there were not a kind of truth-in-advertising problem with Islamic da'wa spokesmen and their western apologists, it would still be entirely reasonable to expect that examples of the "equality" and "freedom" etc. would be shown. But Danios presents no specific examples of this "equality." Someone quoting the word "equal" doesn't demonstrate support for the claim.

There are some critical examples that would need to be assessed. For example, most Muslims nowadays will readily agree to a statement supporting "freedom of expression," as would probably most non-Muslim Westerners. Yet most non-Muslim westerners differ from most Muslims in precisely where the limits on free expression should be drawn and with respect to who should draw them. The most dramatic difference is that, as studies I've read over the past several years suggest, most Muslims believe that those who criticize or "insult" Muhammad and Islam should be criminally prosecuted and punished, whereas most non-Muslims in the west do not believe there should be a punishment for that. Most western non-Muslims believe that criticizing, lampooning, and even "insulting" religious and political leaders is fair game legally speaking and is protected as free expression. Westerners draw the line to exclude, for examples, from the category of reasonable or legitimate free expression, defamation and death threats against persons. Muslims also criticize, "insult," and lampoon non-Muslim religious and political leaders; they just forbid those kinds of expressions regarding Islamic or Islamically-approved leaders. Thus, most Muslims do not practice or believe in equality of free expression. They believe that non-Muslims should have to conform to Muslim rules on expression, while most non-Muslims think Muslims should have to abide by rules that allow criticism of Islam and Muhammad.

In any case, it is not clear that this one aspect of the dhimma, and of Islamic law generally--namely that non-Muslims are not permitted to criticize Islam or Muhammad--has ever been revoked by a Muslim authority in power. This is a major inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims under Islamic law, whereby Muslims can criticize non-Muslim beliefs publicly, but the reverse is not permitted. There is nothing in Danios' citing of indirect comments, containing words like "equality" etc., that demonstrates that Muslims and non-Muslims were to be equal in this respect.

While Danios has not demonstrated repudiation of Islam's limits on free expression of non-Muslims by a Muslim authority in power, he has also not demonstrated repudiation of several other aspects of Islamic law, such as that Muslims are free to leave Islam publicly (thus becoming non-Muslims) without penalty and are to be treated equally to Muslims; that non-Muslims are free to proselytize to Muslims publicly; that Muslim women can marry non-Muslim men (not just Muslim men marrying women from the People of the Book, but abolishing completely from the law any marriage restrictions based on religious differences); that divorce rulings should not favor one parent over the other based on religion (rulings which typically favored the Muslim parent), and so on. There is a long list of restrictions on and inequalities against non-Muslims under Islamic rule. A proper rebuttal to Spencer's challenge would have to provide an extensive list showing how the exceptional Muslim authority, freely and not just temporarily in response to outside pressure from non-Muslim powers, actually repudiated all the previous inequalities with the intention of making Muslims and non-Muslims equal on an indefinite basis in the real world. Such a rebuttal has not yet appeared.

The Politically Correct view of the Crusades

I like to view a website called Deviant Art. Don't let the name throw you, there are art works of many different types there. One that appeared recently and stirred up a lot of controversy was a drawing about Mohammed, who was drawing a picture of himself on the wall while saying, "I'm F*ck*n Muhammed, I draw who I want!". I responded by congratulating the artist on her courage, saying what i think about Islam (views mostly shaped by Jihad Watch), and commenting to another poster that the Crusades were not the wars of aggression she thought they were, but defensive wars.

Well, my comments elicited mostly hateful responses, but the women who's views on the Crusades that I criticized wrote this -

"Yeah, that bit about the Crusades? Nonsense. It was conquest, and it was a political move to give the dissenting European nobles something to rally around. The Pope couldn't have cared less about the troubles of the Byzantines if it wasn't because he was worried that the Turks would become powerful enough to weaken the authority of Christianity in eastern Europe.

It was NOT a defensive move, it was politics and it was cynical agression, thinly justified by a call for holy war.

Moreover, you can't justify the conquest of Jerusalem by saying that the Turks were attacking the Byzantines. What, would it be appropriate to conquer France if the Belgians were attacking Poland?"

-- I just wanted to share that, get some feedback from the people here, and thank Robert Spencer for his book "The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam and the Crusades". JW and the commenters here have really opened my eyes about this subject. Even the ones whose ideas I disagree with!" :-D ---

Happy Memorial Day Weekend everyone.

My apologies if my post was off topic.

"I hope one day to live in a place where there are no mosques" he says
.........................

That Maher El-Gohary—just because so many Muslims want to murder him and his daughter Dina is no reason for him to be so "Islamophobic"! sarc/off

Further responses to Danios' (D) specific statements:

D: "We see quite clearly from the above quote [a statement about the pact of Umar] that “dhimma” is something positive; it is protection. In fact, the exact same word–dhimmah–is used for both Jews and Muslims in the Constitution of Medina. This document declares that all who uphold the pledge–Jew and Muslim alike–are granted dhimma (protection). If the word meant or implied “guilt”, why did the Prophet Muhammad include the Muslims under this?"

K: 1. It would imply guilt in the sense described by T. P. Hughes, mentioned in my above post, i.e., that one is guilty if they break they covenant.

2. Muhammad and the Muslims who recited the Quran would have inevitably used the word "guilt" or others like it to describe disbelievers including but not limited to the People of the Scripture (see references in my above post; there are more).

3. Interesting that Danios thinks the dhimma is something positive.

4. Danios provides no evidence that the "dhimma" arrangement between the Muslims and Jews in the Constitution of Mecca was positive for Jews. For example, did it allow them to publicly criticize Muhammad?

5. The Constitution of Medina is not particularly relevant to the issue at hand, regarding Spencer's quote on page 49 of The Politically Incorrect Guide. The topic there is the Islamic legal notion of the dhimmi, where dhimmi in that context refers to a non-Muslim subjugated under Islamic law, required to pay jizya, and subjected to punishing restrictions. Using the word "dhimmis" in the sense that is relevant here does imply "guilty people."

D: "As I said before, it is complete fabrication on the part of Robert Spencer to claim that the word means “guilty”."

No it isn't; see Robert's rebuttal above, and my reply including the T. P. Hughes' reference.

D: "As we see, not only does Robert Spencer’s claim have no basis in the Arabic language, but his own argument comes to bite him in the ass. The question remains: is this a result of Spencer’s lying nature or merely a consequence of his profound ignorance? Let me know which one you think it is in the comments below."

K: On the contrary, what has been shown by Robert and in my posts above is that the claim does have a basis in the Arabic language, and, more specifically, in Islamic law. It seems that what has happened here is that Danios, in his haste to play "gotcha!", has not bothered to research this issue carefully and did not read Robert's claim carefully in context from the start.

(If Danios had researched this issue a bit more, I do not think he would be presenting himself as surprised and completely dismissive of the "guilty" aspect of the meaning of dhimmi, would he? Why didn't he explain to his readers the basis of Spencer's claim? Is Danios not aware of this interpretation? Does he not think he should explain this to his readers, in at least giving them some background as to why Spencer wrote "...dhimmis, which means 'protected' or 'guilty' people-the Arabic word means both"?)

Also, Danios seems to have trouble with the English word "means," as in meaning. He might want to look that up before concluding that a given word does not mean what someone else claims it means. Spencer has shown that he was neither lying nor writing in ignorance. Clearly, to be decent, Danios would have to issue some kind of clarification and explanation to his readers, as well as an apology to Spencer.

-------------

Briefly, from another recent article by Danios where he claims that some Muslim authorities have repudiated the dhimma and advocated equality for non-Muslims on an indefinite basis, he cites a long list of names of supposed moderates. I could not help but notice that Tariq Ramadan, Yousuf al-Qaradawi, and Khaled Abou El Fadl were in the list.

Ramadan is famous for his unwillingness (or perhaps his inability) to speak clearly about his positions on any number of contentious issues in Islam. He famously refused to condemn stoning for adultery when pressed to do so in a debate with Sarkozy.

Qaradawi supports the death penalty for public apostates, supports blasphemy penalties, and advocates that Islamic rule should spread to cover the entire world.

El Fadl has claimed, consistent with sharia, that Muslim women should not marry non-Muslim men.

These people can't be said to support true equality. How many others on Danios' list have similar problems?

Also note that the so-called rulings that Danios cites are written in vague and impressionistic language. It's the usual ambiguous apologetic, full of loopholes.

" 50 Pak Hindus convert to Islam under pressure " reports Amir Mir in DNA ( a Mumbai News Paper- page 13) of 28th May 2010. They converted to Islam between May 14 & May 19 under pressure fromtheiremployers to save their jobs & survive in the Muslim dominated society.
In the same page another para reads," The head of a religious seminary in the Rahim Yar Khan district of Pakistan Punjab has abducted a minor Hindu girl and stopped her meeting her parents,saying the girl had converted to Islam and no longer wanted to meet her "Non Muslim relatives". According to Mehenga Ram, his daughter Radha, 13 was abducted in Dec 2009 and since then she is not being allowed to meet her parents. The police authorities refused to register a FIR (First Information Report),nor recovered the girl from custody of Abdul Jabbar.

This is a timely post from Robert and also the replies from Kinana of Khaybar referring to Danios at loonwatch. I had noticed that post by Danios on loonwatch just the other day purporting to prove that Robert is an "intellectual huckster". He referred specifically to page 49 of The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam (and the Crusades) in quoting The Qur’an calls Jews and Christians “People of the Book;” Islamic law calls them dhimmis, which means “protected” or “guilty” people–the Arabic word means both…Jews and Christians are “guilty” because they have not only rejected Muhammad as a prophet, but have also distorted the legitimate revelations they have received from Allah. Because of that guilt, Islamic law dictates that Jews and Christians may live in Islamic states, but not as equals with Muslims.

Danios then went on to demolish this dual sense of dhimmi, well at least in his mind. He (or she) is undoubtedly a very clever and knowledgeable writer and does bring up interesting counterpoints, e.g. the Doctrine of Perpetual Servitude and the notion that the Pact of Umar is quite commonly held by Muslims to be a fake in his refutation of Robert in another series of essays.

I find the finer points of his arguments are quite technically detailed and subtle, unlike smooth talking apologists like Tariq Ramadan who only deals in generalities. While that makes a refreshing change the essays are too complicated for me to follow and in these circumstances 'by their fruits you shall know them' is a good guide and Danios and his compatriots seem to exhibit personal animosity, for want of a better word, which does not fit comfortably with their accusations of racism and polemicism as characterizing Robert.

So I suspected there had to be holes in his reasoning and this post was useful Robert in showing that Danios had been somewhat hasty in his refutation of the point that dhimmi carries with it a sense of guilt. In regards to its meaning of 'protected' I had always thought of tanstaafl's point, i.e. 'protected' sounds very kind of the Muslims but yes, protected from what? And the answer has to be along the lines of protected from the fate which would otherwise fall deservedly upon these people from Muslims themselves, a kind of stay of execution if you will and to my mind that necessarily invoked as sense of guilt from the angle of being not innocent. So the link made sense for me in terms of practical effect.

Oh and thanks to K of K too both for the point of Robert's post, Danios's supposed refutation of Robert regarding the status of dhimmi and for pointing out that in his arguments Danios refers to secondary sources a great deal.

In his salivating post of the fallout between Andrew Bostom and Robert Danios accused them both of plagiarizing "from Orientalists who have made the same arguments and presented the same research centuries ago" and in another post was dismissive of Bostom's scholarship in terms of being a mere compiler of secondary sources while, IIRC, alluded to his academic background being that of a medical doctor. Pot calling the kettle black.

A salient issue here in this disagreement about the presentation of the meaning(s) of the word "dhimmis" is that of non-Muslim versus Muslim interpretations of the same word. Apologists for Islam in the west today may want non-Muslims to accept the singular, and single-aspect, meaning of "protection" at face value. They are convinced that Islam is great and that any protection afforded to non-Muslim peoples living under Islamic rule must have been good. Wasn't it nice of the Muslim conquerors to "protect" the conquered peoples?

But of course, using the English word "protection" for dhimma, and trying to pass this off at face value, is highly misleading. There is something funny-peculiar about this "protection," and it would be something like a violation of truth-in-advertising if the Islam apologist did not tell naive non-Muslims exactly what this kind of protection meant. The English word "protection" is at best a euphemism when applied to the type of dhimma at issue here. Protection in the relevant sense here is more like extortion. The "protector" says to the "protected," essentially, "Keep working for us and paying us and following our rules, or else we will put you to death or enslave you." This is after the initial choice has been presented in the context of jihad/da'wa invitation: Convert to Islam, or accept dhimmi status, or face death in battle. (There was also a slavery option). The dhimmis don't believe in Muhammad and Islam, but criticizing Muhammad or Islam constitutes violating one of those many rules.

Robert described the Islamic legal conception of dhimmi, noting that it means protection, but also guilt, i.e., guilt of the non-Muslims who did not believe in Muhammad and the Quran. The imposition of the dhimma is a kind of harsh collective punishment on all the non-Muslims subjected to it, especially those "of the Book" but also others. A non-Muslim living under Islamic rule being called a "dhimmi" by a Muslim jurist would probably not take this as a complement. It is a word that labels and stigmatizes the subjugated person as guilty of not believing in Muhammad and Islam. The punishment for being "guilty" of this crime is the imposition of the dhimma with all its conditions, rules, and restrictions.

Islam propagandists want to control the language that non-Muslims now use to describe the dhimma. The propagandists seem to want non-Muslims to accept the Islamic supremacist view the dhimma, and ignore the reality of non-Muslims subjugated and forced to live under Islamic law. They seem to want to invalidate non-Muslim interpretations of the very laws, policies, and practices by which non-Muslims were subjugated under Islamic rule. To live as a dhimmi, forced under Islamic rule, is essentially like having to live with the consequences of someone else's preposterous accusation, whereby the dhimmi is alleged to be guilty of an imaginary crime (i.e., not believing in Muhammad and Islam), and is punished, for life, for it.

Thanks for the discussion of Danios's pieces K of K, they are interesting aspects but myself I couldn't be bothered nutting out the fallacy in his logic, for the reasons I mentioned, from the inside as by relying on Tariq Ramadan etc he shows his hand. The word 'clever' I used in describing his pieces carries with it a negative connotation.

Just on the issue of protection as extortion the concept is well established in common parlance in terms of mafia protection rackets and protection money (jizya, basically). The mafia protect businesses, from themselves. Maybe the century of Islamic occupation of Sicily left its mark.

Gravenimage and Wowsher,

Thanks for those comments and insights. This thread, starting with Robert addressing the protected and guilty meanings of dhimmi, has been an interesting exercise.

I was curious to see what online translators would produce for dhimmi (and related terms), so I entered into three or four online translators the Arabic script for each of dhimmi, dhimma, and dhamma, as provided above by Robert.

Here are the results:

dhimmi: Invective, disparagements
dhimma: protection, care
dhamma: vilify, dispraised

I also entered the Arabic script provided by Danios in the quoted definition for the word dhimmi.
From Danios' quoted definition: "Dhimmi: A person with whom there exists a treaty".
From online translations: "And a man of invective: it means a man who has entrusted"

Next, from Danios' quoted definition of dhimma: "And ‘dhimmah’ means treaty".

From online translators: "The disclosure of the Covenant"

(I also checked Danios' other quoted definitions for dhimma, but there was no critical difference to report).

These online translations are a bit crude, but I don't believe they are all incorrect in consistently giving the word invective (or disparagements) for the Arabic script of the word dhimmi.

Well, invective basically means strong insult or strongly insulting, but I checked online dictionary definitions.

Example #1.

"in•vec•tive
NOUN:
1. Denunciatory or abusive language; vituperation.
2. Denunciatory or abusive expression or discourse.
ADJECTIVE:
Of, relating to, or characterized by denunciatory or abusive language."

Example #2.

"Quick definitions (invective)
▸ noun: abusive or venomous language used to express blame or censure or bitter deep-seated ill will"

Example #3.

"invective
noun, adjective

Definition: (n.) abusive language used to criticize; (adj.) characterized by abuse or criticism

Synonyms: (n.) abuse, accusation, berating, censure, tirade, defamation, belittlement, reproach, vituperation, (adj.) reproachful, abusive, defamatory, accusatory"

-----------------

The Tafsirs of Ibn Kathir, al-Jalalayn, and Ibn Abbas are freely available online. These classical tafsirs are popular among Muslims today.

Anyways, on the whole issue of the guilt and punishment of the dhimmis, here is an outline of what Ibn Kathir notes for Quran 9:29 and the ensuing passage:

Ibn Kathir [source: tafsir.com]

"9:29 The Order to fight People of the Scriptures until They give the Jizyah
[...] Paying Jizyah is a Sign of Kufr and Disgrace
Allah said,
(until they pay the Jizyah), if they do not choose to embrace Islam,
(with willing submission), in defeat and subservience,
(and feel themselves subdued.), disgraced, humiliated and belittled. Therefore, Muslims are not allowed to honor the people of Dhimmah or elevate them above Muslims, for they are miserable, disgraced and humiliated. Muslim recorded from Abu Hurayrah that the Prophet said,
(Do not initiate the Salam to the Jews and Christians, and if you meet any of them in a road, force them to its narrowest alley.) [...]
(30. And the Jews say: "Uzayr (Ezra) is the son of Allah,'' and the Christians say: "The Messiah is the son of Allah.'' That is their saying with their mouths, resembling the saying of those who disbelieved aforetime. May Allah fight them, how they are deluded away from the truth!)[...]
9:31 Fighting the Jews and Christians is legislated because They are Idolators and Disbelievers
[...]
9:32 People of the Scriptures try to extinguish the Light of Islam
[...]
9:33 Islam is the Religion That will dominate over all Other Religions
[...]"

BTW, Ibn Kathir in his tafsir of 9:29 cited the conditions of Umar's pact with the Christians and cited hadith confirming numerous conditions. Ibn Kathir wrote: "...the Leader of the faithful `Umar bin Al-Khattab, may Allah be pleased with him, demanded his well-known conditions be met by the Christians, these conditions that ensured their continued humiliation, degradation and disgrace. [...]" The section then goes on to describe those conditions as narrated in a hadith.

Al-Jalalayn, 9:29 [source: altafsir.com]
Says fight the people of the Scripture
"[...] until they pay the jizya tribute, the annual tax imposed them, readily ('an yadin is a circumstantial qualifier, meaning, 'compliantly', or 'by their own hands', not delegating it [to others to pay]), being subdued, [being made] submissive and compliant to the authority of Islam."

Ibn Abbas, 9:29. [source: altafsir.com]
Says fight the people of the Scripture "[...] (until they pay the tribute readily) standing: from hand to hand, (being brought low) abased."

Also see Ibn Kathir, 3:111-3:112,
"The Good News that Muslims will Dominate the People of the Book [...]"

Today, the main Islamic legal restriction on Non-Muslims is that they are not permitted to criticize Islam, the Quran, or Muhammad, etc. (This is of course consistent with laws under the dhimma). Polls of Muslims in Europe show that most want those who criticize Islam and Muhammad to be criminally prosecuted and punished. We can reasonably suppose that the support for such laws is much higher in Muslim-majority countries. The fact that polls show that most Muslims want "a strict application" of sharia in every Muslim country (see World Public Opinion, and PEW), and a reinstatement of the caliph or other such religious ruler, is consistent with the hypothesis that most Muslims want at least some of the major elements of Islamic law (including aspects consistent with the dhimma restrictions) reimposed upon non-Muslims today.

There are some dramatic anecdotes, documented almost on a daily basis at JihadWatch, of Muslims trying to impose aspects of Islamic law, and thus essentially dhimmi rules, on non-Muslims.

NIGERIA : MOB STONES WOMAN TO DEATH FOR EVANGELIZING
[source: compassdirect.org]

From Wolfgang Bruner:
"Interviewed by the Wall Street Journal, Hassam El-Masalmeh from Palestinian Jihadist organization Hamas confirmed the organization's plan to re-institute the humiliating jizya, a blood ransom poll-tax (based on Qur'an sura 9, verse 29), levied traditionally on non-Muslims vanquished by Jihad. Arabic lexicographer E.W. Lane, based on a careful analysis of the term, states that: "The tax that is taken from the free non-Muslim subjects of a Muslim government whereby they ratify the compact that assures them protection, as though it were compensation for not being slain."

Islamic militants force Yemeni Jews to pay jizya, following Koran verse 9:29. [source: Jihadwatch.org January 22, 2007, from WNDN]

Muslims Forcing Christian Assyrians in Baghdad Neighborhood to Pay 'Protection Tax' Posted GMT 3-18-2007 18:29:1 [source: aina.org]

Another indication that most of the Islamic world today wants to maintain and continue to impose sharia restrictions on non-Muslims is the fact that practically all the countries in the world having significant Muslim populations have signed on to the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. (56 countries have signed on to this).

Excerpts:
"Adopted and Issued at the Nineteenth Islamic Conference
of Foreign Ministers in Cairo
on 5 August 1990.
"Article 1
(b) All human beings are God’s subjects, and the most loved by him are those who are most useful to the rest of His subjects, and no one has superiority over another except on the basis of piety and good deeds.*
...Article 22
(a) Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such manner as would not be contrary to the principles of the Shari’ah.
(b) Everyone shall have the right to advocate what is right, and propagate what is good, and warn against what is wrong and evil according to the norms of Islamic Shari’ah.
...Article 24
All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari'ah.
...Article 25
The Islamic Shari'ah is the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification to any of the articles of this Declaration."

[Source: religlaw.org]

*My note: Regarding "piety and good deeds," these are Islamically-defined in terms of sharia, based on the Quran and Sunnah. In the Quran, Allah does not accept the good deeds or good works of non-Muslims. In any case, this document implies that those who have more Islamic piety are superior to those who have less or no such belief/adherence to Islam. This implication, and the affirmation of the supremacy of sharia, and the inferiority of non-Muslims, who are considered impious and therefore bad, guilty of the worst crime mentioned in the Quran.

-----------------------------

Here are yet more indications from the Quran and Hadith that non-Muslims are considered inferior and must be punished, subjugated under Islamic rule, to the advantage of Muslims:

61:9 "He it is Who hath sent His messenger with the guidance and the religion of truth, that He may make it conqueror of all religion however much idolaters may be averse."

58:20 "Lo! those who oppose Allah and His messenger, they will be among the lowest.
58:21 Allah hath decreed: Lo! I verily shall conquer, I and My messengers. Lo! Allah is Strong, Almighty."

Sahih Bukhari, Volume 4, Book 53, Number 386:
Narrated Jubair bin Haiya: Umar sent the Muslims to the great countries to fight the pagans. When Al-Hurmuzan embraced Islam, 'Umar said to him. "I would like to consult you regarding these countries which I intend to invade." […] Our Prophet, the Messenger of our Lord, has ordered us to fight you till you worship Allah Alone or give Jizya (i.e. tribute); and our Prophet has informed us that our Lord says:-- "Whoever amongst us is killed (i.e. martyred), shall go to Paradise to lead such a luxurious life as he has never seen, and whoever amongst us remain alive, shall become your master." […]

Sahih Bukhari, Volume 4, Book 53, Number 388:
Narrated Juwairiya bin Qudama At-Tamimi: We said to 'Umar bin Al-Khattab, Jo Chief of the believers! Advise us." He said, "I advise you to fulfill Allah's Convention (made with the Dhimmis) as it is the convention of your Prophet and the source of the livelihood of your dependents (i.e. the taxes from the Dhimmis.) " (parentheses in M. Muhsin Khan’s translation).

LXXXVII: What is said about spears
“It is mentioned from Ibn 'Umar from the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, "My provision has been placed under the shadow of my spear, and abasement and humility have been placed on the one who disobeys my command."
[Source: bewley.virtualave.net]
[In Bewley’s numbering system, the above hadith is unnumbered and is between hadiths 2756 and 2757 in the Jihad section]

Sahih Bukhari. 2748. "It is related that 'Umar said, "The property of the Banu'n-Nadir was part of the booty which Allah gave His Messenger for which the Muslims did not stir horses or camels. It was for the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, in particular and he would spend the yearly maintenance of his family from it and then put what remained into arms and horses as preparation for the way of Allah."

I see some more truth-in-advertising problems at Loonwatch. Here are two titles of articles on the issue of the dhimma:

1. "Do Muslims want to reimpose dhimmitude or live as equals?"
2. "The Protocols of the Elders of Mecca; The Final Word on the Pact of Umar"

These titles, relative to the contents of their respective articles, are misleading, as I will explain.

1. "Do Muslims want to reimpose dhimmitude or live as equals?"

But the substance of the article, by Danios, does not present evidence on what the world's Muslim populations believe and want now, today, regarding the treatment of non-Muslims living under Islamic rule. Nor does it provide a study surveying the views of Islamic scholars, jurists, leaders, etc. Nor does it provide a survey of Islamic legal restrictions on non-Muslims. Nor does it provide a survey of international policy initiatives or projects by Muslim governments in relation to non-Muslim governments. The article simply does not provide the material relevant to answering the question in the title.

The use of the word "reimpose" also implies that there was some point in which all the elements of Islamic law that were included under the dhimma were not imposed, i.e., were abolished by Muslims. However, this has not been shown to be the case (as I pointed out in a post above).

Danios is neglecting the important fact that elements of Islamic law that happened to be implemented under the dhimma historically are also imposed on non-Muslims today who live in Islamic countries. The most significant of these are, in my opinion, the special Islamic restrictions on freedom of expression, whereby Muslims are allowed to criticize and lampoon non-Muslim beliefs (and the Quran itself contains such expressions) in public, but non-Muslims aren't allowed to criticize Islam and Muhammad. In addition, Muslims are allowed to proselytize to non-Muslims (and the Quran and Sunnah call upon them to do this), but non-Muslims are not allowed to proselytize to Muslims. Whether or not these restrictions are called parts of the dhimma is not important. They are historically associated with the dhimma, but the important point is that these are discriminatory Islamic legal restrictions on non-Muslims.

Danios provides claims but no relevant evidence pertaining to the question of whether Muslims want to live as equals with non-Muslims today or indefinitely into the future.

It is also interesting that, while Islam apologists (including Danios) have mocked the term dhimmitude as spurious, it is used in the title above. I frankly don't see a legitimate basis for an objection to the term, which was introduced to academia by Bat Ye'or, to describe the condition or state of dhimmis living under Islamic rule. I'm not aware of another better commonly-used phrase to describe this state/condition of the dhimmis. Why not, then, use this term to describe it? For the new reader, seeing the term naturally raises the question of 'What was it like to be a dhimmi under Islamic rule?' I suspect Islam apologists don't like the term because it is associated with Bat Ye'or's important work on this subject, which takes a non-Muslim and critical perspective of the dhimma and the treatment of dhimmis, and which shows us dhimmis' accounts of their life conditions under Islamic rule. Use of the term dhimmitude, without sneer marks around it, grants it a legitimacy that many Islam apologists are not willing to concede.

2. "The Protocols of the Elders of Mecca; The Final Word on the Pact of Umar"

Another article by Danios, and another misleading title. The article is about the question of whether or not the Pact of Umar is (regarded as) a forgery. The title is clearly a play on the title of another well-know forgery, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which was concocted by anti-Semites to justify anti-Semitic beliefs and theories. Through this analogy, a naive reader might get the impression that the Pact of Umar was a forgery cooked up by Islamophobes or enemies of Muslims, containing policies completely contrary to Islamic law, designed to smear Islam. But there is no evidence that the Pact of Umar was forged by non-Muslims. It was accepted by prominent Muslim sholars and jurists. Moreover, elements of the Pact are consistent with actual policies applied historically against non-Muslims living under the dhimma. In fact, historically, many Muslim scholars and jurists used the Pact of Umar. The most important of the restrictions, namely the restrictions on the public expressions of non-Muslims, are still in place today, and international Muslim groups such as the OIC are trying to further impose these restrictions on non-Muslims. The poll results [from World Public Opinion, PEW, and others] indicate that most Muslims want sharia law and want strong restrictions on non-Muslim expressions about Islam and Muhammad. Those studies aside, one would have to be living in a cave for the past five years not to be aware that there is are strong attitudes and beliefs among vast numbers of Muslims today that non-Muslims need to be tightly restricted in what they express in public about Muhammad and Islam. And this policy is arguably the single most important element of Islamic law that was applied under the dhimma. Thus, the analogy to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion is not only inappropriate, but it is misleading in giving the impression that the dhimma is fiction, part of an anti-Muslim conspiracy. If anything, it was made to justify discrimination against and subjugation of non-Muslims.

Danios at Loonwatch has made a response to Robert's article and my post with the T.P. Hughes quotes. I will post my response below if this thread is still open.

Also, one of Danios' commenters seems to think I ("Kinana of Khaybar") am Bat Ye'or or Andrew Bostom. This is of course not true. Another accuses me of "spewing a lot of crap trying to pseudo-analyze" Danios' arguments. Well, these posters can easily come to this site and discuss these ideas with me or anyone else who is willing, as long as the discussion is on topic and does not run afoul of our hosts.

First, though, some definitions pertaining to meaning:

con•note (k -n t )
tr.v. con•not•ed, con•not•ing, con•notes
1. To suggest or imply in addition to literal meaning: "The term 'liberal arts' connotes a certain elevation above utilitarian concerns" (George F. Will). See Usage Note at denote.
2. To have as a related or attendant condition: For a political leader, hesitation is apt to connote weakness.
de•note (d -n t )
tr.v. de•not•ed, de•not•ing, de•notes
1. To mark; indicate: a frown that denoted increasing impatience.
2. To serve as a symbol or name for the meaning of; signify: A flashing yellow light denotes caution.
3. To signify directly; refer to specifically.
________________________________________
[French dénoter, from Latin d not re : d -, de- + not re, to mark; see connote.]
________________________________________
de•not a•ble adj.
de•no tive adj.
Usage Note: Denote and connote are often confused because both words have senses that entail signification. Denote means "to signify directly or literally" and describes the relation between the word and the thing it conventionally names. Connote means "to signify indirectly, suggest or imply" and describes the relation between the word and the images or associations it evokes. Thus, the word river denotes a moving body of water and may connote such things as the relentlessness of time and the changing nature of life.

Main Entry: mean•ing
Pronunciation: \ˈmē-niŋ\
Function: noun
Date: 14th century
1 a : the thing one intends to convey especially by language : purport b : the thing that is conveyed especially by language : import
2 : something meant or intended : aim
3 : significant quality; especially : implication of a hidden or special significance
4 a : the logical connotation of a word or phrase b : the logical denotation or extension of a word or phrase
— meaning adjective
— mean•ing•ly \-niŋ-lē\ adverb
----------

Regarding blame and guilt:

blame (bl m)
tr.v. blamed, blam•ing, blames
1. To hold responsible.
2. To find fault with; censure.
3. To place responsibility for (something): blamed the crisis on poor planning.
n.
1. The state of being responsible for a fault or error; culpability.
2. Censure; condemnation.
Idiom:
to blame
1. Deserving censure; at fault.
2. Being the cause or source of something: A freak storm was to blame for the power outage.
________________________________________
[Middle English blamen, from Old French blasmer, blamer, from Vulgar Latin *blast m re, alteration of Late Latin blasph m re, to reproach; see blaspheme.]
________________________________________
blam er n.
Synonyms: blame, fault, guilt
These nouns denote a sense of responsibility for an offense. Blame stresses censure or punishment for a lapse or misdeed for which one is held accountable: The police laid the blame for the accident on the driver.
Fault is culpability for wrongdoing or failure: It is my own fault that I wasn't prepared for the exam.
Guilt applies to willful wrongdoing and stresses moral culpability: The prosecution had evidence of the defendant's guilt. See Also Synonyms at criticize.

The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved.

blame [bleɪm]
n
1. responsibility for something that is wrong or deserving censure; culpability
2. an expression of condemnation; reproof
be to blame to be at fault or culpable
vb (tr)
1. (usually foll by for) to attribute responsibility to; accuse I blame him for the failure
2. (usually foll by on) to ascribe responsibility for (something) to I blame the failure on him
3. to find fault with
[from Old French blasmer, ultimately from Late Latin blasphēmāre to BLASPHEME]
blamable , blameable adj
blamably , blameably adv

blame
verb
1. hold responsible, accuse, denounce, indict, impeach, incriminate, impute, recriminate, point a or the finger at They blamed the army for most of the atrocities.
hold responsible clear, excuse, forgive, acquit, vindicate, exonerate, absolve
2. attribute to, credit to, assign to, put down to, ascribe to, impute to The police blamed the explosion on terrorists.
3. (used in negative constructions) criticize, charge, tax, blast, condemn, flame (informal), put down, disapprove of, censure, reproach, chide, admonish, tear into (informal), diss (slang, chiefly U.S.), find fault with, reprove, upbraid, lambast(e), reprehend, express disapprobation of I do not blame them for trying to make some money.
criticize praise, acclaim, compliment, approve of, commend, big up (slang, chiefly Caribbean)
noun
responsibility, liability, rap (slang), accountability, onus, culpability, answerability Bad women never take the blame for anything.
responsibility credit, honour, praise, tribute, acclaim, commendation, Brownie points
to blame at fault, responsible, guilty, culpable, blameworthy Who is to blame here?
Collins Thesaurus of the English Language – Complete and Unabridged 2nd Edition. 2002 © HarperCollins Publishers 1995, 2002

guilt (g lt)
n.
1.
a. The fact of being responsible for the commission of an offense. See Synonyms at blame.
b. Law The fact of having been found to have violated a criminal law; legal culpability.
c. Responsibility for a mistake or error.
2.
a. Remorseful awareness of having done something wrong.
b. Self-reproach for supposed inadequacy or wrongdoing.
tr.v. guilt•ed, guilt•ing, guilts
To make or try to make (someone) feel guilty.
________________________________________
[Middle English gilt, from Old English gylt, crime.]
The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved.

guilt [gɪlt]
n
1. the fact or state of having done wrong or committed an offence
2. (Law) responsibility for a criminal or moral offence deserving punishment or a penalty
3. remorse or self-reproach caused by feeling that one is responsible for a wrong or offence
4. Archaic sin or crime
[Old English gylt, of obscure origin]
Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003

guilt
noun
1. shame, regret, remorse, contrition, guilty conscience, bad conscience, self-reproach, self-condemnation, guiltiness Her emotions went from anger to guilt in the space of a few seconds.
shame honour, pride, self-respect
2. culpability, blame, responsibility, misconduct, delinquency, criminality, wickedness, iniquity, sinfulness, blameworthiness, guiltiness You were never convinced of his guilt, were you?
culpability virtue, innocence, righteousness, sinlessness, blamelessness
Quotations
"This is his first punishment, that by the verdict of his own heart no guilty man is acquitted" [Juvenal Satires]
"So full of artless jealousy is guilt"
"It spills itself in fearing to be spilt" [William Shakespeare Hamlet]
Collins Thesaurus of the English Language – Complete and Unabridged 2nd Edition. 2002 © HarperCollins Publishers 1995, 2002

guilt
n guilt [gilt]
1 a sense of shame a feeling of guilt.
2 the state of having done wrong Fingerprints proved the murderer's guilt.
adj guilty
having, feeling, or causing guilt The jury found the prisoner guilty; a guilty conscience.
n guiltiness

adv guiltily
He looked at his mother guiltily.
Kernerman English Multilingual Dictionary © 2006-2010 K Dictionaries Ltd.

Noun 1. guilt - the state of having committed an offense
guiltiness
condition, status - a state at a particular time; "a condition (or state) of disrepair"; "the current status of the arms negotiations"
blameworthiness, culpability, culpableness - a state of guilt
bloodguilt - the state of being guilty of bloodshed and murder
complicity - guilt as an accomplice in a crime or offense
criminalism, criminality, criminalness - the state of being a criminal
guilt by association - the attribution of guilt (without proof) to individuals because the people they associate with are guilty
impeachability, indictability - the state of being liable to impeachment
innocence - a state or condition of being innocent of a specific crime or offense; "the trial established his innocence"
2. guilt - remorse caused by feeling responsible for some offense
guilt feelings, guilt trip, guilty conscience
compunction, remorse, self-reproach - a feeling of deep regret (usually for some misdeed)
survivor guilt - a deep feeling of guilt often experienced by those who have survived some catastrophe that took the lives of many others; derives in part from a feeling that they did not do enough to save the others who perished and in part from feelings of being unworthy relative to those who died; "survivor guilt was first noted in those who survived the Holocaust"
Based on WordNet 3.0, Farlex clipart collection. © 2003-2008 Princeton University, Farlex Inc.
________________________________________

My response to Danios (Danios in blockquotes):

"And I challenged Spencer to provide an Arabic dictionary that translates the word to mean “guilty person.”"

I can’t speak for Robert, but it seems to me that his claim that dhimmis means “protected” or “guilty” people depends on more specific definitions that can be formulated out of an analysis of the relevant materials and facts. We are dealing with a specialized topic, where the meanings of the terms are framed, understood, or interpreted in light of Islamic law, the Quran, Sunnah, and so forth. The exercise with Lane’s Lexicon should have shown Danios that there is more to reaching a judgement on this question than simply opening up superficial dictionaries, noting the absence of the word “guilt(y)” beside the word dhimmi, and concluding that, therefore, dhimmis doesn’t, or can’t, mean guilty people, or people regarded as guilty. The relevant materials include the Quran, Sunnah, and Islamic law, commentaries, as well as special dictionaries and linguistic texts of various sorts. Some relevant facts are psychological and social, pertaining to the conditions of being a dhimmi, the treatment of dhimmis, the feelings of guilt, the attributions of guilt, the punishments for the sin-crime for which one is assumed to be guilty, what the labels dhimma and dhimmi signify in terms of guilt, and so forth. Robert has cited relevant examples and support from multiple categories of evidence to indicate that the dhimmis in question are regarded in Islam as guilty of a major crime, namely, of rejecting the call to embrace Islam and accept Muhammad as a prophet and the Quran as a revelation from God. This dhimma is a punishment or penalty for the crime of failing to accept Islam after it has been offered and considered. The fact that the dhimma is imposed as a punishment indicates that those punished are classified, by the Muslim conquerors, as guilty people.

“Of course, Spencer could not meet this challenge, proving that he cannot defend his own writing.”

I disagree. However, note also that a consideration of Lane’s Lexicon and other sources shows that Danios can’t support his own conclusion that Spencer’s claim is completely without merit, “fabricated,” and so on. Danios’ claim is arguably more difficult to support than Spencer’s.

“(Spencer’s book is used by the Islamophobic world as an “authoritative” and “scholarly” source for understanding Islam, yet it cannot withstand even cursory critical analysis.) Of course, most of Spencer’s gullible audience does not speak Arabic and choose to unquestioningly believe him, mostly because they desperately want to believe him.”

The alleged characteristics of Spencer’s readers are not relevant. One does not need to speak Arabic to use online dictionaries, translators, Lane’s Lexicon, etc., to match up the relevant Arabic script with the English translations. (It helps of course, but is not strictly necessary in examining just one or a few words). Also, as mentioned above, the Arabic dictionary definitions are only part of the puzzle in answering this question properly. In any case, knowledge of Arabic is not really the issue here. It is a question of interpretation, and whether Spencer’s or Danios’ interpretation is more consistent with the evidence.

“Robert Spencer was forced to respond to my article, and amusingly he refused to take my name or mention the site I work for. He has responded to me several times in the past, and I am forever “he whose name shall not be mentioned.” I’m glad I bother him so much that he can’t even take my name! In any case, it would have been better for Spencer if he had chosen not to reply, because he ended up digging himself deeper into the sh*% hole he created for himself.”

These remarks are non-substantive and tell us more about Danios than anyone or anything else.

“Spencer’s reply reads as follows: [He includes Spencer’s reply, May 27 2010, The Dhimmis: Guilty People] “Notice here that Spencer has moved the goalposts, as he always does. In his response, Spencer has tried to prove that the two words–”dhimmi” and “guilty”–are related or connected to each other. But his initial claim (found on p.49 of his book), the one I refuted, was that the word dhimmi means “guilty person.” It does not. The authoritative Hans Wehr Arabic dictionary defines the word “dhimmi” as “a free non-Muslim subject living in a Muslim country.””

Danios is trying to prove what dhimmi doesn’t mean. He ought to know that the answer to that question is not going to be solved by consulting dictionaries that do not go into sufficient depth on—-much less address explicitly—-the issue at hand. He can go on all day citing superficial and non-relevant dictionaries that cannot decide the issue one way or another. The meaning of the word dhimmi, as applied to a particular kind of dhimmi, is not likely dealt with in general dictionaries.

“In fact, the very sources that Spencer has invoked support this. For example, Spencer cites the online Sakhr dictionary as a proof for his claim; yet, when we look up the word “dhimmi” in this dictionary, we find that it simply says: “a free non-Moslem under Moslem rule, adherent of a revealed religion.”

Again, the definition there does not address the full issue at hand, and does not go into sufficient depth on the question.

“It does not mean “guilty people” as Spencer explicitly claims on p.49 of his book, nor does it mean “guilty ones” as he implies in his response. The same is the case if we look up the Elias Modern Arabic Dictionary. Neither dictionary that Spencer cites says the word dhimmi means “guilty person”. Nor is “dhimma” defined with the word “guilty.”
If two words are related or connected to each other, they do not mean the same thing. They are two separate words entirely. Let’s say that dhimmi is related to the word “guilt”; in that case, why did Spencer claim that the word means “guilty person” or even “guilty”? Is this the level of Robert Spencer’s academic integrity and scholarship that he would use the word “means” when in fact he should have said “related (or connected) to”? There is a world of difference between the two. And this cannot be understood as a mere typo, since Spencer writes (emphasis is mine): “dhimmis, which means ‘protected’ or ‘guilty’ people–the Arabic word means both.” Whatever he meant by the word “means” is the same for “protected” and “guilty,” as we equates them both. In other words, the word “dhimmis” translates to “protected people”, and it equally translates to “guilty people.” He did not say: “dhimmi, which means ‘protected’ people, but is also related to the word ‘guilty.’”

Robert would have to be the one to address the remarks about what he meant. However, it need not be the case that to say that a word W means X and Y, puts X and Y as equally important to W, or equally frequent in usage to each other, or equal or even synonymous in meaning with each other, etc.

“All of this of course begs the question why the Prophet Muhammad didn’t simply refer to these non-Muslims as sha’ab mudhnib (which literally means “guilty people”) as opposed to “dhimmis” (which means “protected people”)? Does that not seem more straightforward and logical? Why use the word “protected people” if the intent was to cast them as “guilty people”?”

Here is part of Danios confusion about the different senses of guilt. Perhaps he has not kept track of the different senses of guilt in this discussion. Multiple senses of guilt are on the table in this discussion because (a) Spencer introduced them in his claim on p. 49 of the P.I.G., and (b) Danios addressed the different senses of guilty and made claims that dhimmi does not (or could not) mean guilty person in any way shape or form. That is, he is claiming that there is no justifiable sense in which dhimmis means guilty people. The senses are (1) the linguistic linkage between dhamma, dhimma, and dhimmi, which pertain to the meaning of blame for violation of some contract, and (2) that the specific non-Muslim dhimmis in question are considered in Islam as guilty of that for which they are blamed or held liable. These non-Muslim dhimmis are regarded as guilty of having made a major violation of a covenant with Allah and with Allah’s followers on Earth, particularly in the context of the Muslims’ da’wa invitation to Islam, followed by the Muslims’ jihad ultimatum to the non-Muslims which sets out the dhimma as a punishment, and then the imposition of the dhimma condition in which non-Muslims are not only treated as guilty but signifies them, marks them, stigmatizes them, as the guilty ones.

“I’ve quite clearly established that Robert Spencer’s claim that the word “dhimmi” means “guilty person” is complete fabrication.”

I think the claim of “complete fabrication” is not sustainable, and Danios’ comes close to admitting as much (see next), concessions he did not make in his original post.

“I will not, however, belabor this point and instead choose to move on. So if the word “dhimmi” does not mean “guilty person”, is it at least related to the word “guilty”? Yes, it is. Case closed? Not so fast. The two words are connected, but in a way that actually punches Spencer in the mouth and proves that he only dug himself into a deeper sh*% hole. The root letters dh-m-m do in fact have the meaning of “blame” or “censure”. But although dhimmi/dhimma is related to this root, the blame or censure in this word is not meant in the sense Spencer is using it.
The authoritative Lane’s Lexicon explains the sense in which “dhimma” (which means “compact, covenant or contract”) is related to dh-m-m: “because the breaking thereof necessitates blame” (Volume 3 p. 976). The larger Arabic dictionaries from which Lane’s is derived–such as Taj al-Arus and al-Muhit–say the same. In other words, the blame (or “guilt”) involved in the term “dhimma” is related to breaking the covenant of security, and the blame/guilt is ascribed to the Islamic state–not the non-Muslim resident. An Islamic state would be guilty/blameworthy if it did not uphold and protect the “sanctity” of the covenanted non-Muslim’s life and property.”

Here’s one of the spots where Danios gets it wrong. Note that he has now added his own unsupported interpretation of Lane's Lexicon (and of Hughes' Dictionary, see below). He is assuming that the sense of blame would only apply, viz. the word dhimma, if the ruling Muslim side broke the covenant. I don't find this to be credible, for the simple common-sense reason that what we are talking about (in sense 2) is the special type of dhimma where non-Muslims are subjugated by and required to pay a tax to Muslims in accordance with Islamic law. In any case, Danios appears to be mistaken. The Lane’s Lexicon, on page 976, vol 3, which Danios references, also mentions the following, which I quote:
“responsibility [for the fulfillment of an obligation, for the payment of a sum of money, for the restitution of a thing, or for the safety, or safe-keeping, of a thing or person]”.
Regarding the non-Muslim people of the dhimma, it states: "The people with whom a compact, or covenant, &c., has been made; {…} [and particularly] those, of the believers in a plurality of Gods, [by which here are meant the Christians, Jews, Sabians, but no others,] who pay the [tax called] *Jizya*; {…} [i.e., the free non-Muslim subjects of a Muslim government, who pay a poll tax for which the Muslims are responsible for their security and freedom and toleration…”
Regarding the word dhimmi “{…} is applied to a person of this class {…} because he is rendered secure, or free from fear, for his property and his blood, by means of the *Jizya*.
Notes. I write *Jizya* here to stand for the same word in Arabic script.
{…} indicate letter symbols and other items not essential to the point here.

Appearing to have overlooked this information (?), Danios then adds to the confusion by misunderstanding one of my claims (see below).

“Kinana of Khaybar, a loyal fan of JihadWatch.org, tries to defend Robert Spencer’s claim that dhimmi means “guilty person” by claiming that the dhimmi (non-Muslim resident) would be “guilty” if he/she broke the covenant. In other words, Kinana is ascribing the guilt to the dhimmi, not the Islamic state. Of course, Kinana’s claim is not true at all, but let’s for argument’s sake pretend it is. Let us suppose then that it is the dhimmi who is “guilty” if he breaks the covenant. Even if we were to concede this (which we don’t–but let’s just say we do), this still does not disprove that Robert Spencer is guilty of wholesale fabrication. Spencer did not just claim that the dhimmis are guilty; he told us why they are called “guilty people.”

In fact, I did not say the Islamic state would not be guilty if it violated the covenant. Danios is mistaken, and apparently hasn’t kept track of the different senses of guilt in this discussion and which I mentioned in separate points. In one point, I referred to T. P. Hughes’ quote, to indicate how guilt would be ascribed to any party who violated the dhimma (broad, general sense of dhimma as a covenant or agreement). This was in response to Danios claim about the general meaning of dhimma, but also in the context of responding to his overall article’s sweeping claim that the word dhimmis (people of the dhimma) did not or could not mean guilty people in any way shape or form.

In general (sense 1), either party, the Muslims or the non-Muslims, would be guilty (or due blame) for failing to meet their important responsibilities, liabilities, debts, etc., whatever those may be. In the main discussion I focus on the usage of the word dhimmis (in sense 2) that refers to those non-Muslims punished with the dhimma in the context of the jihad ultimatum. There are additional specific senses (under sense 2) in which they are guilty and Muslims are not, i.e., the non-Muslims reject Muhammad, the Quran, and Islam’s God Allah, and these non-Muslims are put in conditions that put this judged guilt on display.

“Here are Spencer’s words from p.49 of his book (emphasis is mine): “The dhimmi The Qur’an calls Jews and Christians “People of the Book;” Islamic law calls them dhimmis, which means “protected” or “guilty” people–the Arabic word means both…Jews and Christians are “guilty” because they have not only rejected Muhammad as a prophet, but have also distorted the legitimate revelations they have received from Allah. Because of that guilt, Islamic law dictates that Jews and Christians may live in Islamic states, but not as equals with Muslims.” In other words, Spencer has wholly imagined the claim that the word “dhimmis” means “guilty people” because they are guilty of “reject[ing] Muhammad as a prophet” or because they have “distorted the…revelations.””

No, Spencer backs up his claims with evidence from the Quran, Islamic law, and elsewhere.

“According to Kinana’s own argument, the word “dhimmi” is related to “guilt” not because of any of this but for breaking the covenant.”

Not true; I believe it indicates guilt in multiple senses. The sense which T.P. Hughes mentioned in the definition of zimma, and which is mentioned in Lane’s Lexicon, is only one of the senses of guilt that I cited.

“Again, even if we were to grant Kinana his fantastic defense,”

It’s a quote from T. P. Hughes on the zimmah (also essentially the same thing is stated in Lane’s Lexicon). If you accept those sources on this issue, then one would reasonably expect that you accept the specific point at issue about sense (1).

“…it still wouldn’t answer how it is that Spencer’s shoddy scholarship is such that he doesn’t mind completely fabricating the bolded part above.”

Saying it is “completely fabricated” doesn’t make it so.

“Secondly, and more importantly, Kinana is guilty of wholesale fabrication himself (which is why he fits right into the JihadWatch crew). The word “dhimma” is related to “guilty” not because the dhimmi is a “guilty person” but because the one granting the dhimma (protection) would be guilty if he/she violates it. Said in a clearer way, it is the Islamic state (not the non-Muslim resident) that would be guilty of violating the sanctity of the dhimmi’s life and property. Lane’s Lexicon reads: Dhimma: A compact, a covenant, a contract, a league, a treaty, an engagement, a bond, or an obligation; because the breaking thereof necessesitates blame: and a right, or due, for the neglect of which one is to be blamed: [an inviolable right or due:]… a thing that should be sacred, or inviolable; or which one is under an obligation to reverence, respect, or honour, and defend. The sacred and inviolable right that must be respected, honored, and defended is the safety (amaan) of the non-Muslim resident.”

Danios has left out the parts of Lane’s Lexicon on this page (vol. 3, p. 976) that refer to payment for security etc., and the non-Muslims’ responsibilities for payment (jizya) specifically in this regard (see below). He then accuses me of leaving out material deceptively, which I did not, as I will show (below).

“As Lane’s Lexicon says: dhimma signifies also amaan [as meaning security, or safety; security of life and property; protection or safeguard; a promise, or an assurance, of security, safety, protection, or safeguard...] But Kinana knew this quite well, evidenced by his deceitful half-quoting of another source. Says Kinana: “Thanks for addressing this Robert. Also from T. P. Hughes’ A Dictionary of Islam, 1) “ZIMMAH. , pl. zinam, from the root zamm, “to blame.” A compact, covenant, or contract, a league or treaty, any engagement or obligation, because the breaking thereof necessitates blame; and a right or due, for the neglect of which one is to be blamed. [...]“ and 2) “ZIMMI. , a member of the Ahlu ‘z-Zimmah, a non Muslim subject of a Muslim government, belonging to the Jewish, Christian, or Sabean creed. who, for the payment of a poll— or capitation-tax, enjoys security of his person and property in a Muhammadan country. [...]“ Note: Zimmah = dhimma, zimmi = dhimmi. The T. P. Hughes dictionary is available free online courtesy of Answering-Islam, see their Index to Islam. The section on the zimmi goes into considerable detail.” Notice how Kinana cites (the horribly outdated) T.P. Hughes’ A Dictionary of Islam, and yet he purposely places ellipses [...] in the definition of the word “zimmah” in order to hide the fact that the “blame” (or “guilt”) is attributed to the Islamic state, not the non-Muslim resident. This cannot be a mere mistake on the part of Kinana; it is academic deceit of the highest order. T.P. Hughes’ A Dictionary of Islam reads (emphasis is mine): Zimmah, pl. zinam, from the root zamm, “to blame.” A compact, covenant, or contract, a league or treaty, any engagement or obligation, because the breaking thereof necessitates blame; and a right or due, for the neglect of which one is to be blamed. The word is also synonymous with aman, in the sense of security of life and property, protection or safeguard, and promise of such; hence ahlu ‘z-zimmah [dhimmis], or , with suppression of the noun ahlu, simply az-zimmah, the people with whom a compact or covenant has been made, and particularly the Kitabis, or the people of the book, i.e. Jews and Christians, and the Majusi or Sabeans, who pay the poll-tax called jazyah. [JAZYAH.] An individual of this class–namely, a free non-Muslim subject of a Muslim Government, who pays a poll- or capitation-tax, for which the Muslims are responsible for his security, personal freedom, and religious toleration–is called zimmi (see the following article).”

The T.P. Hughes’ quote presented by Danios shows clearly that I did not exclude material deceptively. It frankly did not occur to me that anyone would come up with the bizarre interpretation that Danios has, that only Muslims could be guilty of violating the dhimma. In any case, I did not include the statements in T. P. Hughes about either the Muslims’ or the non-Muslims’ obligations, because I did not think this was at issue, and as a general rule only the relevant information is included. (Also, I provided the ellipses to properly indicate that material had been excluded in taking the quote, as is standard practice, and provided the source which anyone could go online to look at in as much detail as they like).

After he introduces his strange interpretation that non-Muslims can’t be guilty of violating the dhimma, he then wildly accuses me of deliberately trying to hide information about the role of “aman” in order to deceive people, i.e., “academic deceit of the highest order”! When Danios engages in such obvious hyperbole, with no foundation for the accusation, why do some of his readers continue to take seriously what he writes?

“Notice quite clearly that both A Dictionary of Islam as well as Lane’s Lexicon equate the word “dhimma” with the word “amaan”.”

Not necessarily. Synonymous means having the same or similar meaning. In any case, the safety or protection represents only one side of the dhimma covenant between non-Muslims and Muslims.

“Amaan means “safety” and is related to the word amaanat which means “trust, keepsake.” If, for example, a person gives his property to you to keep it safe until he returns from a business trip, then his wealth is an amaanat (i.e. given in trust) to you. If you violate the sanctity of that trust by failing to safeguard his wealth, then you would be blameworthy/guilty for doing that. It would be absolutely absurd to claim that the person who entrusted his wealth to you is blameworthy/guilty.”

Obviously, I don’t dispute that aman means protection etc., but the covenant (dhimma) at issue (between Muslims and non-Muslims) involves jizya payment for “protection,” and Lane’s Lexicon does have that important information. So does T. P. Hughes' Dictionary:

“AMAN . Protection given by a Muslim Conqueror to those who pay Jizyah, or poll tax. [JIHAD.]”

From T. P. Hughes’ entry for jihad:
“[...] When an infidel’s country is conquered by a Muslim ruler, its inhabitants are offered three alternatives:--
(1) The reception of Islam, in which case the conquered become enfranchised citizens of the Muslim state.
(2) The Payment of a poll-tax (Jizyah), by which unbelievers in Islam obtain protection, and become Zimmis, provided they are not the idolaters of Arabia.
(3) Death by the sword, to those who will not pay the poll tax.[...]”

From T. P. Hughes’ entry for jizya:
“JIZYAH
The capitation tax, which is levied by Muhammadan rulers upon subjects who are of a different faith, but claim protection (aman). It is founded upon a direct injunction of the Qur'an: "Make was upon such of those, to whom the Scriptures have been given, as believe not in God or in the last day and forbid not that which God and his Apostles have forbidden and who profess not the profession of truth until they pay tribute (jizyah) out of their hand, and they be humbled.
According to the Hidayah (vol. ii. p. 211), jizyah is of two kinds: that which is established voluntarily, and that which is enforced. The usual rate is one dinar for every male person, females and children being exempt according to Abu Hanifah, but included by Ash Shafi'i. It should be imposed upon Jews, and Christians, and Magians, but it should not be accepted from the Arabian idolators, or from apostates, who should be killed. But from idolators of other countries than Arabia it may be accepted. It should not be levied upon some monks, or hermits, or paupers, or slaves. He who pays the capitation tax and obtains protection from the Muhammadan state is called a zimmi.”

Also from Francis Joseph Steingass, A Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary (which contains also some Arabic terms):
2. (page 559)
"A ذمی ẕimmī, One tolerated by the Muhammadan law, on paying an annual poll- tax; a tributary, client, subject; a Christian or Jew."

Thus there are obligations incumbent on both sides.

“Likewise, the word “amaan” means “safety” and refers to “safe passage” granted to a person by the state. The state promises to safeguard the person’s live, and would be blameworthy/guilty for not upholding this.”

Right, and the dhimmi (non-Muslim under Islamic rule) would be blameworthy/guilty for failing to pay the jizya due for maintenance of the “protection,” or for any number of other possible violations mentioned in Islamic law as specifically imposed on dhimmis but not necessarily mentioned in the dictionaries.

“For example, ambassadors from other empires would visit the Islamic caliph, and be granted amaan (safe passage) to travel in the Islamic lands without fear of being harmed. This amaan was granted without any payment or other obligation on the ambassador, so it cannot be said that the ambassador is the one blameworthy/guilty of breaching the covenant of security. Rather, it is the state that would be blameworthy/guilty should it harm the ambassador. Kinana’s own source, A Dictionary of Islam, says: The word [zimmah] is also synonymous with aman, in the sense of security of life and property, protection or safeguard, and promise of such…the Muslims are responsible for [the zimmi's] security, personal freedom, and religious toleration.”

Yes, but again, synonymous does not necessarily mean equal. And again, the full definition that Danios is quoting from (p. 976 in Lane’s Lexicon) mentions the jizya, one of the liabilities, debts, or obligations required of the dhimmis. Moreover, jizya is mentioned in the Steingass dictionary entry for zimmi (see above), and in relation to the “protection” in the definition of aman in T. P. Hughes (see above).

“There is absolutely no doubt that it is the Islamic state that is blameworthy/guilty if it violates the dhimma. It therefore cannot at all be said that dhimmi means (or even implies) “guilty people” or “guilty ones.””

Danios has arrived at his own bizarre interpretation, whereby non-Muslims cannot possibly be guilty of breaking the dhimma (e.g., by failing to pay the jizya, etc.).

“Even if Robert Spencer or Kinana of Khaybar were to claim that it could also refer to the dhimmi if he breaks the contract (which does not at all seem to be true, but let’s just say it is for argument’s sake), then this is an incredibly weak polemical point, since the Islamic state is also “guilty” in the same way then!”

In sense (1) of dhimma as a general term, either or any party to the agreement would be rightly to blame for breaking it. That’s the general sense given in both Lane’s Lexicon and T. P. Hughes’ Dictionary. In sense (2), for non-Muslim dhimmis living under Islamic law, they are considered and treated as guilty for additional reasons, namely, violating Allah’s covenant by refusing to accept Islam, Muhammad, and the Quran.

“Furthermore, as I mentioned in my previous reply, the word “dhimma” was used for Muslims as well: …The exact same word–dhimma–is used for both Jews and Muslims in the Constitution of Medina. This document declares that all who uphold the pledge–Jew and Muslim alike–are granted dhimma (protection). If the word meant or implied “guilt”, why did the Prophet Muhammad include the Muslims under this? As I said before, it is complete fabrication on the part of Robert Spencer to claim that the word means “guilty”.”

Again, this seems to be more confusion about senses (1) and (2), and doesn’t affect Spencer’s argument about non-Muslim dhimmis.

“But to completely shatter Spencer and Kinana’s argument, I will reproduce the words of the Prophet Muhammad himself, who said in a hadith narrated in Sahih al-Bukhari: Whoever prays our [Islamic] prayer, faces our Qiblah [Mecca], and eats our slaughtered meat [Zabiha] is a Muslim who is under the dhimma [protection] of God and His Messenger. If we say “dhimma” also means “guilt”, then the saying makes no sense, as it would read “a Muslim…is under the guilt of Allah and His Messenger.” Complete nonsense.”

The confusion continues. Danios apparently doesn’t accept what’s in Lane’s Lexicon then, about this meaning of due blame (e.g., “blamed, dispraised, discommended, censured, found fault with, or reprehended, him, in respect of evil conduct,” and “should be blamed,” and so on; see p. 975).

“Rather, the word means “protection,” and in the above quote the meaning is that God and His Messenger promise the believers to uphold the sanctity of the Muslim’s life. Clearly, the word “dhimma” cannot mean something negative if it is equally applied to the Muslim believers.”

Here Danios is neglecting sense (1) of due blame etc...

“As I have said repeatedly, Spencer’s entire claim is complete fabrication.”

...and here Danios neglects sense (2) and all the evidence Spencer and I brought forth to support it.

“Spencer and Kinana then try to obfuscate the issue by claiming that non-Muslims in general are “guilty” of sins such as shirk. This seems like a strong point to the uninitiated, until of course you think about it. If Muslims believe that non-Muslims are “guilty” of shirk, then what of Hindus who believe that unbelievers are “guilty” of eating beef? Or what of Christians who believe that unbelievers are “guilty” of not taking Christ as their Lord and Savior? For that matter, Christians believe that whoever is guilty of this cannot attain salvation and will thus burn in Hell. Yes, unbelievers would be–by definition–guilty of unbelief! This is not something unique to Islam.”

Whether or not guilt is ascribed for mere religious unbelief in other religions is not the issue here. The fact is that the Quran claims that non-Muslims have committed the worst sort of crime or sin; i.e., they are guilty of not accepting/believing Muhammad, the Quran, and Islam. Sufficient evidence has already been presented above by Robert, and by me, to support this point.

“Furthermore, Muslims are also “guilty” of many sins, and Islamic theology states that no human being–not even the best Muslim–could be completely blameless of sin. So if non-Muslims are guilty of shirk, Muslims are guilty of other sins. But none of this has anything to do with the word “dhimmi” or “dhimma.” Of course, both Spencer and Kinana know this very well and are just desperately trying to obfuscate the issue. The word “dhimmi” is derived from “dhimma”, a word that was used for Muslims as well! If the non-Muslims are to be “under dhimma” because of their shirk, then why are Muslims also “under dhimma” (as quoted in the hadith above)? In fact, by definition, a Muslim is automatically under the dhimma (protection) of the Islamic state. So when Kinana feigns to be perplexed by me, saying: "Interesting that Danios thinks the dhimma is something positive." I respond by saying: your ignorance is profound. We know for a fact that “dhimma” is something positive, because it is granted to Muslim believers, as the Prophet Muhammad declared: Whoever prays our [Islamic] prayer, faces our Qiblah [Mecca], and eats our slaughtered meat [Zabiha] is a Muslim who is under the dhimma [protection] of God and His Messenger.”

See sense (1).

“And this same protection (a good thing!) was granted to non-Muslims who paid the jizya.

Sense (1) and (2) should not be confused.

“To conclude, Robert Spencer is an intellectual huckster. His writings are full of wholesale fabrications, and he has become too accustomed to nobody spending the time to thoroughly debunk his nonsense. Unfortunately for him, that time has come to an end. Spencer’s claim that “dhimmi” means “guilty person” is completely false, and no Arabic dictionary supports this. Blame/guilt is related to “dhimma”, but Spencer is incorrect to claim that the dhimmi (non-Muslim resident) is the “guilty one” for disbelieving in the Prophet Muhammad or distorting the scriptures. Rather, the blame/guilt is attributed to the Islamic state should it violate the inviolable rights of the non-Muslim residents. This, according to the most authoritative Arabic dictionaries, including those cited by Spencer and Kinana.”

No it isn’t; Danios is adding his own interpretation, which is not supported by the Lane’s Lexicon or T. P. Hughes’ Dictionary (see above). Danios’ claim that Spencer’s argument is “completely false”—-a sweeping categorical denial—-is simply not sustainable in light of the above evidence.

“We see that Robert Spencer completely flipped reality on its head. As for Kinana of Khaybar, he too is an intellectual huckster, evidenced by his deceitful half-quoting of a passage of T.P. Hughes’ A Dictionary of Islam, the entirety of which negates his claim and supports mine.”

As I’ve shown, my quotation was legitimate. Danios is ignoring the evidence right in front of him which, fortunately, everyone else can now read and judge for themselves, since both Lane’s Lexicon and T. P. Hughes’ Dictionary are available free online.

“As I said before, Spencer has, by replying to me, dug himself into a deeper sh*% hole.”

I disagree. The material from Lane’s Lexicon (pp. 975-976) further supports the linguistic aspect of Spencer’s argument.

“Update: If you turn to page 133 in the Hans Wehr Arabic dictionary, you will find that cowardice (jubn) and cheese (jubna) share the same root: j-b-n. Are these two words related in such a way that a man who is a coward is also a…cheese? Or does eating cheese make you a coward? Using Spencer’s logic, probably. (hat tip to Ibksi for this humorous but effective point)”

Of course, the fact that words share a root doesn’t necessarily mean they share meaning (e.g., Islam doesn’t mean salam). However, as the Lane’s Lexicon and T.P. Hughes’ quotes show, dhamma, dhimma, and dhimmi do share a common thread of meaning, as shown above.

Lastly, from T. P. Hughes’ Dictionary, here is some more of what he writes under his entry for zimmi:

“[...] One of the most urgent duties enjoined by Muhammad upon the Muslim or true believer, was the Jihad fi Sabili 'llahi, or exertion in the road of God, i.e. warfare for the spread of Islam, amongst the infidels within and without Arabia [JIHAD]; thus the whole world came to be regarded as divided into two great portions, the Daru 'l-Harb and Daru 'l-Islam [DARU 'L-HARB, DARU 'L-ISLAM] —the territories of War and the territories of Peace. These two divisions, one of which represented the land of infidelity and darkness, the other that of light arid faiths, were supposed to be in a continual state of open or latent belligerency, until the Daru 'l-Islam should have absorbed the Daru 'l-Harb and faith conquered unbelief. Infidelity, however, admits of degrees. Its worst shape is idolatry, that is, the worship of idols instead of or Insides the one true God; and this, again, is a crime most abominable on the part of of Arabs, "since the Prophet was sent amongst them, and manifested himself in the midst of them, and the Qur'an was delivered down in their language." Of an equally atrocious character is the infidelity of apostates, "because they have become infidels, after having been led into the way of faith, and made acquainted with its excellence." In the case of neither, therefore, is a compromise admissible they must accept or re-embrace the faith, or pay with their lives the full penalty of their crime.
With regard to the idolaters of a non-Arabic or 'Ajam country, which latter expression in the times of early Islam particularly the applied to the Persian Empire, ash-Shafi'i maintains that destruction is incurred by them also; but the other learned doctors law agree that it is lawful to reduce them to slavery, thus allowing them, as it were, a of respite during which it may please God to direct them into the right path, but making, at the same time, their persons and substance subservient to the cause of Islam.
The least objectionable form of infidelity in the eyes of Muhammad and his followers, Abu is that of the Kitabis or people of the Book ahlu 'l-kitab), i.e. the Jews as possessors of the Old Testament, or Taurat, and the Christians, to whom. Moreover, the Injil (Gospel,
________________________________________
711
was revealed. As they are not guilty of an absolute denial, but only of a partial perversion of the truth, only part of the punishment for disbelief is their due, and it is imposed upon them in the shape of a tribute. called poll- or capitation tax [JAZYAH.], by means of which they secure protection for their property, personal freedom, and religious toleration from the Muslim Government. The same privilege is extended to the Majusi or Sabeans whose particular form of worship was more leniently judged by Muhammad and the Traditionists than that if the idolaters of Persia.[...]”

[my bolding added]

(Again, that source can be found at Answering-Islam). In quoting from Hughes, Danios didn't quote the part where Hughes himself refers to zimmis (specifically the Kitabi dhimmis) as guilty of a “partial perversion of the truth.” They are not considered as guilty as idol-worshippers or apostates, but still guilty. They are considered guilty enough to be punished with that humiliating signifier of guilt known as the dhimma (imposed on non-Muslims), forced on them by jihad warfare or the threat of jihad warfare.

BTW, T. P. Hughes' (encyclopedic) A Dictionary of Islam, and Lane's Lexicon, are not "superficial dictionaries." I was using that phrase to refer to the others that don't go into much depth and therefore can't help much in this debate.

For those who are interested, the Lane's Lexicon online that I was using is freely available at Studyquran.co.uk , though there are other sites that have it.

It is useful to highlight exactly what it was that Danios claimed originally (in his part 1 article about "Intellectual huckster...") about what Robert wrote re dhimmis as guilty people on p. 49 of the P.I.G. It's important to remember what Danios is actually claiming. He is not merely fussing over optimal word choice or presentation. He is claiming that Robert's claim is completely false, without a shred of truth. Here's Danios:

"Wow. Just wow. Usually Spencer dresses his lie up in half-truths, obfuscation, and sensationalism before he peddles it to his hate-mongering audience. But here we have a case of complete fabrication. Dhimmi means “protected person” and in no way, shape, or form means “guilty.” One can simply open up an Arabic dictionary to prove that this has absolutely no basis in the reality-based world. For example, here’s what Lisan al-Arab (considered the most reliable Arabic dictionary in the classical age of Islam) says: [includes quote of that dictionary not showing the word guilty] You can check any other Arabic dictionary to prove that “dhimmi” does not mean “guilty.” The word “madhmum” shares the same root as “dhimmi”, but so do many other words. To imply that there is a necessary connection between the two is pure idiocy, and proof of one’s ignorance of Arabic. They are quite simply two separate words entirely.

[brackets added]

In light of what Spencer and I have presented here, does anyone still think that Danios was right when he sweepingly and categorically told his readers that the word dhimmi, as describing the non-Muslim under Islamic law, in "no way, shape, or form means "guilty"" [as in, guilty person]? Again, why didn't Danios, in Part 1, explain what Robert and I have explained?

Danios concluded:

"As we see, not only does Robert Spencer’s claim have no basis in the Arabic language, but his own argument comes to bite him in the ass. The question remains: is this a result of Spencer’s lying nature or merely a consequence of his profound ignorance? Let me know which one you think it is in the comments below."

Another possibility is overlooked: That Danios has wildly overstated his case, and has made some mistakes.

Regarding Danios' bizarre follow-up claim (in part 2 of his "intellectual huckster" article), which I addressed above, where he claimed that only the Muslim state could be guilty of violating the dhimma, I think it should be obvious to anyone who has a basic grasp of the issue that either side (Muslims or non-Muslims) could possibly violate the dhimma covenant. Yet Danios seems like the kind of person who needs this sort of thing spelled out, so I have found three more quotes to illustrate this point.

Regarding temporary Aman truce pact between a non-Muslim and the Muslim authority when the former is visiting the latter's jurisdiction (my bolding added):

The temporary pact ends by a set date, but
“[I]f no time has been set, the pact ends in one of two ways, namely, by express dissolution by either side, or implicitly, if, for instance, the harbis go out on the highways with the permission of their ruler in order to rob Moslems.”
p. 302

Regarding long-term or "perpetual" aman:

It is dissolved if the dhimmi “becomes Moslem,” “returns to the land of the harbis,” or if he “fights the Moslems.”
p. 303

From Nicolas P. Aghnides, “Classification of Persons,” in Mohammedan Theories of Finance, quoted as Chapter 31 in Andrew Bostom’s edited volume The Legacy of Jihad (2005), pp. 301-304.
-----------------------

Next, from a pro-Islam source:

The Classical Opinion of the Rights of the Dhimmis
Dr. Amini Amir Abdullah and Dr. Siti Zobidah Omar
Universiti Putra Malaysia

"Abu Hamid Abu Sulaiman defines dhimmah as "a sort of permanent agreement between Muslim political authorities and non-Muslim subjects which provides protection for Muslims and peaceful internal relations with non-Muslim subjects."" p. 1

"The agreed mutual consent between dhimmi and Muslims is inviolable. It is only broken when a dhimmi commits a serious unlawful crime such as leaving an Islamic state in order to join the enemy or cause an open revolt on the state or try to demolished it."
p. 4

[my bolding added]

I have not access to the original quote above containing the phrase "protection for Muslims," but I have verified the quote at two other sources, e.g.,
sudjanamihardja.multiply.com/reviews
and
witness-pioneer.org/VSchool/LectureHP101/L_1_IIFR

In any case, it is clear that non-Muslims must also protect Muslims, e.g., Non-Muslims must not fight them, etc., just as Muslims must not fight the non-Muslims who obey Islamic law.
-------------------------------------------

Next example:

"Dhimma is the term used in Islamic law for the covenant of protection (also called aman) that exists between the Islamic state and the tolerated members of the Qur’anically-recognized non-Muslim religious communities (Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and Sabaeans) who live permanently within its boundaries. The medieval Arab lexicographers explained the word as being derived from the root for “blame,” meaning that to violate the covenant was blameworthy. The protégés under this covenant were designated individually as dhimmis and collectively as ahl-al-dhimma (people of the covenant)."

[author goes on to describe how the dhimmis paid for this protection and so on...]

“Public demonstrations of pomp and power by non-Muslim officials were viewed by the pious Muslim masses as violations of the dhimma and at times led to violence not only against the offending official but against his entire community.”

Norman Stillman pp. 205-207
Josef W. Meri, Jere L. Bacharach, Medieval Islamic Civilization: A-K, index Volume 1 of Medieval Islamic Civilization: An Encyclopedia. 2006

----------------------------

That last source gives us an historical example of the perspective of the Muslim "masses" on dhimma violations, i.e., a popular recognition that dhimmis could be in violation of the covenant.

The last source also confirms once again that the Arabic lexicographers described the connection between blameworthy (dhamma) and the meaning of the dhimma, i.e., that one would be blameworthy for violating the covenant. That's a semantic or meaning-based connection, not just a grammatical (phonological) one.

Based on the evidence presented so far in this debate, I would have to conclude that Danios has not supported his absolute, sweeping, categorical denials stating that dhimmis "in no way, shape, or form" means guilty people, when referring to non-Muslim dhimmis. Robert, however, has shown reasonable support for his claim, and I have verified and supplemented this through my own assessment. Note again this is not some minor fussing over word choice; Danios has committed himself, up to this point, to the claim that Robert's statement was completely false. That's simply not sustainable in light of the evidence.

Typo. I meant "...so I have found three more [sources with] quotes to illustrate this point."

Mark Durie has recently posted an article on his blogsite about the dhimma. Very interesting article, well worth reading.
markdurie.blogspot.com/2010/05/islam-and-dhimma-pact.html

For example, Durie notes the symbolism of the jizya payment rituals in which the Muslim tax collector would strike the dhimmi on the neck or head. Durie writes:

"[...] Muslim commentators provide various elaborations of features of the jizya ritual, all designed to degrade the dhimmi and represent his vulnerability under the Muslims’ hand. Commentators refer to two distinct blows to the neck (on the back of the neck or under the ear), which are execution gestures, corresponding to different methods of decapitation, as is taking hold of the beard.[19] The word labbaba, used in many commentaries on Q9:29 to describe dragging the dhimmi by the throat, also symbolises killing, but in a different way.[...]"

Durie provides some more information and examples of the Muslim authority's use of this type of threatening gesture on dhimmis historically.

More from the Encyclopedia of Islam, available online:

"♦ dar al-harb (A) : the territories under perpetual threat of a missionary war, djihad. The classical practice of regarding the territories immediately adjoining the lands of Islam as the ~ and inviting their princes to adopt Islam under the pain of inva-sion, is reputed to date back to the Prophet. Classically, the ~ includes those countries where the Muslim law is not in force, in the matter of worship and the protection of the faithful and the dhimmis. I 26a; II 126a; II 131b"

"dhimma (A) : the term used to designate the sort of indefinitely renewed contract through which the Muslim community accords hospitality and protection to members of other revealed religions, on condition of their acknowledging the domination of Islam; the beneficiaries of the ~ are also collectively referred to as the ~, or ahl al-dhimma. Originally only Jews and Christians were involved; soon, however, it became necessary to consider the Zoroastrians, and later, especially in Central Asia, other minor faiths not mentioned in the Qur'an. II 227a
In law, ~ is a legal term with two meanings: in legal theory, ~ is the legal quality which makes the individual a proper subject of law, that is, a proper addressee of the rule which provides him with rights or charges him with obligations. In this sense, it may be identified with legal personality (fi r l-dhimma 'in personam'). The second meaning is that of the legal practitioners and goes back to the root of the notion of obligation. It is the fides which binds the debtor to his creditor. II 231a; XII 207a; abstract financial responsibility. I 27a
♦ dhimmi (A) : the beneficiary of the dhimma. A - is defined as against the Muslim and the idolater; and also as against the harbi who is of the same faith but lives in territories not yet under Islam; and finally as against the musta'min, the for-eigner who is granted the right of living in an Islamic territory for a short time (one year at most). II 227a"

From the Wehr Arabic Dictionary [Wehr, Hans, and J. Milton Cowan. A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic. London: Harrap (etc.), 1976, available online at archive.org/stream/Dict_Wehr.pdf]:

p. 312
“dimma pl. dimam protection, care, custody; covenant of protection, compact; responsibility, answerableness; financial obligation, liability, debt; inviolability, security of life and property; safeguard, guarantee, security; conscience [[...] the free non-Muslim subjects living in Muslim countries who, in return for paying the capital tax, enjoyed protection and safety [...]]”
“dimmi a zimmi, a free non-Muslim subject living in a Muslim country (see dimma)”
"damim censured; blameworthy, objectionable, reprehensible; ugly, unfair, nasty."
"damima blame, censure"
"madamma blame, censure"
"madmum: censured; blameworthy, objectionable, reprehensible"

Note in the definition for dimma the words responsibility, answerableness; and liability, and debt. In particular, the word responsibility (and answerableness) carries multiple meanings much like those of the word dimma itself. Responsible can mean that the parties to the dhimma are (answerable or) responsible for (or entrusted with, charged with, or held accountable for) following the terms of that covenant; or it can mean that one or more of the parties is (answerable or) responsible for (to blame for, or guilty for, charged for) breaking the covenant.

And again from Lane's Lexicon (dhimma, p. 976):

"A compact, a covenant, a contract, a league, a treaty, an engagement, a bond, or an obligation; {...} because the breaking thereof necessitates blame [...]"

On the assumption that both sides (Muslims and non-Muslims) have "responsibility" to the terms and conditions of the dhimma (i.e., they are responsible-entrusted to keep the terms and responsible-blameworthy if they don't), let's have a look again at some relevant definitions.

From the onestop dictionary online,
the MacMillan Dictionary

"responsibility
1. [uncountable] the state or job of being in charge of someone or something and of making sure that what they do or what happens to them is right or satisfactory
[...]
Synonyms or related words for this meaning of Synonyms or related words for this meaning of responsibility: accountability, obligation, duty, compulsion, guardianship
[...]
2[countable] a duty that you have to do because it is part of your job or position
[...]
Synonyms or related words for this meaning of Synonyms or related words for this meaning of responsibility: accountability, obligation, duty, compulsion, guardianship
[...]
3 [uncountable] blame for something that has happened
claim/accept responsibility for something:
[...]
Synonyms or related words for this meaning of Synonyms or related words for this meaning of responsibility: accountability, obligation, duty, compulsion, guardianship, [also listed "trust, commitment, concern, onus."]

The American Heritage Dictionary

re•spon•si•ble (r -sp n s -b l) KEY

ADJECTIVE:
1. Liable to be required to give account, as of one's actions or of the discharge of a duty or trust.
2. Involving personal accountability or ability to act without guidance or superior authority: a responsible position within the firm.
3. Being a source or cause.
4. Able to make moral or rational decisions on one's own and therefore answerable for one's behavior.
5. Able to be trusted or depended upon; reliable.
6. Based on or characterized by good judgment or sound thinking: responsible journalism.
7. Having the means to pay debts or fulfill obligations.
8. Required to render account; answerable: The cabinet is responsible to the parliament.
________________________________________
ETYMOLOGY:
Obsolete French, corresponding to, from Latin resp nsus, past participle of respond re, to respond ; see respond

OTHER FORMS:
re•spon si•ble•ness(Noun), re•spon si•bly(Adverb)

SYNONYMS:
responsible, answerable, liable, accountable, amenable

These adjectives share the meaning obliged to answer, as for one's actions, to an authority that may impose a penalty for failure. Responsible often implies the satisfactory performance of duties or the trustworthy care for or disposition of possessions: "I am responsible for the ship's safety" (Robert Louis Stevenson). Answerable suggests a moral or legal responsibility subject to review by a higher authority: The court held the parents answerable for their minor child's acts of vandalism. Liable may refer to a legal obligation, as to pay damages or to perform jury duty: Wage earners are liable to income tax. Accountable especially emphasizes giving an account of one's discharge of a responsibility: "The liberal philosophy holds that enduring governments must be accountable to someone beside themselves" (Walter Lippmann). Amenable implies being subject to the control of an authority and therefore the absence of complete autonomy: "There is no constitutional tribunal to which [the king] is amenable" (Alexander Hamilton). See also Synonyms at reliable.
Usage Note:
Some critics have maintained that responsible should not be used to describe things, since only persons can be held accountable. The application to things is justifiable, however, when responsible is used to mean "being the source or cause of." In an earlier survey, a majority of the Usage Panel accepted the sentence Faulty construction was responsible for the crash.

re•spon•si•bil•i•ty (r -sp n s -b l -t ) KEY

NOUN:
pl. re•spon•si•bil•i•ties
1. The state, quality, or fact of being responsible.
2. Something for which one is responsible; a duty, obligation, or burden.
---------------------------

Now again consider the definition for blame

blame (bl m)
tr.v. blamed, blam•ing, blames
1. To hold responsible.
2. To find fault with; censure.
3. To place responsibility for (something): blamed the crisis on poor planning.
n.
1. The state of being responsible for a fault or error; culpability.
2. Censure; condemnation.
Idiom:
to blame
1. Deserving censure; at fault.
2. Being the cause or source of something: A freak storm was to blame for the power outage.
________________________________________
[Middle English blamen, from Old French blasmer, blamer, from Vulgar Latin *blast m re, alteration of Late Latin blasph m re, to reproach; see blaspheme.]
________________________________________
blam er n.
Synonyms: blame, fault, guilt
These nouns denote a sense of responsibility for an offense. Blame stresses censure or punishment for a lapse or misdeed for which one is held accountable: The police laid the blame for the accident on the driver.
Fault is culpability for wrongdoing or failure: It is my own fault that I wasn't prepared for the exam.
Guilt applies to willful wrongdoing and stresses moral culpability: The prosecution had evidence of the defendant's guilt. See Also Synonyms at criticize.

The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved.

Thesaurus

"blame
verb
1. hold responsible, accuse, denounce, indict, impeach, incriminate, impute, recriminate, point a or the finger at They blamed the army for most of the atrocities.
hold responsible [antonyms] clear, excuse, forgive, acquit, vindicate, exonerate, absolve.
2. attribute to, credit to, assign to, put down to, ascribe to, impute to The police blamed the explosion on terrorists.
3. (used in negative constructions) criticize, charge, tax, blast, condemn, flame (informal), put down, disapprove of, censure, reproach, chide, admonish, tear into (informal), diss (slang, chiefly U.S.), find fault with, reprove, upbraid, lambast(e), reprehend, express disapprobation of I do not blame them for trying to make some money.
criticize [antonyms] praise, acclaim, compliment, approve of, commend, big up (slang, chiefly Caribbean)
noun
responsibility, liability, rap (slang), accountability, onus, culpability, answerability Bad women never take the blame for anything.
responsibility [antonyms] credit, honour, praise, tribute, acclaim, commendation, Brownie points
to blame at fault, responsible, guilty, culpable, blameworthy Who is to blame here?
Collins Thesaurus of the English Language – Complete and Unabridged 2nd Edition. 2002 © HarperCollins Publishers 1995, 2002"
[brackets and emphasis added]
--------------------

Again the definition for guilt

guilt (g lt)
n.
1.
a. The fact of being responsible for the commission of an offense. See Synonyms at blame.
b. Law The fact of having been found to have violated a criminal law; legal culpability.
c. Responsibility for a mistake or error.
2.
a. Remorseful awareness of having done something wrong.
b. Self-reproach for supposed inadequacy or wrongdoing.
tr.v. guilt•ed, guilt•ing, guilts
To make or try to make (someone) feel guilty.
________________________________________
[Middle English gilt, from Old English gylt, crime.]
The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved.

guilt [gɪlt]
n
1. the fact or state of having done wrong or committed an offence
2. (Law) responsibility for a criminal or moral offence deserving punishment or a penalty
3. remorse or self-reproach caused by feeling that one is responsible for a wrong or offence
4. Archaic sin or crime
[Old English gylt, of obscure origin]
Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003

"ThesaurusLegend: Synonyms Related Words Antonyms
Noun 1. guilt - the state of having committed an offense
guiltiness
condition, status - a state at a particular time; "a condition (or state) of disrepair"; "the current status of the arms negotiations"
blameworthiness, culpability, culpableness - a state of guilt
bloodguilt - the state of being guilty of bloodshed and murder
complicity - guilt as an accomplice in a crime or offense
criminalism, criminality, criminalness - the state of being a criminal
guilt by association - the attribution of guilt (without proof) to individuals because the people they associate with are guilty
impeachability, indictability - the state of being liable to impeachment
[antonym] innocence - a state or condition of being innocent of a specific crime or offense; "the trial established his innocence"
2. guilt - remorse caused by feeling responsible for some offense
guilt feelings, guilt trip, guilty conscience
compunction, remorse, self-reproach - a feeling of deep regret (usually for some misdeed)
survivor guilt - a deep feeling of guilt often experienced by those who have survived some catastrophe that took the lives of many others; derives in part from a feeling that they did not do enough to save the others who perished and in part from feelings of being unworthy relative to those who died; "survivor guilt was first noted in those who survived the Holocaust"
Based on WordNet 3.0, Farlex clipart collection. © 2003-2008 Princeton University, Farlex Inc."
[brackets and bolding added]

And to further show that this reading of "responsibility" is relevant to the meaning of dhimma, here is from Danios' own cited examples of definitions from the Lisan al-Arab [note the Arabic script may not reproduce well here, but the English descriptions are the aspect of interest]:

ورجل ذِمِّيٌّ: معناه رجل له عهد"
(Dhimmi: A person with whom there exists a treaty)
والذِّمَّةُ العهد
(And ‘dhimmah’ means treaty)
قال الجوهري: الذِّمَّةُ أَهل العقد.
(Al-Jawhari says: Dhimmah refers to the people with whom there is a treaty)
وقال أَبو عبيدة الذِّمّةُ الأَمان
(Abu Ubaydah says: Dhimmah means protection/security)
وقوم ذِمَّةٌ: مُعاهدون أَي ذوو ذِمَّةٍ
(A Nation of Dhimmah: The people who sign a treaty, i.e. the people of ‘responsibility’)"

"Responsibility," again, as shown above, can mean that the parties to the dhimma are (answerable or) responsible for (or entrusted with, charged with, or accountable for, liable for) following the terms of that covenant; and it can mean that one or more of the parties is (answerable or) responsible for (to blame for, or guilty for, charged for) breaking the covenant.

Danios also said in part 1 of his rebuttal on the meaning of the word dhimmis,

"You can check any other Arabic dictionary to prove that “dhimmi” does not mean “guilty.” The word “madhmum” shares the same root as “dhimmi”, but so do many other words. To imply that there is a necessary connection between the two is pure idiocy, and proof of one’s ignorance of Arabic. They are quite simply two separate words entirely."

Note that he does not actually show his readers what madhmum means. But Hans Wehr (see my citation above) defines it briefly as follows:
"madmum: censured; blameworthy, objectionable, reprehensible"

While it is true that madhmum is a different word than dhimma, Danios goes too far in trying to separate them completely. The sources I've cited above (Hughes, Lane, Stillman) explicitly show the linguistic connection between the root dhamma (blameworthy), dhimma (covenant, the breaking of which would be blameworthy), and dhimmis "the people of responsibility" (to be trusted or blamed). According to those sources, the connection or overlap is also semantic or meaning-based, not just phonological (grammatical); there is some significant shared meaning, not just a shared root.

Again from Lisan al-Arab, as quoted by Danios:

"A Nation of Dhimmah: The people who sign a treaty, i.e. the people of ‘responsibility’"

Again, from Lane's Lexicon, the definition of dhimma:

"A compact, a covenant, a contract, a league, a treaty, an engagement, a bond, or an obligation; {...} because the breaking thereof necessitates blame [...]"

Next, the definition of responsible as provided in the free online Sakhr Arabic English dictionary:

"legally or morally obliged, eg to take care of something or somebody or to carry out a duty, and liable to be blamed if one fails. , أَمِين , ضامِن , قَيِّم , مُطَالَب
"

The definition of responsibility from the same Sakhr dictionary:

"responsibility
being responsible or accountable
, اِلْتِزام ( بِـ ) , تَبِعَة , تَعَهُّد , عُهْدَة , قَبَالَة , مَسْئُولِيَّة

commitment or duty for which a person is responsible
اِتِّفاق , اِتِّفاقِيَّة , تَبِعَة , عَهْد , عُهْدَة , قَبَالَة , مَسْئُولِيَّة , مُعَاهَدَة , مَوْثِق
"

Note the strong similarity between Lane's definition of dhimma and the definition of responsible in Sakhr. The overlap includes the concepts of treaty, commitment, custody, agreement, guarantee, and so on, and concepts of liability, culpability, and so on.

From Part 1 of Danios' article "More proof that Robert Spencer is an intellectual huckster," here's another false allegation by Danios:

"Robert Spencer is a Catholic apologist, who starts his book invoking the Crusader call of “Deus Vult!” (God wills it!) and ends his book calling for a Crusade against Islam."

In fact, nowhere does Spencer ever call for a "Crusade against Islam," not in the Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam, nor anywhere else. At the end of the Politically Incorrect Guide, Spencer calls for (what the context shows is) a societal "Crusade" in defense of those aspects of Western civilization worth defending and protecting and passing on to future generations, as well as for defending against the militant jihadists who would kill to impose their ideology. It is interesting that Danios construes this as a crusade against Islam.

Here's the relevant quote from the P.I.G.: "It's time to say "enough," and teach our children to take pride in their own heritage. To know that they have a culture and a history of which they can and should be grateful; that they are not the grandchildren of oppressors and villains; and that their homes and families are worth defending against those who want to take them away, and are willing to kill to do so.
Call it a Crusade." (p.231).

Whatever Danios wants to make of this, he should at least present the views of his opponent accurately to his readers. In addition, given that Robert already receives death threats, it is highly irresponsible for Danios to make such a (dangerously) false accusation.

And in fact, here's what Robert actually says in addressing this type of claim (re alleged war against Islam), earlier in the same book, which Danios claims to be reading: "Moreover, it would be silly for anyone to treat "all conflicts involving Muslims...as the fault of Muslims themselves," or to incite "war against Islam as a whole""--a prospect Spencer goes on to describe as "absurd and unnecessary." (P.I.G to Islam, pp. 198-199). Anyone who's familiar with Robert's work knows that he opposes revival of the intolerant sharia and the political and militant jihad; he is not calling for a crusade against Islam as a personal faith.

Anyone can go to the "About Robert Spencer" page at JihadWatch to get a valid idea of Spencer's views.

Briefly I want to address an erroneous conclusion that Danios draws from Lane's Lexicon. He quotes the Lane's Lexicon (vol. 3, p. 976) under dhimma as follows:

"Dhimma: A compact, a covenant, a contract, a league, a treaty, an engagement, a bond, or an obligation; because the breaking thereof necessesitates blame: and a right, or due, for the neglect of which one is to be blamed: [an inviolable right or due:]… a thing that should be sacred, or inviolable; or which one is under an obligation to reverence, respect, or honour, and defend."

So far so good. However, Danios concludes that only the Muslim side of the dhimma contract could violate the contract. Danios writes:

“The sacred and inviolable right that must be respected, honored, and defended is the safety (amaan) of the non-Muslim resident.”

Here's how the quote from Lane would have continued had Danios continued it, picking up here at "and defend":

"[ […] and defend; everything that is entitled to reverence, respect, or honour, and defend; everything that is entitled to reverence, honour, and defence, in the character and appertenances of a person]"

Lane goes on (p. 976) to describe safety and security, etc., but also responsibility, “for the fulfillment of an obligation, the payment of a sum of money,” and so on. As I've pointed out in my rebuttal to Danios, above, reading the full entry for Dhimma, the aman or safety is not the only obligation mentioned, payment of a sum and jizya are mentioned explicitly, and under the entry for the dhimma (the people of the dhimma), jizya is mentioned as the payment for the protection, etc. Obviously, Lane does not go into all of the details of the obligations in the dhimma contract, but nowhere does he state that only the Muslim side, and not the non-Muslim side, could violate the dhimma contract. Danios appears to be the only one saying this.

Both the Sakhr and the Wehr dictionaries give debt and liability as meanings of dhimma.

debt

American Heritage Dictionary (1973)

"debt 1. Something owed, such as money, goods, or services. 2. An obligation or liability to pay or render something to someone else. 3. The condition of having such an obligation. Usually used with in. 4. Theology. An offence requiring forgiveness or reparation; sin; trespass." […]

"debtor 1. One who owes something to another. [...] 2. One guilty of a trespass or sin; sinner. […]."

"creditor. 1. A person or firm to whom money or its equivalent is owed. […]"

American Heritage Dictionary online

"debt
NOUN:
1. Something owed, such as money, goods, or services.
2.
a. An obligation or liability to pay or render something to someone else.
b. The condition of owing: a young family always in debt.
3. An offense requiring forgiveness or reparation; a trespass."

Merriam-Webster online

"debt

1 : sin, trespass
2 : something owed : obligation
3 : a state of owing
4 : the common-law action for the recovery of money held to be due"

Merriam-Webster

"debtor
1 : one guilty of neglect or violation of duty
2 : one who owes a debt"

American Heritage

"debtor
1. One that owes something to another.
2. One who is guilty of a trespass or sin; a sinner."

---------------

liable

American Heritage Dictionary online

li•a•ble
ADJECTIVE:
1. Legally obligated; responsible: liable for military service. See Synonyms at responsible.
2. At risk of or subject to experiencing or suffering something unpleasant. Used with to: liable to criminal charges; liable to diabetes.
3. Likely. Often used with reference to an unfavorable outcome: In a depression banks are liable to fail.
________________________________________
ETYMOLOGY:
Middle English, probably from Old French lier, to bind, from Latin lig re; see leig- in Indo-European roots [...]"

Macmillan Dictionary

"liable
legally responsible for causing damage or injury, so that you have to pay something or be punished
If something goes wrong, you’ll be liable.
liable for:
The hospital was held liable for negligence.
He could find himself liable for the cost of the repairs.
Synonyms or related words for this meaning of liable: more
a.
if someone is liable for something, they must pay it or must do it
liable for:
You may be liable for taxes on any gains you make.
Synonyms or related words for this meaning of liable: more"

American Heritage Dictionary

li•a•bil•i•ty

NOUN:
pl. li•a•bil•i•ties
1. The state of being liable.
2.
a. Something for which one is liable; an obligation, responsibility, or debt.
b. liabilities The financial obligations entered in the balance sheet of a business enterprise.
3. Something that holds one back; a handicap.
4. Likelihood."

-------------------

obligation

American Heritage Dictionary

"ob•li•ga•tion
NOUN:
1. The act of binding oneself by a social, legal, or moral tie.
2.
a. A social, legal, or moral requirement, such as a duty, contract, or promise that compels one to follow or avoid a particular course of action.
b. A course of action imposed by society, law, or conscience by which one is bound or restricted.
3. The constraining power of a promise, contract, law, or sense of duty.
4. Law
a. A legal agreement stipulating a specified payment or action, especially if the agreement also specifies a penalty for failure to comply.
b. The document containing the terms of such an agreement.
5.
a. Something owed as payment or in return for a special service or favor.
b. The service or favor for which one is indebted to another.
6. The state, fact, or feeling of being indebted to another for a special service or favor received."

-------------------------

Lastly, from the usage note for responsibility in the American Heritage Dictionary (1973), under the discussion of synonyms for responsible, answerable, liable, accountable, amenable:
"These terms relate to obligations, usually to a superior authority. Responsible implies trustworthy performance of fixed duties and consequent awareness of the penalty for failure to do them. It may also refer to obligation for things and possessions. Answerable suggests a moral or contractual commitment subject to resolution by a higher authority. Liable may refer to legal responsibility, as in the payment of damages, or to obligation to perform service, such as military service. Accountable emphasizes liability for something of value either contractually or because of one’s position of responsibility. Amenable refers to the condition of being subject to control or review."

Sense 1. Dhimma means both protection and blameworthiness/guilt (or, dhimmis means protected or guilty people).

The words dhimmi and dhimma are derived from dhamma which means blameworthy, i.e., that someone would be blameworthy for doing something wrong. There is not only a grammatical connection between the words via the common root, but they share some meaning in the concept of blameworthiness.

The word dhimma means contract, treaty, covenant, etc., the breaking of which would necessitate blame.

Dhimma can mean not only covenant, security, protection, etc., but also can mean custody, responsibility, answerableness, liability, debt, and conscience. All of the latter terms have connotations of blame or guilt.

Some of the words used as synonyms for dhimma also can have multiple meanings, like those of dhimma. For example, the word “responsibility” can mean entrusted or blameworthy. Conscience can mean a sense of guilt or remorse, or the capacity of knowing what is right or wrong, or conformity to a sense of right conduct. Custody can mean care and guardianship but also being held in prison or being confined as a penalty for some wrong-doing.

The term “dhimmis” in its normal usage as applying to ahl al-dhimma, the people of the covenant, refers to the non-Muslims who have been subjected to the dhimma contract under Islamic rule. While Muslims and non-Muslims in this case are both parties to the dhimma contract, only the non-Muslims under this regime are called dhimmis.

Sense 2. Dhimmis means, connotes, implies, signifies, refers to “guilty people.”

The Quran repeatedly refers to non-Muslims as being “guilty” of rejecting Allah’s message (the Quran) and messenger Muhammad and Islam. The Quran also repeatedly states that rejecting Allah, Muhammad, the Quran, and Islam is the worst kind of sin-crime. The Quran further states that good works will not avail them; to be saved from punishment in the world and in the hereafter they must accept Islam, Muhammad, and the Quran. The Quran says Islam is the only acceptable religion (3:85). The Quran refers to those who don’t accept Islam as evil, wrong-doers, ill, ignorant, perverse, wicked, corrupt, filthy, the worst beasts, vile creatures, ungrateful, traitors; cursed by Allah, angles, and men, etc.

The Quran accuses non-Muslims (especially the Christians and Jews) of transgressing, and breaking their covenant with Allah, which was binding on them in the Torah and Gospel. The Quran accuses them of perverting their doctrines, or rejecting their doctrines, going astray, and earning the anger of Allah. They are expected to interpret their doctrines as Muhammad does, but they, being non-Muslims, don’t. They have also broken their covenant with Allah by not becoming Muslims when (and then after) Muhammad was sent to all humankind with the Quran. They are accused of religious perversion and polytheism in verse 9:30, which says that “Allah himself fights [q-t-l] them.”

These non-Muslims are still considered guilty of the above crimes when they are brought under the dhimma.

The legislation of jihad, derived from the Quran and Sunnah, specifies that non-Muslims must be punished on Earth, after the da’wa invitation to accept Islam, if they refuse to embrace Islam when the jihad ultimatum is offered to them or when the jihad is upon them. If they do not accept Islam, they are either to be fought, or subjected under the dhimma and forced to pay jizya (9:29), or enslaved. The imposition of these kinds of harsh and discriminatory penalties clearly implies that the punished are considered guilty.

The word dhimma can mean debt. Debt connotes guilt, sin, or transgression. Debtor—-which is what the non-Muslim dhimmi is in this case—-connotes guilty person, sinner, transgressor. Non-Muslims are liable for punishment in the afterlife, according to the Quran. Some conditions in the dhimma constitute punishment whereby non-Muslims who were conquered or who acquiesced and submitted to Islamic rule are “indebted” to the Islamic state. They must pay the jizya as “compensation for their not being slain” (Lane’s Lexicon, vol. 2, p. 422). This life-long penalty/debt shows that they are not only considered guilty by Allah, but also considered guilty by the Islamic state.

Some definitions of dhimmis (or the people of the dhimma) note that their existence is “tolerated” by the Islamic state. (This is in contrast to non-Muslim harbis, who are not tolerated by the Islamic state). “Tolerated” can imply that, even though the dhimmis may be law-abiding, there is still something wrong with them or that they’ve done something wrong, for which Muslims to some extent must put up with them. There is no question that a central tenet of the Quran is that the non-Muslims have committed the worst type of crime by not accepting Islam.

Some conditions in the dhimma signify the guilt of the dhimmis, e.g., being threatened with symbolic strikes or blows to the neck and head when they pay the annual jizya, or having to wear special clothing to distinguish them from Muslims, or being restricted from giving legal testimony, or being prohibited from leaving the Islamic state, and in general being subject to a variety of discriminatory social, cultural, and religious restrictions.

In his most recent response about the meaning of the word dhimma, Danios (June 17, 2010, "Danios of Loonwatch Accepts Robert Spencer’s Challenge to a Debate") makes more erroneous assumptions and unsubstantiated allegations.

He quoted Robert from a recent JihadWatch post as follows:

“And on those rare occasions when the opposition does offer a substantive response, it’s tissue-paper thin. A friend recently told me that he posted a lengthy rebuttal to a pseudo-scholarly presentation purporting to prove false something I said about the meaning of an Arabic word (my friend is a native Arabic speaker); his comment was summarily deleted.”

Danios then replied:

"3. “A friend” I assume you are speaking of Kinana of Khabyar, who like you is an intellectual huckster."

I'm not sure how Danios has so confidently arrived at this assumption. It simply isn't true. I don't know Robert, and I am not a speaker of Arabic. And the "intellectual huckster" comment is just more unsupported personal attack that distracts from the substantive issue.

"5. “native Arabic speaker” Is that supposed to impress me? Kinana of Khaybar could be a professor in Arabic for all I care or the Queen of England. None of that changes the fact that he is guilty of academic deceit."

The accusation of "academic deceit" is wild and unsubstantiated, as I've noted in my previous rebuttal to Danios' part 2 article. Danios doesn't support his allegations, and he hasn't addressed my reply to his part 2 article. He's made a number of false assumptions about my claims, and doesn't have a clear handle on what I'm claiming.

"6. “his comment was summarily deleted.” A lie. I never deleted Kinana’s comment. He never posted it on our site. Instead, he posted it on JihadWatch, and someone posted the link to it on our site, which you will see is still very much there. But let’s even assume–simply for argument’s sake–that I “summarily deleted” his comment. Not only is the link posted by an Islamophobe still on our site, but I myself reproduced the link in my counter-response as well as his response itself!"

Spencer didn't claim that Danios deleted Kinana's comment. Spencer wrote that his friend's comment was deleted. But that won't stop Danios from spinning a false accusation.

"Let’s recap the debate. First, Robert Spencer claimed in his book, The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam (and the Crusades), that the word “dhimmis” translates to both “protected people” as well as “guilty people.” He went on to say that non-Muslim residents are called “guilty people” (or “dhimmis”) because they rejected the prophethood of Muhammad and altered their scriptures. I wrote an article declaring all this to be a bold-faced lie and proof that Spencer is an intellectual huckster who is guilty of wholesale fabrication."

That's not quite accurate. Spencer didn't say "translates"; he said "means," i.e., the Arabic word for dhimmis means protected or guilty people. And he didn't say they were explicitly "called" guilty.

All Spencer would have to show to support his claim is that the word dhimmis (i.e., ahl al-dhimma, the non-Muslim people of the dhimma who live under Islamic rule) connotes "guilty people." He's shown adequate evidence that would support that, and I've added further evidence in support of it. Part of the problem here is that Danios doesn't accept that "means" can refer to connotative and other forms of meaning. As I said, he needs to look up mean and meaning in the dictionaries.

"Both Robert Spencer and his friend Kinana of Khaybar responded to my article."

Note how Danios' false assumption is presented here as though it were a taken-for-granted fact. Again, Robert and I don't know each other. (This is all irrelevant to the topic, but it does show how Danios jumps to erroneous assumptions, and how he then builds upon them).

"Kinana attempted to strengthen this argument by citing various Arabic dictionaries that linked the word “dhimmis” with “guilt.” In my counter-response, I exposed the intellectual chicanery that Kinana was engaging in: he quoted only a part of the dictionary definition, purposefully omitting the critical part which clearly explained that the “guilt” was associated not with the non-Muslim residents as Spencer and Kinana claimed, but with the Islamic state should it violate the rights of the non-Muslim residents."

Actually, as I showed in my reply above on June 8, Danios has come up with the bizarre interpretation that only the Muslim side, not the non-Muslim side, could be guilty of violating the dhimma. Based on his strange and unsupported conclusion, he then imagined that I must have excluded the part about security/protection deliberately with an attempt to deceive. That of course is not correct. I would never have expected someone to come up with the bizarre claim Danios did. And the part I excluded mentioned both the Muslims' and the non-Muslims' obligations.

In other words, Danios has come up with a bizarre unsupported conclusion, entered this as an issue in the debate, and then retroactively blames me for not anticipating the issue conjured up post hoc in his own fantasy world.

In any case, the information about both the Muslims' and non-Muslims' obligations was mentioned in my quote of the definition of zimmi. Here it is again from my original post, to which Danios replied in his part 2:

"2) "ZIMMI. , a member of the Ahlu 'z-Zimmah, a non Muslim subject of a Muslim government, belonging to the Jewish, Christian, or Sabean creed. who, for the payment of a poll— or capitation-tax, enjoys security of his person and property in a Muhammadan country. [...]"

"[E]njoys security of his person and property..."

Danios continues:

"Furthermore, the claim that the non-Muslim residents were called “dhimmis” because they were guilty of rejecting the prophethood of Muhammad and altering their scriptures is complete fabrication from the conspiratorial mind of Robert Spencer. Neither Spencer or Kinana sought to explain this bit of wholesale fabrication."

In fact, I never believed or claimed that that was the origin of the term as applied to non-Muslims living under Islamic rule, or that they were called dhimmis "because" they were guilty. And I never interpreted Robert's statement as necessarily implying what Danios suggests.

"My question now is: whose response is “tissue-paper thin”? Will Spencer or Kinana care to defend their academic honesty (or in this case their lack thereof)? My guess is that they will try to avoid issuing “a substantive response” as much as possible."

That too is false. I have responded substantively and in detail. Perhaps Danios isn't aware that I have rebutted his claims (from his part 2) in this thread. But that would be no excuse for him going ahead and writing the above statement without actually checking the contents of this thread to see whether or not I had responded further.

I can't speak for Robert, but he might have other legitimate reasons for not responding further than he already has, other possible reasons that Danios perhaps has not considered.

The bottom line: Spencer has supported his claim with evidence. In contrast, Danios' claim that Robert's statement is "complete fabrication" and that dhimmis does not in "any way shape or form" mean "guilty people" is clearly contrary to the evidence presented here by Robert and me.

Here's another imaginative and totally unsubstantiated claim at Loonwatch on this issue from the comments of Danios' June 17 article (titled "Danios of Loonwatch Accepts Robert Spencer’s Challenge to a Debate").

One poster writes:

"Ali Azizi Says:
June 17th, 2010 at 5:22 pm
Kinana is his Arabic friend? That explains a lot, Kinana is an amateur academic wanna-be turd who took a semester of Arabic and read Hagarism and now thinks he is the next Spencer."

This is all irrelevant to the topic, but it does show again the tendency of some posters at Loonwatch to resort to false or baseless claims (instigated in this case by Danios) that contain insults.

Despite Danios' efforts to propagate the allegation, I am not Robert's Arabic speaking friend who reportedly posted a lengthy reply at Loonwatch (apparently regarding the meaning of the word dhimmis) which was deleted.

I've never taken a course in Arabic or read Hagarism, nor have I ever claimed to have done these things.

As for "amateur academic wanna-be," the allegation is both unsupported and irrelevant. I present evidence to support my claims, and I have presented evidence (in posts above) showing Danios' claims to be false.

As for the commenter's classification of me as a "turd," I'm not entirely sure of the reason for this accusation, but it is at least consistent with al-Sistani's inclusion of kafirs (non-Muslims who reject Islam) in the same category with feces (and urine, pigs, etc.), i.e., as "najis things". (Also see Quran 9:28, which Robert cites in his article at the top of this thread, which classifies polytheists as "najasun").

Also note the fact that Loonwatch approved that comment.

Further evidence from Islamic fiqh of means by which dhimmis are considered to have violated the dhimma:

"Maliki jurisprudence,
The Risala of 'Abdullah ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani (310/922 - 386/996) A Treatise on Maliki Fiqh
(Including commentary from ath-Thamr ad-Dani by al-Azhari)
[...]
37.19h. Insulting the Messenger of Allah
If someone curses the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, he is killed and his repentance is not accepted. If one of the people of dhimma abuses him outside of that which constitutes his disbelief or curses Allah Almighty other than what constitutes his disbelief, he is killed unless he becomes Muslim."
[Source: ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/ABewley/RisAhkam]

Shafi'i fiqh

[Start of Quotes. Source: Muhaddith]
-----------------------
"The Reliance of the Traveller. Version 1.06 - By Ahmad Ibn Naqib Al-Misri
BOOK O: JUSTICE Chapter O-11.0: Non-Muslim Subjects of the Islamic State (Ahl Al-Dhimma)

O-11.1
A formal agreement of protection is made with citizens who are:
1- Jews;
2- Christians;
3- Zoroastrians;
4- Samarians and Sabians, if their religions do not respectively contradict the fundamental bases of Judaism and Christianity;
5- and those who adhere to the religion of Abraham or one of the other prophets (upon whom be blessings and peace).

O-11.2
Such an agreement may not be effected with those who are idol worshippers (dis: o-9.9 (n:) ), or those who do not have a Sacred Book or something that could have been a Book.
(A: Something that could have been a Book refers to those like the Zoroastrians, who have remnants resembling an ancient Book. As for the psuedoscriptures of cults that have appeared since Islam (n: such as the Sikhs, Baha' is, Mormons, Qadianis, etc.), they neither are nor could be a Book, since the Koran is the final revelation (dis: w-4). )

O-11.3
Such an agreement is only valid when the subject peoples:
(a) follow the rules of Islam (A: those mentioned below (o-11.5) and those involving public behavior and dress, though in acts of worship and their private lives, the subject communities have their own laws, judges, and courts, enforcing the rules of their own religion among themselves);
(b) and pay the non-Muslim poll tax (jizya).

O-11.4: The Non-Muslim Poll Tax
The minimum non-Muslim poll tax is one dinar (n: 4.235 grams of gold) per person (A: per year). The maximum is whatever both sides agree upon.
It is collected with leniency and politeness, as are all debts, and is not levied on women, children, or the insane.

O-11.5
Such non-Muslim subjects are obliged to comply with Islamic rules that pertain to the safety and indemnity of life, reputation, and property. In addition, they:
1- are penalized for committing adultery or theft, thought not for drunkenness;
2- are distinguished from Muslims in dress, wearing a wide cloth belt (zunnar);
3- are not greeted with "as-Salamu 'alaykum";
4- must keep to the side of the street;
5- may not build higher than or as high as the Muslims' buildings, though if they acquire a tall house, it is not razed;
6- are forbidden to openly display wine or pork, (A: to ring church bells or display crosses,) recite the Torah or Evangel aloud, or make public display of their funerals and feastdays;
7- and are forbidden to build new churches.

O-11.6
They are forbidden to reside in the Hijaz, meaning the area and towns around Mecca, Medina, and Yamama, for more than three days when the caliph allows them to enter there for something they need).

O-11.7
A non-Muslim may not enter the Meccan Sacred Precinct (Haram) under any circumstances, or enter any other mosque without permission (A: nor may Muslims enter churches without their permission).

O-11.8
It is obligatory for the caliph (def: o-25) to protect those of them who are in Muslim lands just as he would Muslims, and to seek the release of those of them who are captured.

O-11.9
If non-Muslim subjects of the Islamic state refuse to conform to the rules of Islam, or to pay the non-Muslim poll tax, then their agreement with the state has been violated (dis: o-11.11) (A: though if only one of them disobeys, it concerns him alone).

O-11.10
The agreement is also violated (A: with respect to the offender alone) if the state has stipulated that any of the following things break it, and one of the subjects does so anyway, though if the state has not stipulated that these break the agreement, then they do not; namely, if one of the subject people:
1- commits adultery with a Muslim woman or marries her;
2- conceals spies of hostile forces;
3- leads a Muslim away from Islam;
4- kills a Muslim;
5- or mentions something impermissible about Allah, the Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace), or Islam.

O-11.11
When a subject's agreement with the state has been violated, the caliph chooses between the four alternatives mentioned above in connection with prisoners of war (o-9.14).

The Reliance of the Traveller. Version 1.06 - By Ahmad Ibn Naqib Al-Misri
BOOK O: JUSTICE Chapter O-9.0: Jihad

O-9.14
When an adult male is taken captive, the caliph (def: o-25) considers the interests (O: of Islam and the Muslims) and decides between the prisoner's death, slavery, release without paying anything, or ransoming himself in exchange for money or for a Muslim captive held by the enemy.
If the prisoner becomes a Muslim (O: before the caliph chooses any of the four alternatives) then he may not be killed, and one of the other three alternatives is chosen."
-----------------

[End of Quotes]

In attempting to test whether or not dhimmis could mean guilty people, Danios in his part 2 of the "Intellectual huckster" article claimed:

“But to completely shatter Spencer and Kinana’s argument, I will reproduce the words of the Prophet Muhammad himself, who said in a hadith narrated in Sahih al-Bukhari: Whoever prays our [Islamic] prayer, faces our Qiblah [Mecca], and eats our slaughtered meat [Zabiha] is a Muslim who is under the dhimma [protection] of God and His Messenger. If we say “dhimma” also means “guilt”, then the saying makes no sense, as it would read “a Muslim…is under the guilt of Allah and His Messenger.” Complete nonsense.”

Danios has cherry-picked a translated sentence where the word “protection,” but not the word “guilt,” can be (sensibly and comfortably to English-speaking readers) substituted in for the word “dhimma.” There appear to be at least a few important problems with his choice of example here.

First, he seems to assume that Spencer intended to say that the word dhimmis means “guilty people” the same way it means “protected” people. But that’s not what Spencer said, and it is not reasonable for Danios to write entire articles based on that unfounded assumption. Protection is an obligation mentioned in the dhimma contract, whereas guilt is the state (or judged state) of one who violated the contract.

Second, Danios’ quote has a conditional proposition, whereby if people perform X, Y, and Z obligations, then they are under dhimma [protection] of Allah and Muhammad. Of course the word “protection” works sensibly as a substitute for dhimma (contract) in this case, partly because in this contract the people get protection for doing X, Y, Z. However, if doing X, Y, and Z is a necessary condition for getting protection (i.e., if they don't do those things, they don't get protection), and the people didn’t do X, Y, and Z, then the word “protection” wouldn’t work sensibly as a substitute for dhimma. In the latter case, if the people had no valid excuses, they would be guilty and presumably subject to punishments specified in the contract (for failing to do X, Y, Z). In the latter case, we could also say the people are subject to the dhimma [covenant, contract] of Allah and Muhammad, and this would imply that the people are liable or indebted, blameworthy or guilty, responsible or answerable; or to be charged and punished, for their transgression.

Third, note that the translated sentence Danios chose contains the frame “under the ________ of Allah and Muhammad.” This fits grammatically and sensibly with protection and dhimma, but not with guilt. (The word guilt is more limited grammatically than protect/ion/ing/ed/s/or/ive/orate/ory). One can easily show that this English sentence frame does not provide a valid test of the issue at hand (regarding dhimmis meaning guilty people) by trying out other words that are used in the non-controversial definitions of dhimma provided in dictionaries. For example, the words “receivables,” “conscience,” “answerableness,” “financial obligation,” and “inviolability,” are listed under dhimma in either Sakhr’s or Wehr’s dictionary. But, to the English reader, each of them would be either very awkward or nonsensical in the sentence frame.

It would be erroneous, then, to use this particular sentence frame as a valid test of whether dhimma can mean (or connote, or imply) guilty.

Another of Danios' arguments that is suspect, in the Part 2 "Intellectual huckster" article, is this one, where he wrote:

“All of this of course begs the question why the Prophet Muhammad didn’t simply refer to these non-Muslims as sha’ab mudhnib (which literally means “guilty people”) as opposed to “dhimmis” (which means “protected people”)? Does that not seem more straightforward and logical? Why use the word “protected people” if the intent was to cast them as “guilty people”?”

One of the problems here is that Danios doesn't seem to have stopped to appreciate the fact that, as in English, in Arabic one word can sometimes be used to express more than one concept, and different words can be used to express the same (one) or similar concept.

For example, there are multiple words in Arabic to express the concept of someone who is blameworthy, guilty, a sinner, etc. Likewise, there are multiple words to express the idea of protection, security, guardianship, etc. There are multiple Arabic words available with which to express either the concept of protection or the concept of guiltiness.

And there are individual words that can express multiple concepts, like the English word "responsibility," or the Arabic word "dhimma," as I have described above; i.e., dhimma can connote protection, blameworthiness/guilt, or other concepts. With this in mind, let's go back to Robert's quote:

"The Qur'an calls Jews and Christians 'People of the Book;' Islamic law calls them dhimmis, which means 'protected' or 'guilty' people-the Arabic word means both."

The word dhimma, meaning contract, covenant, treaty, etc., also can connote protection (as one of the obligations in the covenant in question), and blameworthiness/guilt (as the state of someone who violates the covenant). In this sense (what I call "sense 1" in the posts above), Spencer is correct when he says "the Arabic word means both".

Note that Robert's claim is not that dhimma is the best word to convey guilt, or, for that matter, protection. But that seems to be what Danios was implying when he asked:

"...why the Prophet Muhammad didn’t simply refer to these non-Muslims as sha’ab mudhnib (which literally means “guilty people”) as opposed to “dhimmis” (which means “protected people”)? Does that not seem more straightforward and logical?"

This implies that mudhnib is a better or more direct, less ambiguous, more common word to refer to guilty persons, sinners, etc., than is dhimmis. Indeed it is. But that's not the claim Robert made about the word. He said the word "means both." If you can understand how "responsibility" can mean entrusted and guilt/blameworthiness, you should be able to grasp Robert's point here. That "entrusted" and "guilt" might each better refer to their respective concepts than the does the word responsibility hardly negates the fact that responsibility means both.

Danios has also included in his example a suggestion that could be taken by some to mean that Muhammad didn't refer to non-Muslims as "guilty" (or sinners, blameworthy, etc.). But all one has to do is enter terms like guilt, guilty, etc., into a freely-available online Quran search engine and examine the results to see that, in reciting the Quran, Muhammad would have inevitably called the non-Muslims guilty. (That point, of course, is more relevant to sense 2, which I've mentioned above in previous posts).

And then Danios had asked:

"Why use the word “protected people” if the intent was to cast them as “guilty people”?”

Once again, note the difference between what Robert claimed and what Danios is asking about. Robert did not say that the intent of the original use of the word dhimma or dhimmis was to cast them specifically as guilty people. Robert does not deny that the word dhimma means covenant, contract, treaty, etc. Rather, Robert's explanation (of what I call sense 2) is that the Quran, Muhammad, and Islamic law considered the non-Muslims as guilty people for rejecting Islam and Muhammad, perverting their doctrines, breaking Allah's covenant, and so forth. The dhimma was imposed on non-Muslims in the classic arrangement as a punishment, following the punishment of jihad if that was required. Hence by implication the punished are classified as guilty, and dhimmis themselves felt treated as guilty, and so on (see Robert's article at the top and my summary of sense 2 in my June 18 post in this thread), such that the word dhimmis as applied to these punished, indebted, liable non-Muslims came to carry with it not only the meaning of people of the covenant--which all sounds very lofty--but also people of responsibility, i.e., responsible, guilty, for the above-mentioned sin-crimes. All of this (and more of the points I've raised in previous posts in this thread) is enough that the word dhimmis as applied to these people at least connotes "guilty people," and that's all Robert's claim (regarding sense 2) requires.

Again consider Danios' rhetorical question:

"Why use the word “protected people” if the intent was to cast them as “guilty people”?”

Well, the non-Muslims who did not accept Islam, the Quran, and Muhammad were cast as guilty people by Allah in the Quran. The fact is they came to be called ahl al-dhimma, which means people of the covenant, people of responsibility, of liability, of debt; and meaning "protected," or guilty people, in the senses described above in this thread.

It looks like at least one poster at Loonwatch agrees with Danios in his absurd falsehood that only Muslims, not non-Muslims, could be guilty/blameworthy for violating the dhimma:

Moe Says: June 7th, 2010 at 10:46 am “[...] The word Dhimma – which truly implies “protection”, and indeed might have the connotation of “indebtedness” – means that the Muslims are the ones who are “indebted” towards the non-Muslim minorities and are obliged to offer them freedom of worship, legislation, and protection. At least this is what I could deduce from Hadiths that warn Muslims against doing injustice against the non-Muslims who are under the Muslims’ “Dhimma” and the various treaties that were signed with non-Muslims after Muslim conquests (and btw, Arabic is my native language!).”

[emphasis added]

Note that Moe does not actually come out and commit himself explicitly to the whopping error that Danios makes in the article, i.e., that non-Muslims cannot be guilty of violating the dhimma. But the implication of the bolded phrase (esp. "Muslims are the ones...") is that the guilt for breaking the dhimma would only be applicable to the Muslims, not the non-Muslims. So it looks like Moe, who himself claims to be a native Arabic speaker, is perhaps ignorant of the word dhimma, and perhaps doesn't understand the concept of the dhimma at issue. The fact that the Islamic jurists that I've cited above indicate that non-Muslims can violate the dhimma, and the fact that the Arabic dictionaries (and other sources) I've cited above support the implication of blameworthiness/guilt as a meaning, connotation, or implication of the word dhimma, shows that Moe, like Danios, is wrong about this. They are apparently committed to a partisan pro-Islamic view, in which they cannot even entertain the idea that dhimmis could be guilty of violating the dhimma. It is really quite remarkable.

Here's another poster:

"iSherif Says: June 8th, 2010 at 4:00 am Epic counter Danios! You are simply the best! That Kinana character is obviously not gonna admit that Spencer’s arguments are sometimes incredibly poorly phrased and at other times, downright false. But he does seem desperate to find loopholes in Danios’ articles. Problem is, Danios is simply too smart for these ‘phobe chickens…LOL! [...]"

Instead of mindlessly cheerleading, iSherif might first want to do a bit of research to find out whether Danios is correct. Does iSherif seriously believe that only the Muslims could be guilty of violating the dhimma between Muslims and non-Muslims?

There is a big difference between alleging that something is "poorly phrased," and alleging that something that is "downright false." Note that iSherif doesn't say here what he thinks we are dealing with in this example. Does he think Robert's statement was "downright false"?

As I said above, this is not some minor fussing over word choice. (In the larger scheme of things, it is, of course, an argument over word choice that has little bearing on anything. But what this is really about is honesty.) Danios is claiming that the word dhimma does in any way shape or form mean guilt, and that Spencer's claim is a "complete fabrication" having "no basis" in the Arabic language. That's the claim I'm responding to. If Danios was merely saying he thought Robert's exact choice of words in the P.I.G (p. 49) could be improved, or that he might have added a bit more background about how the sense of guilty/blameworthy comes into play here (as, for example, Lane does; also see the other examples I cite above), I doubt that I would have even responded to this. The problem is not Robert's statement. The problem is Danios' sweeping categorical denials about the meaning of the word dhimma (or dhimmi, dhimmis), and his lack of forthrightness (especially in the Part 1 "Huckster" article) about the connotations of guilt/blameowrthiness, and his wildly false accusations against Spencer and me. It is Danios who screwed up here, not me, and not Spencer. And I'm giving Danios the benefit of the doubt by saying he screwed up. If he knows that non-Muslims can be guilty of violating the dhimma, then what is saying, in denying that to be the case, is deception.

A couple of typos to correct, as the immediately above post was written rather quickly just before I had to run off to do something else...[correction in brackets]

"Danios is claiming that the word dhimma does [not] in any way shape or form mean guilt,"

"If he (Danios) knows that non-Muslims can be guilty of violating the dhimma, then what [he] is saying, in denying that to be the case, is deception."

I would add to that latter statement, that, if Danios has subsequently learned that he was wrong, then he at least owes it to his readers to publish a correction to his error.

I also wrote: "But what this is really about is honesty." And I would add, it's about getting at the truth of an issue, what people learn, and how they conduct themselves in that process. I invite anyone, who has read this far along, to compare Danios' conduct, on one side, with that of Robert and me on the other.

I will also give credit where credit is due. One poster, in Danios part 2 "Huckster" thread, shows an understanding of the concept we are dealing with, i.e., a word [dhimma] with multiple meanings.

Hassan Says: June 7th, 2010 at 12:38 am "The word is very much like “charge” in English. To charge means to “accuse, blame”, as well as “impose a duty, responsibility, obligation” on someone. Finally, something one is responsible and duty-bound to care for (lest they incur blame) is also called a charge. A parent is charged with caring for their young charges lest they be charged with criminal neglect."

This is an excellent and relevant analogy. It's similar to the idea I explained with the word "responsibility" above, where I also found the word charge to be useful. (While it's not clear to me whether Hassan thinks only the Muslim side would be charged, I have no reason to suspect he's made the same error as Danios). Responsibility can mean guilt/blameworthiness for something, or it can mean entrusted with something. More importantly, the Wehr dictionary and Lane's Lexicon indicate that dhimma means responsibility (among other things), and Danios' own quoted example from Lisan al-Arab calls dhimmis the people of responsibility. Yet neither Danios nor any of Danios' supporters in that thread had responded to Hassan's point.

Danios and many of his commenters seem to be confused. Some of the commenters, and Danios, seem to be having a basic difficulty with the idea that this word dhimma can have more than one meaning (see my above comments on this).

Another poster shows an understanding of what we are dealing with:

Aymenn Al-Tamimi. Says: June 6th, 2010 at 1:50 pm "Sorry Danios, but Spencer is actually right on this issue. You are certainly correct that ‘dhimma’ and other forms of the same triconsonantal stem can have positive connotations in the genuine sense of being in a contract with someone, but when applied to non-Muslims who agree to live under the Shari’a it does have the connotation of ‘liability’, ‘debt’ or ‘guilt’ in the sense of being guilty of rejecting the truth of Islam. When it comes to Muslims who live under the Shari’a, the term ‘dhimmi’ is never used. If you want an analogy, Danios, think of the word ‘gay’: it can have positive connotations of being merry, but many people unfortunately use it as a synonym for ’stupid’, ‘crap’ and so on. Howbeit, back to the original point, Islam is not unique in this idea that unbelievers are guilty of rejecting the truth, mainstream Christianity has historically been the same vis-à-vis non-believers."

Yet Danios posts nothing substantive in response to this. Here's the level of response the above poster got from Danios:

Danios Says: June 6th, 2010 at 1:58 pm "Aymenn al-Tamimi, could you have possibly chosen a more Muslim-sounding name, lol? But nice try. Thank you everyone else. I appreciate the positive feedback a lot!"

Another Loonwatch writer adds:

Garibaldi Says:
June 7th, 2010 at 2:31 pm
"This has got to be one of my favorite pieces ever. Good job Danios, glad to be on the same team with you. :-)
The intellectual deception or more likely laziness that goes into Spencer’s work is profound.
The fact that he can’t take your name also points to how badly he is hurt. Spencer will probably cower away like usual from this debate."

Thus, even fellow writers at Loonwatch don't seem to understand that Danios is (at best) confused and has made some remarkable errors.

More Loonwatch authors who've apparently bought Danios' argument that dhimmis does not in any way shape or form mean guilty people, has no basis in the Arabic language, etc.

Mooneye Says: May 25th, 2010 at 3:41 pm "I have to mention a thought that came to my mind as I was perusing Spencer’s hate site. He had a post about “Obama’s dhimmitude…” and the irony of that just struck me. I know now that not only is he and his cohorts unable to understand Arabic, as Danios demonstrated, but they don’t know how to logically use the word. Imagine this, somehow, Barack Obama the leader of the strongest nation on earth is a “subdued dhimmi” who pays jizya to Muslims. First off, all the contradictions came rushing to my head, “but Spencer according to Pamela Obama is the birth child of Malcolm X, and she is certain that he is a Mooslim, you yourself said he ‘may be’ a Mooslim. So I guess the pertinent question is, ‘Is he a dhimmi or a Mooslim?’” Is it to hard to ask you guys to stick to one or the other falsity? Very confusing."

[emphasis added]

Mooneye above implies pretty clearly that he accepts Danios' argument in the Part 1 "Huckster" article, where Danios didn't present a forthright discussion of how Robert would have arrived at the claim that dhimmis means protected and guilty people.

Emperor Says: May 25th, 2010 at 11:57 am "Thanks for reading Spencer’s book Danios. The man doesn’t even have undergrad Arabic 101 knowledge, yet his followers fawn over his “scholarship.” We keep exposing, he keeps quiet."

This too clearly implies agreement with Danios' claims about the word dhimma or dhimmis.

Hence, there are at least four authors at Loonwatch--Danios, Garibaldi (as noted in my post above), Mooneye, and Emperor--who agree that Spencer's claim about dhimmis meaning protected and guilty people has "no basis in the Arabic language," is "a case of complete fabrication," and that "Dhimmi means “protected person” and in no way, shape, or form means “guilty.” One can simply open up an Arabic dictionary to prove that this has absolutely no basis in the reality-based world."

That's what they've agreed to. And if they have any disagreements with Danios' wild, sweeping, categorical denials, they haven't posted them in those "Huckster" threads or anywhere else that I've seen.

I also note that none of the other three LW writers I cited (i.e., the three besides Danios), has expressed whether or not he/she agrees with Danios additional whopping error (in the part 2 Huckster article) that non-Muslims could not be guilty of violating the dhimma. Why do they not address it? The fact that they haven't addressed that claim on the site, and the fact that it remains on the site uncorrected, suggests they are either unaware of the error, or that they've seen it and don't think it is an error. (Or, they may all know it's an error, but it would be too troublesome for them now to concede that to be the case). In any case, the Loonwatch site has the final say in what stays up in an article, whether a correction is added or a comment is made, so the rest of the Loonwatch crew does bear some responsibility for maintaining this falsity, not just Danios.

Another Loonwatch poster wrote:

Robert4 Says: May 31st, 2010 at 10:53 pm "“JihadBob”, in the link you provided, Spencer says: The Arabic word ذمي‎ (dhimmi) is derived from ذمة‎ (dhimma), “‘protection, custody’”), and from ذم‎ (dhamma), which means “to blame.” Thus the dhimmis are the blamed, or guilty ones. His poor understanding of Arabic might not be as important here as his poor conception of English. When does “blamed” mean “guilty”? Spencer’s entire online career is devoted to blaming Muslims, which, for him, warrants saying that Muslims are guilty of the charges these loons have leveled against them. For Spencer, Geller, et al., they are conflating “blame” with “guilt”, a keen rhetorical trick that allows them to point to accusations as evidence."

Blamed person in this context refers to someone who would have violated the covenant (dhimma), and for this violation would be blameworthy or guilty. That's the sense mentioned in Lane and elsewhere, and that is a semantic or meaning-based (not just grammatical) connection between dhamma and dhimma. Hence, there is no such rhetorical trick on Spencer's part. If "Robert4" is reading this, I suggest he read my explanation of sense 1 and sense 2, in my comments above.

Incidentally, a conflation of blame and guilt is committed by those Muslims who take "Allah's" accusations against non-Muslims (specifically, those who have been exposed to Islam and invited to it but who refuse to embrace it) as factually true statements about those non-Muslims. Allah in the Quran refers to such non-Muslims as guilty. Hence, to pious Muslims who take their Quran seriously and literally, such non-Muslims are guilty.

Here's another commenter cheering Danios on, apparently without a clue as to what he is reading [note in the post, shown in dubaiforums.com, the poster "shafique" refers to another poster "event horizon" (mentioned as "eh") who had attempted to defend Spencer's article and my early post which quoted Hughes]:

Re: Dhmmis: Guilty People by shafique » Sun Jun 06, 2010 5:04 pm Oh dear, eh's not going to be happy. The TP Hughes quote above (and others) have been comprehensively dealt with - and Spencer (and by extension eh) has been well and truly punked. {Inserts the link to Danios' part 2 Huckster article} I know eh balks at reading long posts - but 'eh' the whole page is blowing out of the water Spencer's argument. In respect of the quote you give... he deals with it about half way down (quoting it in full) and explaining ... {Begins Danios quote} Notice how Kinana cites (the horribly outdated) T.P. Hughes’ A Dictionary of Islam, and yet he purposely places ellipses [...] in the definition of the word “zimmah” in order to hide the fact that the “blame” (or “guilt”) is attributed to the Islamic state, not the non-Muslim resident. This cannot be a mere mistake on the part of Kinana; it is academic deceit of the highest order. T.P. Hughes’ A Dictionary of Islam reads (emphasis is mine): Zimmah, pl. zinam, from the root zamm, “to blame.” A compact, covenant, or contract, a league or treaty, any engagement or obligation, because the breaking thereof necessitates blame; and a right or due, for the neglect of which one is to be blamed. The word is also synonymous with aman, in the sense of security of life and property, protection or safeguard, and promise of such; hence ahlu ‘z-zimmah [dhimmis], or , with suppression of the noun ahlu, simply az-zimmah, the people with whom a compact or covenant has been made, and particularly the Kitabis, or the people of the book, i.e. Jews and Christians, and the Majusi or Sabeans, who pay the poll-tax called jazyah. [JAZYAH.] An individual of this class–namely, a free non-Muslim subject of a Muslim Government, who pays a poll- or capitation-tax, for which the Muslims are responsible for his security, personal freedom, and religious toleration–is called zimmi (see the following article). {Shafique writes to eh} See what happens when you selectively quote people who selectively quote? Tut tut. But please, read all the other points made in the link - you'll hang your head in shame that you believed Spencer was spinning you something that was true! Cheers, Shafique

{inserts in these brackets added by me}

Note how Shafique talks triumphantly as if Danios' bizarre confabulated claim, which isn't supported by the T.P. Hughes quote at all, has somehow won the argument. And "eh" is supposedly to hang is head in "shame" because Danios imagined some bizarre interpretation and declared victory in his own mind.

Look at that Hughes zimmah quote closely. Danios claims that only the Muslim, not the non-Muslim dhimmis, could be blamed for violating the dhimma. But T.P. Hughes does not say that (nor does Lane).

Anyone who has a basic grasp of the classic dhimma contract knows that either the Muslim or non-Muslim side could be blameworthy/guilty for breaking the contract. And for those who need that spelled out, I've presented evidence above, in previous posts, showing that to be the case.

Given that Danios has made the false claim that only the Muslims, not the non-Muslims, would be considered guilty for violating the covenant (dhimma), I've speculated as to whether this is just an error on his part, or whether he knows the claim is false but used it anyway. There isn't 100% certain clear evidence to answer that question, from what I've seen. I also doubt that we'll ever get a clear answer out of Danios about this. If he lied, he's likely not going to come out and say "Sorry, I lied about that." If he simply made a major error, I also suspect he's not going to come out to his readers and say "Sorry folks, I have to make a correction: I was wrong in what I claimed that only Muslims, not non-Muslims, would be guilty of violating the dhimma." And I strongly suspect he's not going to apologize to Robert or me for the errors he has made in making his false and misleading accusations against us.

If Danios' readers find out that he has erred in a big way, "Danios" can always change his moniker to something else, thus disconnecting himself from his published history of statements and any issues of responsibility that would arise in relation to obligation for publishing retractions and corrections for his errors, and so on. That would be irresponsible, but he does have that option open to him.

I've looked at some of the other articles Danios has written related to the dhimma issue, and the part 1 "Huckster" article about the meaning of the word dhimma, and specifically whether Danios had written anything, prior to his part 2 "Huckster" article, indicating whether he thought non-Muslims could be considered guilty for violating the dhimma (covenant). For, if Danios had a correct understanding of this aspect of the dhimma, he would have at some point, having written several articles on the subject, mentioned something about non-Muslims violating the dhimma. Or he might have at least made a statement that implied that he believed the non-Muslims could be guilty of violating the dhimma. If it is established from his own writings that Danios did understand and believe that non-Muslims could be guilty of violating the dhimma, then this would support the hypothesis that Danios was knowingly writing a falsehood when he wrote, in his Part 2 "Huckster" article, that only the Muslims, not the non-Muslims, would be considered guilty of violating the dhimma (covenant). So, what did he know, and when did he know it?

While I do not have time to search Danios' articles exhaustively, I have at least skimmed through the ones on the dhimma, and I have read (and reread) the ones on the meaning of the word dhimma (Part 1 and 2 "Huckster" articles and the June 17 "Challenge" to Spencer). In skimming the earlier articles, I was looking for instances where the issue of the non-Muslims violating the dhimma is raised incidentally and where Danios comments on it. Note that, prior to the part 2 "Huckster" article where Danios had to confront the T.P. Hughes quote, according to my brief search, Danios never claimed that only Muslims, not non-Muslims, could be guilty of violating the dhimma.

In his lengthy article "The Church’s Doctrine of “Perpetual Servitude” was Worse than “Dhimmitude”" (Posted on 30 November 2009 by Danios, Danios cited Mark R. Cohen as follows:

Professor Mark R. Cohen explains: "Success tempted some Jews (and Christians) to feel so much at home outside the niche assigned them by their lowly religious rank that they frequently ignored the sumptuary restrictions of the dhimma. Seeming to acquiesce, many a Muslim ruler overlooked these flagrant violations of the stipulations of the Pact of ‘Umar. This combination of circumstances often created resentment in Muslims, exacerbating latent religious contempt and leading to acts of oppression."

This is presented in the context of a Cohen's claim that some violations of the dhimma by non-Muslims were overlooked in practice by the Muslim authority, and there is a reference to the Pact of Umar, the historical authenticity of which is in some doubt. But importantly, Danios writes nothing disputing the claim that the non-Muslim dhimmis could either in fact, or in principle, violate the dhimma. He does not say Cohen is wrong in indicating that non-Muslims could be considered to have violated the dhimma.

Danios in the same article cites Tritton:

{Danios}"Interestingly, the book Robert Spencer himself quoted says this: {Tritton}“Before going into details there is one general remark to be made. In theory the dhimmi had to fulfill all the conditions of the covenant if he would claim protection. In practice only a few actions put him outside the protection of Muslim law...Malik, Shafe’i, and Ahmad b. Hanbal hold that failure to pay the poll-tax deprives them of protection. This was not the view of Abu Hanifa. Ahmad and Malik hold that four things put the dhimmi outside the law–-blasphemy of God, of His book, of His religion, and of His Prophet. Abul Kasim said that eight deeds made a dhimmi an outlaw. They are [1] an agreement to fight the Muslims, [2] fornication with a Muslim woman, [3] an attempt to marry one, [4] an attempt to pervert a Muslim from his religion, [5] robbery of a Muslim on the highway, [6] acting as a spy for unbelievers or [7] sending them information or acting as a guide to them, [8] and the killing of a Muslim man or woman. Abu Hanifa taught that they must not be too severe with dhimmis who insulted the Prophet. Shafe’i said that one who repented of having insulted the Prophet might be pardoned and restored to his privileges. Ibn Taimiya taught that the death penalty could not be evaded." [19] {Danios comments} "As can be seen, the required rules revolved around preventing the non-Muslims from “harming” the Muslims, physically or even verbally."

[My emphasis and {brackets}; ellipses as they appear as presented by Danios. The reference 19 as listed by Danios is A.S. Tritton, The Caliphs and Their Non-Muslim Subjects, 16-17. ISBN 1443787035, 9781443787031]

First, note that here again we have examples of the ways in which dhimmis could be considered to have violated the terms of the dhimma, and Danios does not dispute that non-Muslim dhimmis could be considered to have violated the dhimma, in principle or in fact.

Second, Danios' comment on the quoted passage makes clear that Danios accepts the idea that non-Muslims also had obligations to not harm the Muslims, physically or verbally. Danios is indicating clearly that he (Danios) believes that non-Muslims also had obligations to Muslims, including not harming Muslims physically, i.e., not violating the security of Muslims.

Having established that Danios very probably accepted that non-Muslim dhimmis would be considered guilty if they violated the terms of the dhimma, let's now turn to the part 1 "Huckster" article, where Danios attempts to refute Robert's statement from page 49 of the P.I.G. about the word "dhimmis" meaning protected or guilty people. At no point in this part 1 "Huckster" article does Danios claim that non-Muslims could not be guilty of violating the dhimma. But he does write this:

{Danios writes}"If the Prophet Muhammad and early Muslims wanted to refer to the People of the Book (Jews and Christians) as “guilty” people, why not just use the word for that? That seems much more straightforward. Of course, this nonsense just reflects the demagoguery of the dhimmi system that the anti-Islam elements engage in. To illustrate the absurdity of the claim that “dhimmi” means “guilty”, let us look at the word used in the nefarious Pact of Umar, as reproduced on p.50 of Spencer’s academic (ha!) book: {The quote from Spencer's P.I.G.}“If we {the non-Muslims} break any of these promises that we set for your benefit against ourselves, then our Dhimmah (promise of protection) is broken and you {the Muslim authority} are allowed to do with us what you are allowed of people of defiance and rebellion.” {Danios writes}"So if the Christians broke the conditions in the Pact of Umar, then their guilt is broken? How nonsensical! We see quite clearly from the above quote that “dhimma” is something positive; it is protection. In fact, the exact same word–dhimmah–is used for both Jews and Muslims in the Constitution of Medina. This document declares that all who uphold the pledge–Jew and Muslim alike–are granted dhimma (protection). If the word meant or implied “guilt”, why did the Prophet Muhammad include the Muslims under this? As I said before, it is complete fabrication on the part of Robert Spencer to claim that the word means “guilty”.

{my brackets added}

As I've noted in previous posts, a lot of Danios' rhetoric with these types of appeals (misleading and invalid use of sentence frames, and erroneously implying that dhimma has a much more limited meaning than it actually does) reflects his own confusion about the word dhimma and its multiple meanings or senses, connotations, etc. Note, though, that he doesn't contest the idea that non-Muslims in the above examples (Pact of Umar, and Constitution of Medina) would be guilty if they broke the terms of the dhimma. But the Pact of Umar example clearly indicates that the non-Muslims would be guilty for breaking the dhimma. Why doesn't he object to that here in part 1? (If he truly believed that non-Muslims would not be guilty for violating the dhimma, or somehow could not violate it, he could even raise this as another objection about the validity of the Pact of Umar). Why doesn't he jump in and say that non-Muslims would not be guilty of breaking the dhimma? Probably because, at this point, he still has the view he held previously, i.e., that non-Muslims would be considered guilty if they violated the dhimma.

With that in mind, let's look at part 2, which is quoted below. Note the change in Danios' claims in part 2 (published almost two weeks after part 1), where he is, when confronted with the T.P. Hughes quote and having found that it is supported by Lane's Lexicon, now claiming that only Muslims, not non-Muslims, could be guilty of violating the dhimma. Danios writes:

"The root letters dh-m-m do in fact have the meaning of “blame” or “censure”. But although dhimmi/dhimma is related to this root, the blame or censure in this word is not meant in the sense Spencer is using it. The authoritative Lane’s Lexicon explains the sense in which “dhimma” (which means “compact, covenant or contract”) is related to dh-m-m: “because the breaking thereof necessitates blame” (Volume 3 p. 976). The larger Arabic dictionaries from which Lane’s is derived–such as Taj al-Arus and al-Muhit–say the same. In other words, the blame (or “guilt”) involved in the term “dhimma” is related to breaking the covenant of security, and the blame/guilt is ascribed to the Islamic state–not the non-Muslim resident. An Islamic state would be guilty/blameworthy if it did not uphold and protect the “sanctity” of the covenanted non-Muslim’s life and property."

Since I have already addressed this claim in detail in the posts above, I will only note here that Danios has, there in the part 2 "Huckster" article, committed himself to the view that only the Muslim, not the non-Muslim would be guilty for violating the dhimma (covenant).

For contrast, here again is Danios' own statement from the much earlier article "The Church’s Doctrine of “Perpetual Servitude” was Worse than “Dhimmitude”," as I quoted him above:

"As can be seen, the required rules revolved around preventing the non-Muslims from “harming” the Muslims, physically or even verbally."

This clearly shows that he previously believed that non-Muslims could be guilty of violating the dhimma, including in matters of security. Yet he seems to have abandoned that view (and reality!) in having to deal with the T.P. Hughes and Lane definitions in the Part 2 Huckster article.

More from Danios' part 2 Huckster article [bolding mine].

“Kinana of Khaybar, a loyal fan of JihadWatch.org, tries to defend Robert Spencer’s claim that dhimmi means “guilty person” by claiming that the dhimmi (non-Muslim resident) would be “guilty” if he/she broke the covenant. In other words, Kinana is ascribing the guilt to the dhimmi, not the Islamic state. Of course, Kinana’s claim is not true at all, but let’s for argument’s sake pretend it is. Let us suppose then that it is the dhimmi who is “guilty” if he breaks the covenant. Even if we were to concede this (which we don’t–but let’s just say we do), this still does not disprove that Robert Spencer is guilty of wholesale fabrication. Spencer did not just claim that the dhimmis are guilty; he told us why they are called “guilty people.”

As I noted above, I did not say the Islamic state would not be guilty if it broke the covenant. Danios has falsely attributed that claim to me. More Danios from part 2 "Huckster":

“Here are Spencer’s words from p.49 of his book [...]: “The dhimmi The Qur’an calls Jews and Christians “People of the Book;” Islamic law calls them dhimmis, which means “protected” or “guilty” people–the Arabic word means both...Jews and Christians are “guilty” because they have not only rejected Muhammad as a prophet, but have also distorted the legitimate revelations they have received from Allah. Because of that guilt, Islamic law dictates that Jews and Christians may live in Islamic states, but not as equals with Muslims.” In other words, Spencer has wholly imagined the claim that the word “dhimmis” means “guilty people” because they are guilty of “reject[ing] Muhammad as a prophet” or because they have “distorted the...revelations.””

This again shows Danios' confusion about senses 1 and 2. In this confusion, he flails about wildly, hurling accusations against Robert. And if Danios had read further in the T.P. Hughes discussion of the word zimmi, he would have seen Hughes state that the Christian or Jewish zimmi was considered in Islam as "guilty" of a "partial perversion" of God's true message etc. (see my quote above in my second June 8th post).

“Secondly, and more importantly, Kinana is guilty of wholesale fabrication himself (which is why he fits right into the JihadWatch crew). The word “dhimma” is related to “guilty” not because the dhimmi is a “guilty person” but because the one granting the dhimma (protection) would be guilty if he/she violates it. Said in a clearer way, it is the Islamic state (not the non-Muslim resident) that would be guilty of violating the sanctity of the dhimmi’s life and property. Lane’s Lexicon reads: "Dhimma: A compact, a covenant, a contract, a league, a treaty, an engagement, a bond, or an obligation; because the breaking thereof necessesitates blame: and a right, or due, for the neglect of which one is to be blamed: [an inviolable right or due:]...a thing that should be sacred, or inviolable; or which one is under an obligation to reverence, respect, or honour, and defend." The sacred and inviolable right that must be respected, honored, and defended is the safety (amaan) of the non-Muslim resident.”

Note how Danios simply superimposes his own bizarre interpretation onto Lane. Lane never says that only the Muslim authority, not the non-Muslim dhimmis, could be guilty/blamed for violating the covenant.

"Notice how Kinana cites (the horribly outdated) T.P. Hughes’ A Dictionary of Islam, and yet he purposely places ellipses [...] in the definition of the word “zimmah” in order to hide the fact that the “blame” (or “guilt”) is attributed to the Islamic state, not the non-Muslim resident."

In fact, Hughes' definition, which is valid and consistent with Lane's, doesn't say that at all, so there is no such thing to hide. It is Danios' own confabulated and projected interpretation, presented in his part 2 article, that he accuses me of "hiding" in a quote in a post that I wrote before his part 2 article appeared!

“For example, ambassadors from other empires would visit the Islamic caliph, and be granted amaan (safe passage) to travel in the Islamic lands without fear of being harmed. This amaan was granted without any payment or other obligation on the ambassador, so it cannot be said that the ambassador is the one blameworthy/guilty of breaching the covenant of security. Rather, it is the state that would be blameworthy/guilty should it harm the ambassador."

This discussion is about regular dhimmis, who are called dhimmis. Nevertheless, I have addressed the issue of temporary aman (in a previous post above), which could be violated by either side. In any case, even if the ambassador in this example was a dhimmi, does Danios presume the ambassador is really free of all obligations and can harm and even kill Muslims without being declared guilty? Contrast this again with Danios' previous statements (see "harm"), made long before he got into trouble over the meaning(s) of the word dhimma!

“There is absolutely no doubt that it is the Islamic state that is blameworthy/guilty if it violates the dhimma. It therefore cannot at all be said that dhimmi means (or even implies) “guilty people” or “guilty ones.””

Note here that he is now even more explicit in his sweeping claims, denying that "dhimmis" could even imply guilty people.

“Even if Robert Spencer or Kinana of Khaybar were to claim that it could also refer to the dhimmi if he breaks the contract (which does not at all seem to be true, but let’s just say it is for argument’s sake), then this is an incredibly weak polemical point, since the Islamic state is also “guilty” in the same way then!”

It isn't a weak polemical point in this debate. It is Danios who decided to take Robert to task over the meaning of the word dhimmis. Robert made a general claim about what the word dhimmis (or dhimma) meant, i.e., that it could mean protected people or guilty people. This is due to the nature of the word, which is like the word "responsibility"; it can mean the condition of being entrusted or the condition of being blamed. In this sense (sense 1), any party to the covenant could be guilty/rightly to blame for violating the covenant.

The sense, meaning, connotation, implication of guilty/blameworthiness is further due to the fact that the Quran, Muhammad, and Islamic law considered the non-Muslims who refused to embrace Islam and perverted their doctrines (again, see my quote of T.P. Hughes on this) and broke their covenant as guilty (sense 2). Dhimmis are the non-Muslims under an Islamic state who refuse to embrace Islam. Once a dhimmi embraces Islam, he is no longer a dhimmi. He becomes a Muslim. Muslims in this regime are not called dhimmis.

I have established that prior to the Part 2 "Huckster" article, Danios indicated that he believed or assumed non-Muslims would be considered guilty for violating the dhimma. Thus, it cannot be claimed that he didn't know this or wasn't aware of it. In the part 2 "Huckster" article, however, under pressure from a counter-response from Robert Spencer and my quote of T.P. Hughes (which Danios himself validated by checking Lane's Lexicon), Danios confabulated a bizarre interpretation whereby non-Muslims could not be guilty of violating the dhimma.

So let us now ask:

A. Did Danios genuinely change his mind about whether non-Muslims could be guilty of violating the dhimma?

or

B. Does Danios (still) know that non-Muslims can be guilty of violating the dhimma, and, knowing this, did he confabulate and lie in the part 2 "Huckster" article (perhaps in order to try to get himself out of trouble)?

If Danios changed his mind, why didn't he state to his readers that he was departing from what he'd earlier assumed about the dhimma? Why didn't he "correct" (from the standpoint of his new perspective) what he'd said earlier? I think it would be highly implausible that he understood the basic concept of the dhimma when he wrote the previous "Perpetual Servitude" article but then lost or abandoned that basic understanding during the writing of the Part 2 "Huckster" article.

After considering his statements in earlier articles, I suspect it is more likely that Danios (still!) knows that non-Muslim dhimmis can be guilty of violating the dhimma, and that he now knows the Hughes and Lane definitions of the dhimma (covenant) apply to both non-Muslim and Muslim parties who could be guilty of violating the covenant. If Danios knows these things, then he is lying when he denies them in his part 2 "Huckster" article.

A fuller quote from Spencer's Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam, p. 49, is as follows:

“The dhimma The Qur’an calls Jews and Christians “People of the Book;” Islamic law calls them dhimmis, which means “protected” or “guilty” people--the Arabic word means both. They are “protected” because, as People of the Book, they have received genuine revelations (“the Book”) from Allah and thus differ in status from out-and-out pagans and idolaters like Hindus and Buddhists. (Historically, the latter two groups have been treated even worse by Islamic conquerors, although as a practical matter their Muslim masters ultimately awarded them dhimmi status.) Jews and Christians are “guilty” because they have not only rejected Muhammad as a prophet, but have also distorted the legitimate revelations they have received from Allah. Because of that guilt, Islamic law dictates that Jews and Christians may live in Islamic states, but not as equals with Muslims.”

I take Robert's description to be consistent conceptually with T.P. Hughes' presentations of the meanings of zimmah and zimmi, as well as those of Lane.

From Hughes, here are the key elements (covenant, blameworthiness/guilt, security/protection, payment of jizya to secure protection, etc., and then "guilt" in sense 2 as I have discussed above) once again:

“ZIMMAH. , pl. zimam, from the root zamm, “to blame.” A compact, covenant, or contract, a league or treaty, any engagement or obligation, because the breaking thereof necessitates blame; and a right or due, for the neglect of which one is to be blamed.[...]" “ZIMMI. , a member of the Ahlu ‘z-Zimmah, a non Muslim subject of a Muslim government, belonging to the Jewish, Christian, or Sabean creed who, for the payment of a poll— or capitation-tax, enjoys security of his person and property in a Muhammadan country. [...]"

Continuing under zimmi, referring to the People of the Book, Hughes writes:

"[...]As they are not guilty of an absolute denial, but only of a partial perversion of the truth, only part of the punishment for disbelief is their due, and it is imposed upon them in the shape of a tribute called poll- or capitation tax [JAZYAH], by means of which they secure protection for their property, personal freedom, and religious toleration from the Muslim Government. The same privilege is extended to the Majusi or Sabeans whose particular form of worship was more leniently judged by Muhammad and the Traditionists than that if the idolaters of Persia.[...]"

In his Part 2 "Huckster" article, Danios introduced his idea that non-Muslim dhimmis would not be guilty for breaking the covenant; only the Muslim side would be guilty if they broke it. I established that he had indicated in a previous article that he did assume that non-Muslim dhimmis could violate the dhimma, and that, in the part 1 Huckster article, he did not object to the idea of non-Muslims being guilty of violating the dhimma in the Pact of Umar example.

Note, further to this point, that Danios claims he has reviewed Robert's chapter 4 of the P.I.G., which contains other instances mentioning the idea of dhimmis violating the covenant. Yet Danios did not object to those statements at all. Why not? Wouldn't this have given him a perfect opportunity to pounce on more supposed errors of Robert Spencer?

Here is an example, where Robert, writing about various rules and restrictions on the non-Muslims who were party to the dhimma contract (as described in the Reliance of the Traveller), writes: "If they [the dhimmis] violate these terms, the law further stipulates that they can be killed or sold into slavery at the discretion of the Muslim leader. Dhimmis were strictly forbidden, on pain of death, to proselytize among Muslims [...]" (p. 51, P.I.G. to Islam) [my brackets added].

In addition, Robert cites the example of Sheikh Marzouq Salem Al-Ghamdi discussing several sharia restrictions and obligations on the non-Muslim dhimmis, including not to incite anyone against Muslims and not to strike a Muslim. Otherwise, as the Sheikh says, "...If they violate these conditions, they have no protection." (p. 52, P.I.G. to Islam).

The question for Danios now is, If you really believe what you said in the part 2 Huckster article, that non-Muslim dhimmis would not be considered guilty for violating the dhimma, will you now take the opportunity to "correct" Robert Spencer and Sheikh al-Ghamdi, and, for that matter, all the other examples I've cited in this thread, of dhimmi violations of the covenant (dhimma)? Will Danios at least state, consistent with his part 2 Huckster view, that the non-Muslim dhimmis in these examples would not be guilty for violating the covenant (dhimma)?

Here are some more examples of how non-Muslims would be considered to have violated the dhimma (covenant), from Bostom’s (2005) edited volume The Legacy of Jihad:

-{my notes in these brackets}
-ellipses [...] are mine
-[notes in square brackets are as quoted in Bostom]
-page numbers are for Bostom's volume

From Shara ‘i’ u l-Islam, by Al-Hilli (d. 1277)

p. 205
Infidels upon whom a tribute may be imposed
170. “If it appears that the infidel has not told the truth*, the treaty made with him is dissolved by that very fact.”

*{Note, this refers to telling the truth when asked about his religious belief/identity, as a Christian, Jew, etc., see articles 167-169}.

p. 206
"On the rate of the tribute {Jizya}
[...]
186. The annual rate of the tribute owed by the subject infidel, when he happens to die after the expiration of the legal year, must be withheld from the total of his estate. The subject infidel who embraces Islam before the expiration of the legal year and even after that time, without having paid the tribute, is exempt from it."

{Note how in the above example converting to Islam could be one way of avoiding having to pay the jizya, which normally was set at a higher rate than the zakat or tithes which Muslims pay}

p. 207
"Conditions to which the infidel tributaries must be subjected
187. The six conditions to which the infidel tributaries must be subjected are as follows
188. First, to pay the tribute.
189. Second, not to commit any act contrary to the terms of the surrender, such as rebelling against the Muslim authority, or giving aid to the enemy. Every infidel who commits an act of this nature places himself, ipso facto, outside the terms of the surrender [i.e., forfeits his protection]
190. Third, not to commit any act that is harmful to the Muslims, such as fornication or adultery with a Muslim woman, sodomy with a Muslim youth, stealing something belonging to a Muslim, giving asylum to enemy spies or spying on behalf of the enemy.
191. When the obligation to refrain from one of the acts mentioned in the preceding article is the subject of one of the terms of surrender, any infraction entails a breach [annulment] of the treaty.
192. When this obligation is not stipulated, the treaty remains valid, but the guilty parties become liable to the punishments incurred by the crime.
193. A tributary who blasphemes the Prophet must be put to death.
194. A tributary who speaks irreverently about the memory of the Prophet incurs a corporal punishment only, if the terms of the treaty did not include a prohibition of this act.5 {Note 5: “5. Otherwise, the treaty can be dissolved, since it has been violated.”}
195. Fourth, to abstain from committing publicly any act forbidden by Muslim law, such as consuming wine, fornication and adultery with the women and wives of their coreligionists, consuming pork, or marriage between persons related by consanguinity in the degrees prohibited among the Muslims.
196. Perpetrating one of these acts publicly results in the annulment of the treaty; some jurists, however, who do not consider this as a violation of the treaty, are of the opinion that the guilty party in this case must be punished according to the provisions of the Muslim penal code.
197. Fifth, not to build temples or to ring church bells, and not to erect houses to a height more prominent than the houses of the Muslims, under pain of corporal punishment, when the terms of the surrender are silent on this subject. When, on the other contrary, this prohibition is incorporated into the treaty, an infraction results in the annulment of the treaty.
198. Sixth, to abide by Muslim laws.
p. 208
Particular Provisions
199. When the tributary acts contrary to the laws of Islam in a Muslim country, the imam has the right to banish him. Some jurists admit the imam’s right to kill the infidel in this case, to reduce him to slavery, or to impose a fine on him, but this point is disputed."

Jami’-i ‘Abbasi: Yakdawrah-i Figh-i

Muhammad al-Amili (d. 1621)

p. 213

Part Six: Holy War (Jihad)

"Islamic holy war against followers of other religions, such as Jews, is required unless they convert to Islam or pay the poll tax. There are twelve conditions required in paying the poll tax. [...] The amount of the poll tax depends on the Imam’s decision. If a Jew or any of those possessing the Holy Scriptures converted to Islam, they are not obliged to pay the poll tax.
[...]
Third condition: Those possessing Holy Scriptures are not authorized to sabotage Muslims’ safety, which means they are not supposed to associate with Muslim enemies or disobey paying poll tax. Fourth condition: Those possessing the Holy Scriptures are not allowed to sleep with Muslim women or marry them. Fifth condition: Those possessing Holy Scriptures must not deceive Muslims or debunk what they [the Muslims] believe in. Sixth condition: Those possessing Holy Scriptures must not be convicted of robbery. Seventh condition: Those possessing Holy Scriptures must not harbor or finance the Muslims’ enemies such as spies and invaders, or reveal any intelligence information regarding Muslims to infidels. Eighth condition: Those possessing Holy Scriptures must not be convicted of murdering a Muslim. Ninth condition: Those possessing Holy Scriptures must not disrespect the Muslim Faith.
[...]
Part Twenty
A Muslim is allowed to kill the dhimmi unless the dhimmi follows the twelve conditions that are mentioned above in the Jihad section, or the dhimmi converts to Islam."

p. 217-218
Risala-yi Sawa’iq Al-Yahud

Muhammad Al-Majlisi (d. 1699)

"In the realization of the state of dhimma [protection] it is necessary that they [the dhimmis] should accept the jizya and not perpetrate deeds that are opposed to [the state of] security, such as waging war against Muslims, or aiding infidels in war against Muslims. And some [of the jurists] said that they should commit themselves to the laws of the Muslims, and that they should not reject anything decreed upon them by a Muslim ruler in accordance with the sharia. And they [also] said that it is appropriate for the Muslim ruler to impose upon them seven conditions; First, that they should not fornicate with the Muslim women, nor assault their [Muslims’] children; second, that they should not marry Muslim women; third, that they should not tempt Muslims to turn away from their religion; fourth, that they should not rob Muslims; fifth, that they should not harbor the spies of infidels; sixth, that they should not help infidels attain victory over the Muslims nor inform them about the state/conditions of the Muslims; seventh, that they should not kill Muslim men, women, and children. If these seven conditions have been stipulated, and they violate them, then they forfeit protection. But if the conditions have not been stipulated, [and they commit any of the above acts] they will be punished in accordance with the sharia of Islam, but they do not forfeit the protection. Most of the “ulama” maintain that they should not perpetrate anything that would be to the detriment of the religion of Islam, such as maligning the Supreme God or His Excellency, the prophet, or one of the innocent Imams, may God’s prayers be upon them, and that this should also be a condition imposed upon them. And if they violate it, they forfeit protection. And if, God forbid, they insult God, the Prophet or the Imams, peace be upon them, whoever [from among the Muslims] hears [such an insult] from the dhimmis must kill [them] if no harm results from it."

Classification of persons
Nicolas P. Aghnides
p. 301-304

"In reply to the following question put by certain Muslims, “How may the dhimmis be allowed to persist in what is the worst of crimes, i.e., unbelief, by payment of a monetary consideration?” al-Sarakhsi says that the object is not the monetary consideration, but their invitation to the Faith in the most beautiful way. In fact, as a result of the act of covenant (‘aqd al-dhimmah) the dhimmi abandons fighting, and the person who does not fight may not be attacked. Then, too, “the dhimmi by living among the Moslems sees the beauties of the Moslem faith and is exhorted to, and often does, accept Islam.”11
[...]
“According to the Shafiites,14 the pact is broken if the dhimmis fight the Moslems, or if they refuse to pay the jizya or to obey the Moslem laws, but, unless expressly stipulated, not if they debauch Moslem women or slander the Prophet. Finally, according to the Malikites,15 the pact is broken in all the four cases mentioned.”

-------------------------

And here is (Danios-approved) Mark R. Cohen, in Under Crescent and Cross, again mentioning incidentally that a dhimmi could be considered to have violated the dhimma (Pact).

p. 74
"The view of one of the stricter Islamic schools of law, the Malikite, is that Islam should not impose collective retribution for one person’s violation of the Pact if the other non-Muslims repudiate the act or are found to have transgressed under compulsion.135"

These next excerpts challenge Danios' claims about the Tanzimat reforms, as well as relating to the topic of non-Muslim subjects under Islamic law perceived to be in violation of the covenant.

More from Bostom (2005) The Legacy of Jihad
-[brackets] and (parentheses) as quoted

pp. 518-524

A Modern Jihad Genocide

Andrew G. Bostom

p. 521
“The renowned Ottomanist Roderick Davison has observed that under the Shari’a (Islamic Holy Law) the “infidel gavours” [“dhimmis,” “rayas”] were permanently relegated to a status of “inferiority” and subjected to a “contemptuous half-toleration.” Davison further maintained that this contempt emanated from “an innate attitude of superiority,” and was driven by an “innate Muslim feeling,” prone to paroxysms of “open fanaticism.”16 Sustained, vehement reactions to the 1839 and 1856 Tanzimat reform acts by large segments of the Muslim population, led by Muslim spiritual leaders and the military, illustrate Davison’s point.17 Perhaps the most candid and telling assessment of the doomed Tanzimat reforms, in particular the 1856 act, was provided by Mustafa Resid, ottoman grand vizier, at six different times between 1846 and 1858. In his denunciation of the reforms, Resid argued the proposed “complete emancipation” of the non-Muslim subjects, appropriately destined to be subjugated and ruled, was ‘entirely contradictory” to “the 600-year traditions of the Ottoman Empire.” He openly proclaimed the “complete emancipation” segment of the initiative as disingenuous, enacted deliberately to mislead Europeans, who had insisted on this provision. Sadly prescient, Resid then made the ominous prediction of a “great massacre” if equality was in fact granted to non-Muslims.18”

p. 521-522

“During the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid, the Ottoman Turks massacred over two hundred thousand Armenians between 1894 and 1896. This was followed, under the Young Turk regime, by the Adana massacres of twenty-five thousand Armenians in 1909, and the first formal genocide of the twentieth century, when in 1915 alone, an additional six hundred thousand to eight hundred thousand Armenians were slaughtered.21 The massacres of the 1890s had an “organic” connection to the Adana massacres of 1909, and more important, to the events of 1915. As Vahakn Dadrian argues, they facilitated the genocidal acts of 1915 by providing the Young Turks with “a predictable impunity.” The absence of adverse consequences for the Abdul Hamid massacres in the 1890s allowed the Young Turks to move forward without constraints.22
Contemporary accounts from European diplomats make clear that these brutal massacres were perpetrated in the context of a formal jihad against the Armenians who attempted to throw off the yoke of dhimmitude by seeking equal rights and autonomy. For example, the Chief Dragoman (Turkish-speaking interpreter) of the British embassy reported regarding the 1894-1896 massacres:
“[the perpetrators] are guided in their general action by the prescriptions of the Sheri [Sharia] Law. That law prescribes that if the “rayah” [dhimmi] Christian attempts, by having recourse to foreign powers, to overstep the limits of privileges allowed them by their Mussulman [Muslim] masters, and free themselves from their bondage, their lives and property are to be forfeited, and are at the mercy of the Mussulmans. To the Turkish mind the Armenians had tried to overstep those limits by appealing to foreign powers, especially England. They therefore considered it their religious duty and a righteous thing to destroy and seize the properties of the Aremenians.”23”
The scholar Bat Ye’or confirms this reasoning, noting that the Armenian quest for reforms invalidated their “legal status,” which involved a “contract” (i.e., with their Muslim Turkish rulers). This
“breach...restored to the umma [the Muslim community] its initial right to kill the subjugated minority [the dhimmis], [and] seize their property.”24”

------------------------

A separate point I raised above was that punishment implies that the punished are considered guilty of some wrong-doing or wrong belief (this is relevant to sense 2 of guilty, as discussed in my above posts). Danios-approved Mark R. Cohen, in Under Crescent and Cross, writes:

p. 69
“Jurists debated whether the jizya mandated by the Qur’an constituted a penalty (‘uquba; that is, a means of debasement) or a fee (ujra), paid to secure physical protection and residential rights. Most authorities held that it was a penalty.109”

And note, again, this "penalty" of jizya is removed if the dhimmi converts to Islam.

---------------------------

BTW, with a bit of reading of Under Crescent and Cross, it comes as no surprise why Mark R. Cohen is Danios-approved. Andrew Bostom and Bat Ye'or have made criticisms of Mark R. Cohen's work.

From Jihadwatch (dhimmiwatch) archives see
"Response to Mark Cohen’s article in the Jerusalem Post of January, 2008"
Bat Ye’or

From Bostom's blog, see
"Tendentious Marc Cohen OK, Bat Ye’or Not OK?"
January 19th, 2008 by Andrew Bostom
[source: andrewbostom.org/blog]
Bostom includes a review of Mark Cohen’s book Under Crescent and Cross

Quoted in Bostom's opening essay in The Legacy of Jihad (2005)
-{My notes in these brackets}
-ellipses .... as quoted

p. 97
Joseph Schacht (1964)
“The basis of the Islamic attitude towards unbelievers is the law of war; they must be either converted or subjugated or killed (excepting women, children, and slaves); the third alternative, in general, occurs only if the first two are refused....Apart from this, prisoners of war are either made slaves or killed or left alive as free dhimmis or exchanged for Muslim prisoners of war, at the discretion of the imam; also a treaty of surrender is concluded which forms the legal basis for the treatment of the non-Muslims to whom it applies. It is often called the dhimma....This treaty necessarily provides for the surrender of the non-Muslims with all duties deriving from it, in particular the payment of the tribute, i.e., the fixed poll-tax (jizya) and the land tax (kharaj), the amount of which is determined from case to case. {Schacht then goes on to list several of the duties, restrictions, and obligations of the non-Muslim dhimmis}.... A non-Muslim who is not protected by a treaty is called harbi, “in a state of war,” “enemy alien”; his life and property are completely unprotected by law.304”

pp. 56-57
Charles Emmanuel Dufourcq
“A learned Muslim jurist of Hispanic Christian descent who lived around the year 1000, Ahmed ibn Said ibn Hazm (father of the famous mid-eleventh-century author Ibn Hazm) gives glimpses, in several of his juridical consultations, of how the freedom of the “infidels” was constantly at risk. Non-payment of the head-tax by a dhimmi made him liable to all the Islamic penalties for debtors who did not repay their creditors; the offender could be sold into slavery or even put to death. In addition, non-payment of the head-tax by one or several dhimmis—especially if it was fraudulent—allowed the Moslem authority, at its discretion, to put an end to the autonomy of the community to which the guilty party or parties belonged. Thus, from one day to the next, all the Christians in a city could lose their status as a protected people through the fault of just one of them. Everything could be called into question, including their personal liberty....Furthermore, non-payment of the legal tribute was not the only reason for abrogating the status of “People of the Book”; another was “public outrage against the Islamic faith,” for example, leaving exposed, for Moslems to see, a cross or wine or even pigs.
[B]y converting [to Islam], one would no longer have to be confined to a given district, or be the victim of discriminatory measures or suffer humiliations....Furthermore, the entire Islamic law tended to favor conversions. When an “infidel” became a Moslem, he immediately benefited from a complete amnesty for all of his earlier crimes, even if he had been sentenced to the death penalty, even if it was for having insulted the Prophet or blasphemed against the Word of God: his conversion acquitted him of all his faults, of all his previous sins. A legal opinion given by a mufti from al-Andalus in the ninth century is very instructive: a Christian dhimmi kidnapped and violated a Moslem woman; when he was arrested and condemned to death, he immediately converted to Islam; he was automatically pardoned, while being constrained to marry the woman and to provide for her a dowry in keeping with her status. The mufti who was consulted about the affair, perhaps by a brother of the woman, found that the court decision was perfectly legal, but specified that if the convert did not become a Moslem in good faith and secretly remained a Christian, he should be flogged, slaughtered, and crucified.”

{Notes about the Dufourcq quote above.
There is some variation in whether collective punishment was meted out in response to one person’s crime.
There is some variation in whether blasphemy would be forgiven due to some sort of repentance or conversion to Islam etc.}

{"his conversion acquitted him of all his faults, of all his previous sins."
-To which I would add, explicitly, his former major sin-crime of being a non-Muslim. Hence the removal of the jizya and other penalties.}

----------------------------

Next topic.

In his 'Perpetual Servitude' article on the dhimma, Danios wrote this:

“Unlike Christianity, the church (mosque) was separate from the state under Islamic rule; there was no equivalent to the pope.”

However, Danios' approved author Mark R. Cohen, in Under Crescent and Cross (a book Danios relied heavily upon in the 'Perpetual Servitude' article), wrote this (p. 54):

“Another important contrast with Christendom is that traditional Islam knows no distinction between secular and religious law, between the law of the state and the law of the “church.” This goes back to the very foundations of the Islamic polity. Muhammad began his mission as a man of religion, a prophet preaching a revealed message. But he rapidly turned founder of a religiopolitical community, which he called the umma. “Muhammad’s role as a prophet (nabi) within a community that he himself had summoned into being necessarily included the functions of legislator, executive, and military commander of the umma.”14”

When I initially (May 27) checked the basis for Robert's "dhimmis, which means 'protected' or 'guilty' people-the Arabic word means both" claim, I became aware that at least two other authors made essentially the same claim, yet both of them are Islam critics. Hence, apologists would likely object to those authors and dismiss their claims out of hand. So instead I turned to the T. P. Hughes dictionary. Anyways, here are the two Islam critic sources who also claim that the word dhimmis means, connotes, or implies guilt/blameworthiness:

1. From The Religion of Peace website [Source: thereligionofpeace.com/Pages/Myths-of-Islam]:

"[...] anyone who rejects Muhammad is not considered to be innocent under Islamic law. The most protected and respected of all non-Muslims are the dhimma, the “people of the book.” These would specifically be Jews and Christians who agree to Islamic rule and pay the jizya (tribute to Muslims). Yet, the word “dhimmi” comes from the Arabic root meaning “guilt” or "blame." ["...the dhimmi parent and sister words mean both 'to blame' as well as safeguards that can be extended to protect the blameworthy" Amitav Ghosh, In an Antique Land] So, if even the dhimma have a measure of guilt attached to their status (by virtue of having rejected Allah’s full truth), then how can non-Muslims who oppose Islamic rule or refuse to pay the jizya be considered “innocent?”"

2. Understanding the Islam in Islamic Antisemitism
by Andrew G. Bostom, November 17, 2008 [Source: Jewcy, though the critical part of Bostom's quote can also be found elsewhere, including at Bostom's site, see andrewbostom.org/content/view/71/55/]

"In his seminal The Laws of Islamic Governance al-Mawardi (d. 1058), a renowned jurist of Baghdad, examined the regulations pertaining to the lands and infidel populations subjugated by jihad. This is the origin of the system of dhimmitude. The native infidel "dhimmi" (which derives from both the word for "pact", and also "guilt"-guilty of religious errors) population had to recognize Islamic ownership of their land, submit to Islamic law, and accept payment of the Koranic poll tax (jizya)-the tax paid in lieu of being slain-based on Koran 9:29. Al- Mawardi notes that "The enemy makes a payment in return for peace and reconciliation... Reconciliation and security last as long as the pavment is made. If the pavment ceases, then the jihad resumes." A treaty of reconciliation may be renewable, but must not exceed 10 years. This same basic formulation was reiterated during a January 8, 1998 interview by Yusuf al-Qaradawi confirming how jihad continues to regulate the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims to this day. The "contract of the jizya", or "dhimma" encompassed other obligatory and recommended obligations for the conquered non-Muslim "dhimmi" peoples. Collectively, these "obligations" formed the discriminatory system of dhimmitude imposed upon non-Muslims-Jews, Christians, [as well as Zoroastrians, Hindus, and Buddhists]-subjugated by jihad."

[my bolding added]

The Religion of Peace author quotes the source (Amitav Ghosh) directly, though Ghosh, certainly a credible source, is not himself a linguist, lexicographer, Islamic scholar or jurist, etc. Hence, it would be appropriate to check Amitav's source.

It is not entirely clear that Bostom is quoting his source (al-Mawardi) on the key terms, though the quotation marks around "pact" and "guilt" in the context suggest these come from Mawardi himself. However, that's not certain since the full statement is not quoted.

In any case, Ghosh's reference could be checked, and al-Mawardi could be checked (probably his al-Ahkum al-Sultaniyyah, i.e., The Laws of Islamic Governance).

The idea that dhimma can connote protection or guilt/blameworthiness, as I have shown, is not some idea cooked up by Islam critics.

Interestingly, I came across another source, this one a pro-Islam scholarly source, that states essentially the same thing Robert states on p. 49 of his Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam. Here it is:

An Islamic Perspective on Governance Zafar Iqbal and Mervyn K. Lewis (2009) Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham U.K. pp. 75-76 “...the Holy Qur’an refers to Jews and Christians as ahl al-kitab, the People of the Book, because they belong to ‘revealed religions’ (Stork, 1999, p. 16). Although in one of the verses in the Holy Qur’an they are reserved Allah’s curse for stubbornly rejecting Faith (2:159), generally they are afforded forgiveness (4:153), praise for devotion to learning (5:82) and placed in the ranks of the righteous (3:113-114). Under Islamic Law, People of the Book are accorded the status of dhimmis (non-Muslims protected by a treaty of surrender), a position which, like the Arabic word itself, means ‘protected’ or ‘guilty’. They are protected because they have been recipients of genuine revelations (the Book) and share common religious beliefs with Muslims such as God, Angels and the Last Day. On these grounds, they received the status of ‘protected minorities’ (ahl adh-dhimma). At the same time, People of the Book are guilty of not accepting Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) as a prophet, and having misinterpreted (or distorted) the revelations that they did receive (al-Mawardi, [1405 AH] 1985). There are differences, for example, on the Oneness of God, the Prophets, Revealed Books, lawful food, inheritance, etc., that pose difficulties for marriage between Muslims and non-Muslims and for the bringing up of children.” “As dhimmis, Jews and Christians may live in Muslim states and practice their religions, but under certain conditions and not quite as equals with Muslims.[...]"

[my bolding added]

Note the strong similarity to Robert's (2005, p. 49) description. Possibly they are drawing on some of the same sources as Robert (or maybe they've read Robert's book). I suspect that a common source is al-Mawardi, since he is cited by Iqbal and Lewis, and by Bostom, in close proximity to the key statement, and Robert also lists al-Mawardi as a source in the 2005 P.I.G (though does not cite him in this specific context on p. 49).

(BTW, I won't address in detail the tolerant interpretations of verses 4:153, 5:82, and 3:113-114, in the above quote. I will note that many of the generally positive-seeming references to Jews or Christians in the Quran pertain to those particular people from among the Jews or Christians who seem to have views compatible with Islam or seem inclined toward it, or who have actually converted to Islam from Christianity or Judaism. All such verses have to be reconciled with 3:85, 9:29, etc. And there are many more negative verses about Christians and Jews than implied by Iqbal's and Lewis' statement.)

So in light of this statement from a pro-Islam scholarly source, will Danios and company now claim that Iqbal and Lewis too have committed "complete fabrication," "absurdity," and that they are "intellectual hucksters," who've written "nonsense" that "just reflects the demagoguery" of "the anti-Islam elements," etc.? Or is it okay when they say it, but not when Spencer says it?

------------------------------

I suspect that a contributing factor to Danios' false claim that non-Muslims can't violate the dhimma is the existence of many truncated, one-sided, or incomplete descriptions of the dhimma concept. For example, many sources simply mention something to the effect that dhimma means protection and Muslims were obliged to provide it to the non-Muslims. That fragment of a description of course overlooks the obligations of the non-Muslims, such as paying the jizya to secure protection, not jeopardizing the Muslims' security, not to fight the Muslims, and so on. Here is part of a quote from Schacht (1964), quoted in Iqbal and Lewis (2009, Google Books):

"It is often called dhimma, ‘engagement,’ ‘obligation,’ ‘responsibility,’ because the Muslims by it undertake to safeguard the life and property of the non-Muslims in question, who are called dhimmis."

This part from Schacht had been excluded in Bostom's quote (see his ellipses), but was included in Iqbal and Lewis's quote (they also include the next part mentioning the non-Muslims' obligations). I show it here in truncated form to illustrate how, with a truncated description, someone who might not know much about the dhimma might hastily or erroneously conclude that only the Muslims had any obligations.

Yet the idea that the non-Muslims have obligations and restrictions, and that if or when they violated the dhimma they would be considered guilty/blameworthy for doing so, is so basic to the concept of the dhimma covenant that I frankly cannot believe that Danios does not understand this--especially in light of his own previous comments (as I've shown above). Rather, I think he thought he found some kind of technicality that could allow him to escape the trouble he'd got himself into over his sweeping denials and dismissals about the meanings of the word dhimma. Indeed, he tried to turn this around and go on the offense, accusing both Robert and me of being "intellectual hucksters" and so forth.

Loonwatch and Danios must take responsibility for their false claims and issue a correction and retraction of his major error that non-Muslims wouldn't be considered guilty/blameworthy for violating the dhimma (covenant).

Recently I was able to check the Amitav Ghosh and al-Mawardi references, mentioned in my July 8 post.

Briefly, Al-Mawardi (The Ordinances of Governance, 2000, translated by Wafaa H. Wahba, Reading, U.K., Garnet Press, i.e., Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya w’al-Wilayat al-Diniyya) does not discuss directly the “guilt” or blameworthiness aspect of the meaning of the word dhimma. Amitav Ghosh (In an Antique Land, 1994, pp. 161-162, 371, Granta Books) does not provide a source for his interpretation of the word dhimma.

Nevertheless, since my above (July 8) post, I have surveyed numerous dictionaries and scholars’ descriptions of the dhimma concept, and have verified my above claims and evidence. I also did not encounter any source that claims, as Danios and Loonwatch claim, that the sense of blameworthiness/guilt in the meaning of the word dhimma would only apply if the Muslim, not the non-Muslim, violated the dhimma. Danios did not support his bizarre claim.

I will further support my claims in the above posts and will further show that Danios' claim is not credible.

Note: in cited or quoted sources below, these brackets { } are mine.

Outline:

1. The sense of blameworthiness/guilt applies to both sides (non-Muslim and Muslim) of the covenant.

2. Blameworthiness (or guilt) is an aspect of the general meaning of the word dhimma itself.

3. Other definitions or labels.

4. Conscience is an important word that is included in the definition of dhimma.

5. Dhimmis were also responsible for Muslims' security.

1. The sense of blameworthiness/guilt applies to both sides (non-Muslim and Muslim) of the dhimma covenant. Here is a scholarly source that does, incidentally, literally spell out that both sides are held accountable (i.e., responsible, liable) to the dhimma contract [excerpts from “Minority Rights in Islam. From Dhimmi to Citizen,” by Recep Senturk, pp. 67-99, Chapter 5, in Islam and human rights: advancing a U.S.-Muslim dialogue. Shireen Hunter, Huma Malik, eds., Washington: CSIS Press, 2005]
p. 71 “…dhimmah, the right to legal personhood with accountability and inviolability.”
p. 71 “A dhimmi may be defined as a person with accountability and inviolability, while a millah, or millet, is a religious community or nation united around a religious identity and discourse.”
p. 73 “In classical Islamic jurisprudence, as related earlier, the term dhimmah means accountability and inviolability, which is usually termed personhood in modern legal discourse.15 Moral, religious, and legal accountability requires one to have dhimmah. If one has dhimmah, one can bear rights and responsibilities. Dhimmah distinguishes human beings from animals because humans are responsible for their actions. Having dhimmah is thus a privilege that entitles one to be a full member of society. Accountability before the law is a prerequisite for membership in society, which comes with a right to complete inviolability.”
{The author distinguishes what he calls the Universalist school, which considers all human beings as born with dhimmah, from the Communalist school which assumes that non-Muslims must acquire dhimmah or some level of dhimma, through their engagement in the dhimmah contract with the Muslim authority}
p. 74 “…ahl al-dhimmah, which literally means ‘people with accountability and inviolability.’”
p. 75 “From this {Universalist} perspective, the compact of dhimmah is merely an act of acknowledgement by both sides about their rights and duties. This is because non-Muslims are already granted all the rights they may possibly have by virtue of their humanity, and thus signing a treaty with Muslims is not going to bring them new rights. However, the act of dhimmah serves as a confirmation of those rights and duties by both parties.”
p.76 “{In the Communalist view,} Non-Muslims achieve that status {of dhimmah} by virtue of the compact they make with the Muslim authority. From this perspective, dhimmah is a gained right and privilege; it is also the basis for other rights to be gained by virtue of signing a treaty with the Muslim authority. Enjoying legal personhood requires fulfilling the conditions of the treaty. Otherwise, it will be lost. One of the conditions for keeping legal personhood is to pay the special poll tax, jizya, to the state.21”
p. 76 […] “As mentioned above, the right to inviolability is gained by virtue of faith (iman) or treaty of security (aman). One is automatically considered a citizen of the Islamic state if one is a Muslim, and consequently his dhimmah is respected. The non-Muslim who makes a treaty with the Islamic state can also become a citizen and gain the right to dhimmah. Only then can he become accountable and inviolable.”
p. 77 “From the perspective of the communalist school, jizya is the fee for dhimmah, which entitles one to inviolability…”

Thus, both sides or parties to the dhimma, Muslim and non-Muslim, have responsibility and would be blameworthy/guilty if they violated the contract. Although both Muslims and non-Muslims can have dhimma, as Schacht (1964, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press) writes in his chapter on “Capacity and Responsibility,” the “highest degree of legal capacity is that of the free Muslim male who is sane (‘akil) and of age (baligh); he is fully responsible (mukallaf)” (p. 124). Dhimmis were subject to some limitations, such as that “the dhimmi cannot be a witness, except in matters concerning other dhimmis (even if they belong to other religions)…” (p. 132, Schacht, 1964).

This is further supported by examples of dhimmis deemed to be in violation of the covenant (dhimma), as discussed in previous posts, and thus held responsible, to blame. Here is another:

Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. Benjamin Braude, Bernard Lewis, (1982). Introduction.
{Muslim persecution of those dhimmis perceived to have violated the dhimma}
p. 9 “Sometimes one finds that when a persecution begins the instigators are concerned to justify it in terms of the Holy Law. The usual argument is that the Jews or the Christians have violated the pact by exceeding their place. They have thus broken the conditions of the contract with Islam, and the Muslim state and people are no longer bound by it.”

In “Between foreigners and Shi'is: nineteenth-century Iran and its Jewish minority,” (2007), Daniel Tsadik wrote “The dhimmah Pact was perceived as a contract between the Muslims and the dhimmis. If the dhimmis violated its clauses they forfeited their protection, and the Muslim government was fully entitled to punish them.6 The dhimmis were thus expected to observe the dhimmah regulations closely.” (p. 16).

From Al-Mawardi (2000), p. 161:
“[…] There are two sets of conditions to include in a tribute {jizya} contract: one obligatory and the other desirable. The requisite conditions are six in number: first, to refrain from any defamation or distortion of God Almighty's scripture; second, not to talk of the Apostle, God bless him and grant him salvation, in terms of denial or disparagement; third, not to talk of the Islamic faith in derogatory or slanderous language; fourth, not to commit adultery or enter into an unauthorised marriage with a Muslim female; fifth, not to entice a Muslim to renounce his faith, encroach on his property or assault his religion; sixth, not to assist the enemies of Islam or maintain cordial relations with their associates. These six conditions are compulsory even if not mentioned in so many words. They are included in the contract for purposes of emphasis and to make it all the more binding, so that failure to observe them would constitute a breach of their covenant.”

That the non-Muslims have obligations is explicitly stated by Al-Mawardi:
“Once a contract for the tribute {jizya} is reached and accepted by leaders of the subject population, it becomes an obligation to be met by them and their descendants from one century to the next, never to be reduced or increased by a succeeding ruler.” (Al-Mawardi, 2000, p. 160).

Schacht (1964), under “Obligations in General,” writes “There exists no general term for obligation; the nearest approximation is to it is dhimma, ‘care as a duty of conscience’; the debtor has the performance ‘in his care’. A claim or debt, primarily of money but also of fungible things in general, is called dayn.” (p. 144).

And from “The Monotheists: The Peoples of God,” by Francis E. Peters (2003),
p. 109 “…the dhimma also imposed certain obligations on the Scriptuaries.”

2. Blameworthiness (or guilt) is an aspect of the general meaning of the word dhimma itself. The concept of a bond or agreement, or a right or due, the breaking or neglect of which necessitates blame, is inherent in the meaning(s) of the word, just as it is inherent in the meaning of words like responsibility, obligation, and liability—-all of which are used to define dhimma.

Some Arabic-English and English-Arabic dictionaries (e.g., see archive.org) in their definitions of dhimma include statements like “right or due for the neglect of which one is to be blamed” (e.g., see Wortabet*), and others encapsulate essentially the same idea with words like liability, responsibility, or obligation (e.g., see Lane, Sakhr, Wehr, et al.).

*Wortabet defines dhimma as “Duty of protection, clientship; duty; right or due for the neglect of which one is to be blamed; compact, covenant; responsibility; guarantee, security. Conscience, moral sense.”

Schacht (1964) defines “dhimma” as “engagement, undertaking, 130; care as a duty of conscience, obligation, 144” (p. 298), and “responsibility” (p. 130).

In addition, multiple Islamic sources refer to dhimma as "liability" or "undertaking of liability." Examples:

The Al_Hidayah: The Guidance (2006), Burhan Al-Din Al-Farghani Al-Marghinani, Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee
p. 611 “dhimmah (liability)”

The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer (Ibn Rushd)
p. 154, note 123 “The term “liability” here is used to indicate the Arabic word dhimma.”

The Book of Revenue: Kitab al-Amwal
By Abu Ubayd Al-Qasim Ibn Sallam
p. 44
“Abu ‘Ubayd said: The interpretation of this tradition is that if a person embraces Islam at the end of the year and he was liable to pay jizya, it is not to be taken from him,84 even though he became liable before his conversion.”
{Note 84: “84 That is, Islam removes the liability of jizya from him after he became liable for it.”}
author {quoting a tradition} (123) Hushaym related to us that Sayyar reported from Zubayr ibn ‘Adi who said: “A dihqan converted to Islam during ‘Ali’s rule. ‘Ali said to him, ‘If you stay on your land, we shall waive the personal liability of jizya from you and take it (kharaj) from your land. If you depart from your land then we (the state) have a greater right over it.’”
{note. On page xx, the author quotes Muhammad saying essentially the same thing, i.e., “As the Prophet said: ‘If you stay on your land, we shall lift your personal obligation to pay jizya, and if you give it up, then we have a prior right to it.’”}
[…]
“Abu ‘Ubayd said: It is to be noted that these traditions narrated from the rulers are continuous with respect to the waiver of jizya from those who have embraced Islam. (In this context) they did not give weight to the issue whether it was at the beginning of the year or at its end. In our opinion, then, Islam annuls all previous liability.89”
“89 This is correct. Islam, as the Prophet (pbuh) has said, removes all previous liability.”
p. 150 see "within our (Muslims’) “dhimma (liability)”"
p. 173 under Muslims’ “protection (dhimma),”
p. 182 “liability (dhimma)”
p. 166 {heading} “When Does breach of the Covenant or Peace Agreement make the Shedding of Blood Lawful?”
p. 170 “(467) The decision to expel the Ahl al-Dhimma of the Jabal Lubnan should not include those who did not collaborate in the insurrection, the entire community not having been guilty. Some of them should be executed, but the rest of them should be returned to their villages. How can the entire public be held responsible for the acts of some specific persons so as to be sent away from their homes and possessions? […]”
p. 207 “On each household the liability is one full dinar. You do not have the liberty to gather different households [283] under one household for purposes of reduction of jizya.[284] We have the right to segregate combined households into several so as to increase the liability for jizya.[285]”
p. 559 “{ahl} al dhimma: Non-Muslim residents of the Islamic state having a contract of dhimma (undertaking of liability) with the Muslims.”
p. 561. “Dhimmis: Non-Muslims living in Muslim lands under the guarantee and security of the contract of dhimma (liability).”

In “The Concept of Dhimma in Early Islam,” C. E. Bosworth, pp. 37-51, in Braude and Lewis, (1982), notes that non-Muslims were “liable to a poll tax” {similar to the provisions} “imposed on minority faiths in Near Eastern empires”

Hence, when Mark Durie writes "This pact of surrender came to be known as a dhimma or “covenant of liability”," this cannot be dismissed as a critical bias; rather it accurately reflects what the word dhimma means.

3. Other definitions or labels. The dhimma goes by many names, such as "pact of concession," "treaty of surrender" (Schacht, 1964), "tribute {jizya} contract" (al-Mawardi, 2000, p. 161). The terms responsibility, conscience, obligation, liability (see above), etc., are also used for dhimma.

A Dictionary of Hindustani and English. John Shakespear. “Zimma trust, charge, obligation, subjection, duty, service, fidelity, lineage. Zimma lina, to take charge, to take care of, to take upon one’s self.” “Zimmi, an infidel (i.e., a person who is not a Musalman) subject to Muhammadan government.”

Steingass. A comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary including the Arabic words and phrases to be met with in Persian literature, p. 559. “Zimma Obligation, responsibility, suretyship; security; trust, charge, subjection; duty, service, fidelity; zimma kardan, To entrust with; ahli zimma, People of the Book, i.e., Jews, Christians, or Majusi, living under the protection of Islam.”

In the Quran, dhimma is mentioned in 9:8 and 9:10, and (using 9:8) is typically translated as covenant, treaty, agreement, but also as "honour" (Pickthall, Amatul Rahman Omar), [ties of] "faith" (Rodwell, Sale) or "good faith" (Hughes), "pledge" (Free Minds), "obligation" (T. B. Irving), and "promise" (Syed Vickar Ahamed).

4. Conscience is an important word that is included in the definition of dhimma. For example, Sakhr, Wehr, Wortabet, Steingass, Stace, Shapiro, Amery, Hava, and others, mention conscience as one of the defining words of dhimma (or zimma). Lane, under dhimma, also discusses this in terms of moral responsibility. Steingass (from Arabic-English and English-Arabic) defines zimma as “Conscience, qualm, remorse; honour, right”; and Qualm, as in a “qualm (of conscience).” Stace, dhimma: debt, conscience, “obligation (being bound in conscientiousness).” Shapiro, zimma: “conscience” and “remorse”; and “justification, due, right or due.” Amery, zimma: “Conscience.” Hava, zimma: “responsibility; safe conduct: Allied people; wedding dinner; conscience.”

As I noted in a post above, conscience can imply guilt, i.e., guilty conscience, self-blame (for which there is yet another word in the dh-m-m family). Steingass and Shapiro both cite remorse as a meaning of dhimma in the sense of conscience. From the Oxford Compact Dictionary (online), “remorse {…} deep regret or guilt for a wrong committed: they were filled with remorse and shame”. Macmillan dictionary, “remorse {…} a strong sad and guilty feeling about something that you have done wrong show/feel/express remorse (for): She has never shown any remorse for her crime.” From the Merriam-Webster, “remorse {…} a gnawing distress arising from a sense of guilt for past wrongs : self-reproach {…}”. Of course, conscience does not necessarily (nor only) imply guilt, but the inclusion of remorse in the definitions of dhimma provides further evidence for the notions of blame and guilt as important aspects of the meaning of the word dhimma. The notion of “guilt trip” also seems relevant here.

Another sense of guilt, mens rea, “Latin for a "guilty mind," or criminal intent in committing the act” –from Law.com), is relevant to the notion of dhimma as conscience. The dhimmis have been exposed to the “true” message of Islam and yet have knowingly, voluntarily, willfully or even defiantly, purposely, or recklessly or negligently, rejected it, and retained their religions, despite the fact that Islam considers disbelief as the worst category of offences.

Anyways, to return to the more general notion of conscience, note, again, that Schacht (1964) defined dhimma as “‘care as a duty of conscience’; the debtor has the performance ‘in his care’” (p. 144).

Other examples:

Samih K. Farsoun, Christina E. Zacharia (1998) Palestine and the Palestinians
p. 343 “Dhimmah. Conscience. Ahl al-Dhimmah were the people of conscience, the protected minorities of Christians and Jews during the Arab Islamic caliphates, A.D. 632-1258.”

The Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence: Command of the Shari‘ah and Juridical Form
Ahmad Hassan (1993)
p. 297 “This responsibility (dhimmah), being a trust (amanah), as termed by the Quran….”
p. 298 “In this definition, dhimmah has been construed as a covenant (‘ahd) and nafs (soul) as a receptacle of covenant (raqabah). […] Dhimmah dwells (hall) in man (mahall).”
p. 300 “…dhimmah (covenant of responsibility)…”

Dhimma (conscience) in Islamic theology and jurisprudence refers to awareness and knowledge of one’s moral, legal, and religious responsibilities, obligations, debts, and liabilities; a knowledge of right and wrong and the inclination to be rightly guided by this knowledge. (Also see the above excerpts from Senturk). For someone, Muslim or non-Muslim, to be eligible to be a party to the dhimma contract (whereby non-Muslims surrender to the Muslims and pay them jizya), they must have dhimma (conscience): they must be sane and sufficiently mature, must know the basic rules of the contract, must be legally responsible, must understand and meet their obligations, and must be cognizant of the punishments for failing to do so. Al-Mawardi states “Only free men in full possession of their mental faculties are liable to the tribute. Women, children, the insane, and slaves are exempted because they are classified as offspring and dependants” (Al-Mawardi, 2000, p. 160). Yet women and minors of sound mind still had to follow other rules of the dhimma contract, such as not publicly criticizing Islam, the Quran, or Muhammad.

5. Dhimmis were also responsible for Muslims' security. The conditional promise or guarantee of protection, security, of a person and his or her property is one of the major aspects of the dhimma. The Muslim authority was responsible for the protection of the dhimmis, provided the latter obeyed the rules, especially the required elements, of the dhimma contract or terms of surrender. The non-Muslim dhimmis were also responsible for the security and protection of Muslims. First, the Muslims’ obligation to protect non-Muslim dhimmis was based on the precondition that non-Muslims had laid down their arms and surrendered and agreed not to harm Muslims.* (Hence the dhimma contract is sometimes called the “treaty of surrender,” with the non-Muslims agreeing not to fight, or harm, or undermine the Muslims as one of the major obligatory elements). The foundational element of the dhimma agreement is that the security situation for Muslims must be assured. Secondly, non-Muslims had to maintain, and not disrupt, the continuing state of security (e.g., see the Ahl Al-Dhimma section in the Reliance of the Traveller, quoted above in a previous post), and not harm Muslims, physically or otherwise, nor aid the enemies of the Muslims. (I cite sources for these conditions in posts above).
*e.g., see “The Risala of 'Abdullah ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani (310/922 - 386/996). A Treatise on Maliki Fiqh (Including commentary from ath-Thamr ad-Dani by al-Azha)”.
[online source: bewley.virtualave.net]
“30.2k pledge of security A pledge of security given by the least of the Muslims is binding on the rest of then.
[This security is granted to specific people, i.e. specific unbelievers. The people of a region or town are not granted security except by the ruler. If someone else makes such a contract, the ruler can break it if he wishes. We read in al-Jawahir, "The precondition of the security is that there is no harm in it for the Muslims. If someone grants security to a spy or scout or one who contains harm, it is not binding."
“30.2d Where jizya is acceptable
Jizya is only acceptable in places where they are subject to our law. If they are a long way from our jurisdiction jizya can only be accepted from them if they move to our territory. If they do not do this they are to be fought.
[Ibn 'Umar said that this precondition is about the people of force. As for the people of truce, it is not a precondition for them. Jizya is accepted from them where they are because they restrained themselves until they paid peace for themselves and their lands. ]”

As Braude and Lewis (1982) observed, “The origin of the restrictions {on dhimmis} seem to go back to the very first period of the conquest and to be military in nature.” {The ruling Arab Muslims were a} “tiny minority of conquerors amid a vast majority of the conquered” {so these conquerors} “needed certain security precautions for the protection of the governing and occupying groups.” (p. 5).

Also, Daniel Tsadik (2007, see above), wrote, under the heading mentioning the rule that dhimmis are “Not to Contradict the Aman,” that “Dhimmis are not allowed to act in a manner incompatible with the protection (aman) articles. For instance, they are forbidden from assisting the polytheists. If the dhimmis violate this article or the above jizya clause, they are regarded as having breached the dhimmah agreement.77” (p. 26). Under the heading describing the rule “Not to Harm Muslims” Tsadik wrote that “According to Najm al-Din al-Muhaqqiq, dhimmis are required not to trouble Muslims. They are prohibited, for instance, from committing adultery with the wives of Muslims or from engaging in acts of sodomy with Muslim boys. They may not steal Muslim property, nor may they shelter polytheists (‘ayn al-mushrikin) or spy for them.78 In this context, another derivative article is specified: A dhimmi who curses the Prophet, like any other person who does so, is to be put to death.79” (p. 27).

Incidentally, I noted in a previous post that I had not yet verified the original source of a statement that the dhimma contract provided “protection for Muslims.” I have now verified the original source: “Towards an Islamic theory of international relations: new directions for Islamic methodology and thought” ÀbdulHamid AbuSulayman. International Institute of Islamic Thought, (1993).
p.28 “Al Dhimmah: In classical jurisprudence, this term is defined as a sort of permanent agreement between Muslim political authorities and non-Muslim subjects which provides protection for Muslims and peaceful internal relations with the non-Muslim subjects.”

The non-Muslims, after the message of Islam has been presented to them, are judged and treated as blameworthy or guilty if they fail to accept Islam. As I noted earlier, according to the Quran, failure to believe in Islam, after the message of Islam has been presented to and considered by someone, is in the worst category of offenses in Islam. This idea that the non-Muslims have committed major sins in rejecting Islam is expressed in some detail by al-Mawardi in his assessment of Quran 9:29 and of the rationale behind the punishment of the jizya and dhimma system. Al-Mawardi wrote:

“[…] The tribute {jizya}, a word by derivation implying "compensation", is a poll tax levied on persons, either in punishment, to be paid by them in submission for being heathens, or to be collected from them gently in return for the protection extended by us to them. It is founded on God Almighty's words: "Fight those who, having been given the scripture, do not believe in God or in the Last Day, do not hold as forbidden what God and His Apostle have forbidden, and those who do not profess the true religion, until they pay the tribute readily and in submission" (Qur'an 9:29).
The Lord's phrase, praise His name, "who do not believe in God" is capable of two interpretations: one is that though the people of the scripture may recognise the unity of God Almighty, yet their belief is nullified because they do not believe in the Qur'an, which is God's scripture; the second is that their belief is voided by their failure to believe in His apostle Muhammad, God bless him and grant him salvation, for belief in messengers signifies belief in the One who sent them.
His "or in the Last Day" may, again, imply either that they do not fear what they are promised on the Last Day, even though they recognise in principle the
existence of reward and punishment, or that they do not acknowledge the kinds of torture described by the Almighty.
The phrase "do not hold as forbidden what God and His Apostle have forbidden" may either refer to aspects of their religions that God has ordered them to revoke, or to God's sanctions and prohibitions.
His words "do not profess the true religion" could be taken to refer to the exhortations in the Torah and the Bible for them to follow the Messenger. This is al-Kalbi's view. In the prevailing interpretation, however, they refer to embracing Islam.
The Almighty's reference to "those who, having been given the scripture," could either mean descendants of those given the scripture in earlier times, or else those to whom the Qur'an is now accessible, because they have the same obligation to follow it as the believers.
His phrase "until they pay the tribute" has two meanings: "until they actually pay the tribute" or "until they promise to pay it", for they should be granted amnesty as soon as they make such a promise.
The word "tribute" [jizya] itself could be regarded as standing for a general concept signifying many things that need to be specified, or else as just another general name that must be used as such unless qualified in some way.
His word "readily" may denote "if they have the wealth and ability", or "knowing it is an indication of the power we have over them".
Similarly, the words of the Almighty "and in submission" have two interpretations: "resigned and humiliated" or "subject to Islamic law".
It is, therefore, the duty of the man in power to impose the tribute on the persons of those People of the Book who enter into a covenant to settle in Muslim territory. By paying it, they gain two rights: cessation of hostilities against them, and positive protection, so that they would enjoy both peace and security. Quoting Ibn ‘Umar, Nafi‘ has stated that: "The last thing uttered by the Prophet, God bless him and grant him salvation, was: ‘Keep my covenant [in regard to the protected non-Muslims.’"
The tribute should be taken from Arabs as from other peoples — although Abu Hanifa argued that he would not impose it upon Arabs in order to spare them this indignity — but not from a renegade, an atheist, an idolator, even though Abu Hanifa would collect it from idolators of other races than Arabs. The People of the Book are Jews and Christians, and their scriptures are the Old and New Testaments. Magians are treated like them with respect to the tribute, but differ in that their slaughtered animals may not be eaten and their women may not be married by Muslims. The tribute must also be collected from Sabians and Samaritans if their beliefs are basically similar to those of Christians and Jews, however different in detail, but not if they are radically different. Converts to Christianity or Judaism before they were changed are tolerated, but not those
who convert to them afterwards; in doubtful cases, the tribute is taken from them but the animals slaughtered by them may not be eaten. Those who convert from Judaism to Christianity are not taken to have converted, according to the best opinion, and must become Muslims, but there is disagreement regarding such converts if they go back to their original faith. The Jews of Khaybar are, by consensus of the jurists, liable to the tribute like everyone else who is.”

Source: al-Mawardi, excerpt quoted from pp. 158-160, from chapter XIII, On Tribute and Land Tax, in The Ordinances of Government (Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya w’al-Wilayat al-Diniyya), 2000, translated by Wafaa H. Wahba. Reading, U.K.: Garnet Press.

Note. My emphasis added. These brackets {} are mine, as below.

In further describing the jizya as a penalty associated with unbelief, on p. 140 (in the above-cited source, in chapter XII On Dividing the Spoils of War), al-Mawardi wrote:

“The two kinds of spoils, fay’ and ghanimah, are funds acquired from unbelievers or through them. They obey different rules, and differ from alms in four respects: first, alms are taken from Muslims as an act of purification, while they are taken from infidels as an act of retribution {…}”
“The fay’ and the ghanimah agree in two respects and differ in two respects. They agree in that each has something to do with disbelief, and in that a fifth of each has to be spent in the same way. They differ in that fay’ is a windfall while the ghanimah is taken by coercion, and that four-fifths of the former has to be dispensed differently than four-fifths of the latter, as will be explained if God, the Most High, wills.
“Starting with the fay’, we say: out of all the spoils acquired from infidels incidentally, without fighting or charging by horse, such as truce money, the capitation tax jizya and tithes on their merchandise, or accruing because of them, such as land tax—out of all of them shall be taken a fifth for the designated shares of it, that fifth itself being divided into parts.”

Al-Mawardi (pp. 183-184, in the above-cited source) describes the non-Muslim dhimmis as unclean:

“The fifth rule is that it is not permitted for any non-Muslims, whether protected or treaty people, to enter the Sanctuary in order to stay or even pass through. This is the approach of al-Shafi‘i, may God have mercy on him, and most authorities. Abu Hanifa made it permissible for them to enter if they do not intend to make it their permanent residence. God Almighty’s admonition: “Unbelievers are unclean, so let them not come near the Holy Mosque after this year of theirs” (Qur’an 9:28), contains a text that supersedes any other, for if an unbeliever enters, he has to be castigated if he does so without permission, but killing him is forbidden; if he enters with permission, he is not punished, but the person who grants the permission is rebuked, and if necessary punished, but the unbeliever is conducted safely out. {…} Malik said that their entry should not be permitted under any circumstance.”

Likewise, in "Between foreigners and Shi'is: nineteenth-century Iran and its Jewish minority," Daniel Tsadik (2007, p. 17) {in the context of mentioning verses 9:28 and 9:30-31} writes that “The majority approach in Imami Shi‘i hadith literature views the people of the Book as infidels, who are thus religiously unclean.14”

In failing or refusing to accept Islam, the people of Christian and Jewish populations are deemed to have violated their covenant with Allah. In addition, the Christians and Jews are accused of other failures and transgressions in relation to their covenant, as given to them through the scriptures. (For one, they are deemed guilty of having perverted their scriptures).

Lane mentions in his Lexicon (vol. 3, p. 976) the notion of a covenant with Allah as one of the senses of the word dhimma:

“And it is said in another trad., {…} [Then the responsibility of God is clear, or quit, of him]; i.e., there is given to every one, by God, a covenant whereby He binds Himself to preserve and protect him; and when he throws himself into destruction, or does that which is unlawful for him to do, or acts at variance with that which he is commanded to do, and the covenant of God fails to aid him.”

In "Religion and Law: Biblical-judaic and Islamic perspectives," (ed. Edwin B. Firmage 1990), Bernard G. Weiss in Covenant and Law in Islam (p. 77) discusses this covenant in relation to the concept of blame which can be indicated by the word dhamm.

“Razi then goes on to point out that, on the dalil-centered interpretation, blame (dhamm, a corollary of obligation) arises from the fact that people broke a covenant God had ‘made firm’ (ahkama) through adilla “which he had made clear and raised above doubt,” whereas on the oath-centered interpretation blame rests upon the fact that people neglected to do something they had taken upon themselves entirely on their own (shay’an hum bi-anfusihim iltazamuhu).” {...}
p.81 {Conclusions} “There does exist within the Islamic tradition the concept of a covenant that God establishes with human beings. This covenant defines the basic relationship between God and human beings: he is their sovereign, and they as his subjects are under an obligation to obey the commandments he has revealed through his prophets. The covenant also entails a promise to those who keep it: they shall inherit the joys of Paradise.”

The Quran describes the covenant-breaking of the Jews and Christians (for a few of the examples, see 3:81-85, 3:98:3:114, 5:12-19), using other words for covenant but nevertheless clearly conveying the concept of covenant. Hence, the Jews and Christians have violated their dhimma with Allah and are thus blameworthy or guilty for doing so. Rejecting Islam when it is offered to them may be seen as a further violation of their dhimma with Allah, for which they are blameworthy or guilty.

The Jews and Christians are accused of shirk (e.g., see 9:30), which is the worst major sin-crime according to Islam, and thus they would obviously be deemed blameworthy. In committing shirk, they are deemed to have violated the covenant with Allah. The term blameworthy/reproved (dh-m-m) is mentioned explicitly in 17:22 (madhmooman, or mathmoonan): 17:22 "Set not up with Allah any other god (O man) lest thou sit down reproved, forsaken." The Jews and Christians in the Quran are also accused of disobeying Allah and going astray; and of desiring the life of the world more than that of the hereafter. Disobeying Allah, going astray, and desiring the life of the world (more than the hereafter) are also considered blameworthy (dh-m-m; 68:49, 17:22).

The Quran accuses the Christians and Jews of disbelief (kufr) and calls them disbelievers (kafirs)* (9:30-32, see 9:32, alkafiroona; 5:11-17 see 5:17 kafara; 5:72-73 kafara, kafaroo; 98:6 “kafaroo”). Disbelief, as I mentioned in posts above, is considered in the Quran to be the worst type of sin-crime e.g., 10:17 "Who doeth greater wrong than he who inventeth a lie concerning Allah and denieth His revelations? Lo! the guilty never are successful").

*From the glossary at islam101.com: “Kafir signifies one who denies or rejects the truth, i.e. who disbelieves in the message of the Prophets. Since the advent of Muhammad (S.A.W.), anyone who rejects his Message is a kafir.”

Verse 17:15 says "...We never punish until we have sent a messenger." Rejection of the Quran is deemed as rejection of Allah's revelations (6:33), revelations sent via Muhammad to all humankind (34:28, 7:157-158). Thus, being a "believer" means believing in and obeying Muhammad and his message [e.g., 24:62, 49:15; and failure to do so results in the hell-fire punishment (e.g., 48:13, 33:71) and punishment in this world (e.g., 9:29). To obey Muhammad is to obey Allah (4:80)]. Since Muhammad, and then his followers, have brought the message of and invitation to Islam to the non-Muslims, adult non-Muslims of sound mind who have been exposed to the message and invitation are under liability to accept it; that is, they are exposed to blame, and would be deemed blameworthy or guilty if they did not accept it. Thus, historically, the non-Muslim scriptuary dhimmis were peoples who had received scriptures but who, upon receiving some exposure to the message of Islam and the invitation to embrace Islam, refused to embrace it and instead retained their beliefs.

The refusal of the dhimmis (and other non-Muslims) to submit and bow down prostrate in worship of Allah according to Islam, the Quran, and Muhammad, can be compared to an archetypal example of evil mentioned in the Quran, wherein Iblis (Satan) refuses to obey Allah's command to bow prostrate to Adam (7:11, 20:116-117, 18:50, 38:74-76), whereas all the other bowed down. But by making a partial submission, i.e., agreeing under duress to the terms of surrender whereby they must follow the rules and meet the obligations of the dhimma, while retaining their religion, the dhimmis were considered relatively less evil than harbis, apostates, etc.

The Quran says that disbelievers are "guilty" (e.g., 74:41, and others) and that those who reject Muhammad's revelations are "evil" (7:177), "ungrateful traitors" (31:32), and so on. The Quran makes it clear that their disbelief makes them guilty, and thus Allah's punishment is justified (30:10, 38:14, 35:39, 46:34, 8:35). The stigma of guilt attached to the disbelieving non-Muslims (kafirs), through Islamic judgements and penalties, is a permanent feature of non-Muslims as long as they remain non-Muslims refusing or neglecting to embrace Islam. The guilt is seen as a permanent inherent aspect of disbelievers; they cannot overcome it except to convert to Islam. For example, as Ibn Kathir notes in his tafsir of 6:90, "Shirk eradicates deeds." Thus, the non-Muslims' good works, or what they deem to be good conduct, will not avail them; according to the Quran they are going to be punished anyway (5:5, 18:104-106, also 18:30, 33:19, 47:1-4, 47:32, 14:18), and they must be punished on earth (9:29-33) by Muslims. The notion that a stigma of guilt is attached to the dhimmis for their disbelief in Islam is expressed in the dhimma system and in the dhimmi status. In "Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire" (1982), Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, in their Introduction, wrote (p. 4):

“Unbelievers on the other hand {as compared to women and slaves} were such {inferior} entirely by their own choice. Their state of inferiority was voluntary—Muslims might say willful—and they themselves could put an end to it at any time by an act of will. From the point of view of the Muslim, unbelievers were people to whom the truth had been offered in the final and perfect form of God’s revelation, which they had willfully and foolishly refused.”{...}
{The Muslim authorities believed that they needed to} “enforce or at least visibly symbolize his inferiority

{brackets added}

To act contrary to the rules of the dhimma system and dhimmis status could itself be considered a sign of disbelief/disobedience to Islam. As Bat Ye'or writes in "The decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam: From jihad to dhimmitude" (1996, pp. 382-383).

“In al-Ashbah wa-l-naza’ir 5, it says:
‘Deference to an unbeliever is unbelief. He who greets a dhimmi with deference is guilty of unbelief. He, who says to a Magian,6 in deference, “O, Master” is guilty of unbelief. That is so because they are the enemies of our beloved, the Lord of the Messengers; and he who honors the enemy of his beloved has humiliated his beloved. That is why it is not permissible to install infidels as officials. To let them gain sway over a Muslim by empowering them to beat, imprison, or oppress him in order to extract money turns the infidel into [a] tax collector from a Muslim, all on behalf of a chieftain or dignitary who, for the sake of worldly affairs and in disregard of punishment in the hereafter, fears not the consequences of endowing unbelievers with power over believers. If the infidel has behaved this way, he has violated the covenant [dhimma] with the Muslims as mentioned above, and is subject to death.’”

[brackets as quoted from Ye’or]

As the Quran (68:35) asks rhetorically, "Shall We then treat those who have surrendered {almuslimeena} as We treat the guilty?" This is consistent with the idea that non-Muslims had to be treated as inferior to Muslims. Moreover, in this view, Islam must be above the other religions (9:33).

Another indication of the non-Muslim dhimmis' supposed guilt is in their restricted status as witnesses in Islamic law. The Quran calls non-Muslims liars (2:10, 4:50, 6:28, 9:42, 16:39, 16:105, 23:90, 59:11, 7:66, 58:18-19). The fact that they have rejected Islam, Muhammad, and the Quran stands as further "proof" of their foolishness, dishonesty and "lies." As Joseph Schacht writes in An Introduction to Islamic Law (1964, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 132 “But the dhimmi cannot be a witness, except in matters concerning other dhimmis (even if they belong to other religions)..."

Also, Ghazali has been quoted incidentally mentioning the presumed inadmissibility of dhimmi testimony:

“Ghazzali was not happy with the state of affairs of the Muslims of his period, as almost all students were interested in the science of jurisprudence at the cost of all other beneficial and praiseworthy (Mahmud) sciences. He says with great regret that: ‘However many a town has no physician except from among the followers of protected religions (dhimmah) whose testimony according to law of jurisprudence, should not be accepted. However, we see no Muslim practicing medicine, but on the contrary all ravel in jurisprudence, as peculiarly in controversy and polemics.’105” {Note 105 Ghazzali, Book of Knowledge (Tr. By Nasih Amin Faris) Lahore, 1979, p. 41.}

Source: Quoted in "Saints and saviours of Islam" (2005) by Hamid Naseem Rafiabadi, pp. 27-28

And from The Risala of 'Abdullah ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani (310/922 - 386/996) A Treatise on Maliki Fiqh (Including commentary from ath-Thamr ad-Dani by al-Azha):

"38.3b. Acceptable witnesses One only accepts the testimony of reputable witnesses. [Being reputable ('adala) is not that a man is investigated for obedience so that no act of disobedience sullies it because that is impossible and only the true are capable of it. What is meant is he usually is obedient to Allah and avoids wrong actions.] [Someone who is 'adl is free, Muslim, sane, adult, free of iniquity, debarment due to foolishness, and free of innovation. Innovation includes Mu'tazilites and Kharijites. Al-Qarafi said, "In our view, 'adala is Allah's right from the judge. He is only permitted to give judgement with reputable witnesses. Ash-Shafi'i said, "Since it is Allah's right, even if the litigants agree to accept the testimony of an unbeliever or one with whom Allah is angry, the judge is not permitted to give judgement on that basis." Ibn al-Qasim said that.]"

[online source: bewley.virtualave.net]

From the Reliance of the Traveller:

"The Reliance of the Traveller. Version 1.06 - By Ahmad Ibn Naqib Al-Misri BOOK O: JUSTICE Chapter O-24.0: Witnessing and Testifying O-24.1 It is a communal obligation (def: e-3.2) to both witness (A: i.e observe) legal events and to testify to have witnessed them. If there is only one person to do so, then it is personally obligatory upon him, in which case he may not accept payment for it, though if it is not personally obligatory, he may accept a fee. O-24.2 Legal testimony is only acceptable from a witness who: (a) is free; (b) is fully legally responsible (mukallaf, def: c-8.1) (O: as testimony is not accepted from a child or insane person, even when the child's testimony regards injuries among children that occurred at play); (c) is able to speak; (d) it mentally awake; (e) is religious (O: meaning upright (o-24.4) (A: and Muslim), for Allah Most High says, "Let those of rectitude among you testify" (Koran 65:2), and unbelief is the vilest form of corruption, as goes without saying); (f) and who is outwardly respectable (O: respectability (muru'a) meaning to have the positive traits which one's peers possess in one's particular time and place. Sheikh al-Islam (A: Zakariyya Ansari) says, "Respectability is refraining from conduct that is unseemly according to standards commonly acknowledged among those who observe the precepts and rules of the Sacred Law." It is according to standards commonly acknowledged (def: f-4.5) because there are no absolute standards for it, but rather it varies with different persons, conditions, and places, Such things as eating and drinking (A: in the marketplace or wearing nothing on one's head may vitiate it (A: though the latter is of no consequence in our times), as may a religious scholar's wearing a robe or cap in places where it is not customary for him to do so). The testimony of an absentminded person (O: meaning someone who often makes mistakes and forgets) is not acceptable (O: because he is unreliable). O-24.5 Nor is testimony acceptable from someone who: 1- has committed an enormity (O: meaning something severely threatened against in an unequivocal text fro the Koran or hadith (dis: book p) N: though if someone who commits such an act then repents (def: p-77) and is felt to be sincere in this, he regains his legal uprightness and his testimony is accepted, provided he is tested after his repentance long enough to believe in its genuineness); 2- persists in a lesser sin (O: because it then becomes an enormity, as opposed to when one does not persist therin. A lesser sin in one that has not been severely threatened against in an unequivocal text); 3- or is without respectability (def: o-24.2(f) ), such as a street-sweeper, bathhouse attendant, and the like. (A: A legally corrupt or immoral person (fasiq) is someone guilty of (1) or (2) above.) O-24.4 (A: Normal uprightness ('adala) for purpose other than giving testimony in court means that one avoids (1) and (2) above, while (3) concerns court testimony alone (N: i.e. uprightness for testimony in court means a person is none of the above).)" {...} "BOOK P: ENORMITIES (Al Kabaa'ir, by Imaam al Zhahabi) >> Chapter P-1.0: Ascribing Associates to Allah Most High P-1.1 Ascribing associates to Allah Most High means to hold that Allah has an equal, whereas He has created you, and to worship another with Him, whether it be a stone, human, sun, moon, prophet, sheikh, jinn, star, angel, or other."

As Ibn Warraq writes:

"The legal testimony of a dhimmi was not admissible in a judicial suit where a Muslim was one of the parties, because it was felt that infidelity, the obstinate failure to recognize the true light of Islam, was proof of defective morality and a consequent incapability of bearing legal witness. In the words of the Hanafi jurist Sarakhsi (d.483 / 1090), "the word of a dishonest Muslim is more valuable than that of an honest dhimmi." On the other hand, the deposition of a Muslim against a dhimmi was perfectly valid in law. It was further held by almost all schools of Islamic law (with the exception of the Hanafi one) that the diya or blood money payable on the killing of a dhimmi was only two-thirds or half of that of a free Muslim."

[Source: centerforinquiry.net/isis]

1. Another definition of dhimma, from "Contingency in a sacred law: legal and ethical norms in the Muslim fiqh
(1999)" By Baber Johansen. {In the quote below he discusses mainstream Hanafite view of dhimma, but it is of general relevance. Note: dimma = dhimma}
p. 192
“1. dimma
{…} From Sarahsi in the eleventh century, to Ibn Abidin in the 19th century, the lawyers defined the term dimma in the following words: “The basis of the legal action is a dimma able to incur obligations (and acquire legal rights) (mahall at-tasarruf dimma saliha li’iltizam al-huquq)”.11 The term has a technical meaning: dimma is the basis of an obligation in money or other fungible goods.12 It “…is not only the bond which ties the creditor to the debtor but is, in particular, the seat of it.” Since the seat of the obligation is the person itself, the meaning of dimma as the seat of the obligation merges with the idea of the legal person.13 The technical definition quoted above shows both, the narrower and broader meaning. In the broader meaning dimma comes very close to the German term “Rechtsfahigkeit”, i.e. the capacity to acquire rights and duties.14 It then simply denotes the legal person capable of acquiring rights and duties.15 This capacity begins at birth. Each person regardless of age, mental state, sex or religious affiliation, has a legal personality in this sense.16”

From the glossary in the above source: p. 485, “Dhimma: the capacity to enjoy rights and incur obligations (Rechtsfahigkeit)”

2. Another note on the etymology of the word dhimma, from Andras Rajki's A. E. D. Arabic Etymological Dictionary (2002), source: freeweb.hu/etymological/
"dhamma : reproach [Syr damem (observe)]"
"dhimma: responsibility [dhamma] Hin zimma, Per dhemme borrowed from Ar"

Note that "Etymologies are listed in rectangular brackets," and that Ar = Arabic {based on "Wehr, Hans: Arabisches WB"}, Per = Persian, Hin = Hindi and/or Urdu, Syr = Syriac.

3. On a separate point, I encountered multiple authors who indicated that the dhimma rules are still considered relevant today by Muslims. Some examples:

In "Revolt against modernity: Muslim zealots and the west" (1985) Michael Youssef (p. 13) writes:
“In the present post-colonial era, Shaykh al-Azhar, the highest Islamic authority in Egypt, revived the practice of calling the non-Muslims who live in Muslim lands Ahl al-Dhimmah (Dhimmi), i.e., ‘the protected of the state,’ in his message to Christians on 7 January 1983 as reported by the major Egyptian newspaper.4”

In "Human rights: universality and diversity" (2001) Eva Brems (p. 213) notes that
“The dhimmi system no longer exists as such, yet several rules discriminating between Muslims and non-Muslims are still on the books.”
{she goes on to mention the prohibition of marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man, and other forms of discrimination}

In "Islam and the secular state: negotiating the future of sharia" (2008) ‘Abd Allah Ahmed Na‘im writes (p.128)
“While that system {of dhimma} is simply untenable as the basis of citizenship in the territorial states where all Muslims live today, it continues to have a strong influence on the attitudes and behavior of Muslims.”
{brackets added}

In "The Monotheists: The Peoples of God" (2003) Francis E. Peters (p. 109) describes the Pact of Umar, and states that it is a forgery, but then adds that it “does embody some of the basic conditions that bind the dhimmis from that day to the present”

In "Civil Society in Southeast Asia" (ed. Hock Guan Lee) (2004), in the chapter "Islam, Constitutional Democracy, and the Islamic State in Malaysia," Patricia Martinez (in pp. 32-35) reports that Al-Mawardi’s Al-ahkam al-sultaniyya (The Ordinances of Government) is still being used in Malaysia. After listing some of the restrictions on dhimmis mentioned in al-Mawardi’s classic text, Martinez writes that: “Some of the above {restrictions} will seem familiar to non-Muslim Malaysians as reasons cited over the years by various local authorities for why it has been so difficult to obtain burial sites, or the stipulations put upon more recent applications of church building plans in the states under the BN government. Al-Mawardi’s has been the authoritative text for many of the ulama of the Jabatan Agama Islam of the various states and other issues described earlier.
“In other words, there are already practices if not policies and laws, where non-Muslim Malaysians are already being treated as dhimmi in a privileging of Islam and Muslims by some state governments, especially those of the BN. If Al-Mawardi’s text continues to define the Islamic state as envisaged by the BN government, and if at a later stage more of his positions about non-Muslims are invoked and implemented, resulting in non-Muslim Malaysians becoming official second-class citizens, these measures would be in conflict with the notion of egalitarian citizenship rights that are endowed upon all Malaysians, as stipulated in the Constitution of Malaysia.”

----------------------------

4. Alternative spellings:

dhimmah dhimma dimma zimmah zimma dhimmi dimmi zimmi
dhamm zamm

K of K

I don't have the time right now to read all your latest posts about the meaning of dhimmi but thanks for all that material to which I must return.

I noticed in the book The Third Choice that the author pointed out that when the dhimmi pact was broken, i.e. by one dhimmi rejecting the status then the whole community was to be held guilty of rejecting the status, and hence by default to have voted for the second choice, i.e. death. If this was correct then that was a very powerful means of self regulation by the dhimmis indeed to keep their own in check.

So I had looked again at Danios's article where he/she claimed to have delivered Robert a knockout punch to remind myself of where he/she had sourced the meaning that it was the Islamic authority which was to be held guilty when a 'protected' person had the misfortune to be un-protected, i.e. presumably not just the individual Muslim who had forgotten that he could do what he liked to the dhimmi just not kill him/her.

He seems to have reversed the common sense reading of communal responsibility to see Muslims as being the ones who would break the pact rather than the dhimmis.

The one source he quoted, apart from his own reasoning, is the one he says is the outdated one you used (the horribly outdated) T.P. Hughes’ A Dictionary of Islam. So it will be interesting to see your rebuttal of his shots at you, 'deceit' was his term.

It will be interesting to read the above posts to see how you rebutted his attack on you, i.e. for omitting the [...] quote from Hughes which indicated it was the Islamic 'state' to be held guilty.

Wowsher,

Thanks for the response. You write:

"I noticed in the book The Third Choice that the author pointed out that when the dhimmi pact was broken, i.e. by one dhimmi rejecting the status then the whole community was to be held guilty of rejecting the status, and hence by default to have voted for the second choice, i.e. death. If this was correct then that was a very powerful means of self regulation by the dhimmis indeed to keep their own in check."

Yes, I've encountered those types of examples also. Yet there appears to be a difference of opinion among jurists over the issue of collective versus individualized attribution of guilt to dhimmi violators of the dhimma contract (i.e., in cases where the dhimma terms of surrender had actually been established and agreed to). My sense is that individualized attribution of guilt in those cases is the more common view, but I haven't researched that particular issue.

"So I had looked again at Danios's article where he/she claimed to have delivered Robert a knockout punch to remind myself of where he/she had sourced the meaning that it was the Islamic authority which was to be held guilty when a 'protected' person had the misfortune to be un-protected, i.e. presumably not just the individual Muslim who had forgotten that he could do what he liked to the dhimmi just not kill him/her."

Danios has either misunderstood this or is being dishonest. There is a general sense (what I call sense 1, above) in which either party would be blameworthy or guilty for violating the dhimma. That's due to the general meaning of the word dhimma itself, which means "responsibility," "liability," "obligation," etc. In sense 2, dhimmis under Islamic rule are called dhimmis; Muslims (though parties to the dhimma contract whereby non-Muslims are subjugated under Islamic rule) are not called dhimmis. There are several kinds of guilt or blame associated with these (non-Muslim) dhimmis that are not associated with Muslims, e.g., that the dhimmis have violated their covenant with Allah, have committed shirk, have (by definition) refused the offer to embrace Islam, have to be subjected to punishment, and so on.

"He seems to have reversed the common sense reading of communal responsibility to see Muslims as being the ones who would break the pact rather than the dhimmis."

The communal versus individual attribution of blame/guilt is not at issue here. Danios' mistake (in his part 2 "Huckster" article) revolves around the basic meaning of the word dhimma, and its meaning in Islamic jurisprudence. Either Muslims or non-Muslims could break the pact (terms of surrender) and thus would be blameworthy or guilty (i.e., held responsible, held liable) for doing so. His mistake in the part 1 "Huckster" article was mainly, I think, was not sufficiently researching the meaning of the word dhimma, and perhaps not paying due attention to the meaning of words like "responsibility," "liability," etc., in the brief definitions that he would have read. I also don't think he looked very closely at the Lisan al-Arab.

"The one source he quoted, apart from his own reasoning, is the one he says is the outdated one you used (the horribly outdated) T.P. Hughes’ A Dictionary of Islam. So it will be interesting to see your rebuttal of his shots at you, 'deceit' was his term."

Danios' "horribly outdated" accusation is, I suspect, a cheap shot with no relevance to the issue at hand. T.P. Hughes' dictionary is still quoted in the 21st century and is on recommended reading lists. Danios does not support the allegation that Hughes' dictionary is "horribly out of date" in this case. Indeed, in this case (of zimmah and zimmi) Hughes' definition is consistent with Lane's, which is also an old one.

There was no "deceit," nor even a mistake, on my part for including the ellipses, as I showed in previous posts.

"It will be interesting to read the above posts to see how you rebutted his attack on you, i.e. for omitting the [...] quote from Hughes which indicated it was the Islamic 'state' to be held guilty."

What Danios is claiming (in the Part 2 Huckster article) is that only the Muslim authority, not the non-Muslim dhimmi, would be guilty or blameworthy for violating the dhimma. Hence, he claims that dhimma would not even imply blameworthiness or guilt as attributed to the non-Muslim dhimmi. That is absurd. But more importantly, neither Hughes, nor Lane, nor any other authority as far as I'm aware claims what Danios has claimed, i.e., that only the Muslim side would be to blame. (Nor does Danios quote anyone making that claim). In any case, the evidence that I've presented above clearly shows that either side would be blameworthy or guilty for violating the dhimma. Once it is understood that the word dhimma means "responsibility," "liability," or "contract of liability," "duty of conscience," etc., the sense of blame or guilt (in sense 1) becomes clear.

Typo: In my August 4th post, I had written: "Disobeying Allah, going astray, and desiring the life of the world (more than the hereafter) are also considered blameworthy (dh-m-m; 68:49, 17:22)." For "17:22," I had meant to cite 17:18 here.

Nice clarification K of K and I did get back to read where you dealt with Danios's allegation against you.

I chuckled over the 'horribly outdated' adjective he applied to Hughes's work, dated 1895, but he happily relied on Lane which was published decades previously without the same comment.

His arguments leave me puzzling so no wonder your refutation is necessarily convoluted. His eventual inference from Lane and from Hughes relies on a lot of extrapolation and interpretation, drawing a really long bow. The proof of the pudding is in the eating as revealed in Egypt and Pakistan today where the dhimmis who go to the authorities when attacked by mobs find themselves blamed and hounded by the Muslim 'state'.

If there ever was any sense in which he was correct then it would have been a very superficial PR front, much as today major corporations and government agencies will promulgate personnel policies and codes of conduct about zero tolerance for bullying and harassment etc but when someone complains about such behavior they quickly discover the reality and regret it.

Wowsher,

Re your last paragraph, you might appreciate this parenthetical comment from C. E. Bosworth, who wrote that the dhimma is a "sort of contract promising protections" that could be "automatically revoked in the case of non-fulfillment by the dhimmis (what happened when the Muslim authorities failed to implement the promised protection was left less clear)." [p. 40, in "The concept of the dhimma in early Islam," from pp. 37-51, in "Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire," (1982), Benjamin Braude, Bernard Lewis, (eds.)].

Also re your last paragraph, I am reminded of the numerous pro-Islam descriptions of the dhimma that I read in my informal investigation. Particularly in the past 50 or 60 years, they tend to emphasize the protection, protection, protection, theoretically provided by the Muslims, but they usually tell us less about the non-Muslims' obligations (which also include maintaining security of Muslims), beyond a cursory mention of the so-called fee or tax for protection.

BTW, re the convoluted distribution of my rebuttal, you'll note that in some places I'm not rebutting Danios, but exploring the concept of the dhimma and posting what I've learned about it, and sometimes taking a detour to rebut some of Danios' other statements. So, on the meaning of dhimma (in senses 1 and 2) I should probably do a concise summary of Danios' claims about the meaning of dhimma, and the evidence showing them to be incorrect or otherwise dubious.

A few things to take care of before getting to the concise summary...

1. I found yet another scholar who thinks the word dhimmi (from the root dh-m-m) has a meaning of blame:

In "Justice and Rights: Christian and Muslim perspectives" (2009), Michael Ipgrave (Ed.), a note (on p. 104) for a poem (the relevant part of which appears on p. 79) in which the word dhimmi is used reads as follows:

"44. This is a play on words. The Arabic verb dhamma, the root of dhimmi, means “to blame.” Thus, the phrase dhimmiyu dinikum, which is used in the poem, can mean both “a non-Muslim whom your religion protects” and “one whom your religion blames.””

The relevant lines of the poem, in section 6.2, by Vincent J. Cornell, reads: "“Oh scholars of religion, a dhimmi 43 of your religion 44
Is perplexed. So guide him with the clearest proof:
If my Lord has decreed, in your opinion, my unbelief
And then does not accept it of me, what is my recourse?
{...}”
Note 43 states “The dhimmi in this case is a Jew—-there were hardly any Christians in Granada at this time, as they had been ordered to leave by church authorities.”
The note 44 may have been written by Ipgrave or Cornell. Cornell writes that the poem, "The Verses of the Dhimmi," may have been composed as a theoretical exercise, possibly not by an actual dhimmi author. Regardless of the significance of the poem, though, the important point here is that Ipgrave and/or Cornell clearly indicate that they believe dhimmi can mean someone protected or blamed by Islam.

2. One of Danios' failures of reading comprehension became manifest, in his Part 2 Huckster article, when he claimed that "Kinana is ascribing the guilt to the dhimmi, not the Islamic state." Danios missed the fact that I was pointing out multiple ways in which the word dhimmis could mean or imply guilt or blame. This was in response to Danios' sweeping denials about the meaning of the words dhimma or dhimmis. One sense is suggested by T. P. Hughes' quote of the general definition of the word dhimma, which includes the idea that one would be to blame for breaking one's obligations or commitments. Here is what I wrote on May 27, long before Danios' June 6 reply. I (K) first quoted a question that Danios (D), in his May 25 article, had posed, and then I answered the question:

D: "We see quite clearly from the above quote [a statement about the pact of Umar] that “dhimma” is something positive; it is protection. In fact, the exact same word–dhimmah–is used for both Jews and Muslims in the Constitution of Medina. This document declares that all who uphold the pledge–Jew and Muslim alike–are granted dhimma (protection). If the word meant or implied “guilt”, why did the Prophet Muhammad include the Muslims under this?"
K: 1. "It would imply guilt in the sense described by T. P. Hughes, mentioned in my above post, i.e., that one is guilty if they break they covenant."

That is a direct response to his question about why Muslims were included under the type of "dhimma" mentioned in the context which he cites. (It's almost certain that he read that post, because he quoted and responded to a different part of the same post). I did not label "sense 1" and "sense 2" at that stage (on May 27), but I clearly did describe the sense in which (1) the general meaning of the term dhimma implies that anyone who is a party to the contract--including Muslims--would be worthy of blame for violating or neglecting the contract. That's the general sense of the word first mentioned in Hughes under zimmah. And then sense 2, of course, refers to the sense in which blame or guilt is attributed to the dhimmis for their failure to accept Islam and so on--which I also described in the May 27th posts.

3. Regarding Danios' weak, dubious, invalid arguments, I have identified (at least) his faulty use of sentence frames, and his apparently highly limited understanding of the meaning of the word dhimma (see my June 21 and June 27 posts). One of his other invalid assumptions was that the word dhimma could not mean or imply something negative like guilt because it was a word that was also applicable to Muslims, i.e., early Muslims mentioned in the Hadith who were said to be "under the dhimma" of Allah and His Messenger (Muhammad). Danios wrote: "Clearly, the word “dhimma” cannot mean something negative if it is equally applied to the Muslim believers."

His assumption here shows that he either does not understand the word dhimma, or that he does understand it and is trying to hide the negative aspects of the meaning, like liability, debt, responsibility (as in blame or guilt), and so on.

His belief that some word could not "mean something negative" if it was applied to the Muslim believers is just silly. In Islam, Muslim believers are subject to blame (dhamm) for all sorts of things for which they are responsible but which they, being human, might fail to uphold or achieve. Historically, this included, at least theoretically, their obligations to the dhimmis.

He was also mixing up different forms of dhimma. The dhimma contract that was imposed in the terms of surrender on the non-Muslims who refused to accept Islam is different in many important ways from the dhimma that is mentioned in the examples Danios cites. For example, as al-Mawardi noted, some of the dhimma rules and requirements were imposed at least in part as punishments (e.g., the jizya). And in the dhimma with Allah and His Messenger Muhammad, I would expect that according to at least some pious Muslim interpretations at least one of the parties (Allah) cannot (or perhaps should not) be held liable or to blame, or judged guilty; whereas in the dhimma between the subjugated non-Muslims and the Muslim rulers, theoretically either side, being humans and subject to the laws and real punishments, could be blamed, held liable, and judged to be guilty.

A relatively concise summary of the refutation of Danios' denials about the meaning of the words dhimma and dhimmis.

Note: These brackets {} are mine.

1. In his part 1 "Intellectual Huckster" article, Danios claims that the word dhimmis "in no way, shape, or form means “guilty” people."

Rebuttal:

(Sense 1)

The word dhimma (or zimmah), according to T.P. Hughes' Dictionary of Islam, is "...from the root zamm, “to blame.” A compact, covenant, or contract, a league or treaty, any engagement or obligation, because the breaking thereof necessitates blame; and a right or due, for the neglect of which one is to be blamed.[...]" Essentially the same definition is given in Lane's Lexicon. Thus the meaning of dhimma includes a sense of being liable to be blamed or held guilty. And as Robert noted, the Elias Modern Arabic Dictionary includes "hold guilty" as one of the meanings of the z-m-m (or dh-m-m) root.

According to Wehr's Arabic-English dictionary, dhimma means "...protection, care, custody; covenant of protection, compact; responsibility, answerableness; financial obligation, liability, debt; inviolability, security of life and property; safeguard, guarantee, security; conscience [[...] the free non-Muslim subjects living in Muslim countries who, in return for paying the capital tax, enjoyed protection and safety [...]]” Wehr's entry for dhimmi (dimmi or zimmi) reads "...a free non-Muslim subject living in a Muslim country (see dimma).”

A word of critical importance here is responsibility. Sakhr's online dictionary defines responsible as "legally or morally obliged, eg to take care of something or somebody or to carry out a duty, and liable to be blamed if one fails." And Sakhr defines responsibility as "being responsible or accountable {...} commitment or duty for which a person is responsible"

Dhimma literally means responsibility. Just as the word responsibility in English can mean blameworthiness or guiltiness, and entrustedness, the Arabic word dhimma can mean promise of protection and liable to be held guilty. (The word "charge" is also used in some dictionary definitions of dhimma, and like the word dhimma can mean accuse or hold liable, hold responsible, i.e., hold guilty, and can mean to entrust or assign someone to perform some duty or obligation, e.g., to put someone in charge of some task).

Having dhimma, or conscience, i.e., moral, legal, and religious responsibility, is what makes it possible for one to be rightly subject to dhamm or blame, liable to be held guilty, if one violates one's agreements or neglects one's duties, debts, and obligations. Note that both Muslim and non-Muslim parties to the dhimma contract, who are of sound mind, and so forth, are considered to have dhimma, responsibility, and thus subject to blame.

Thus, ahl al-dhimma, or dhimmis, refers to non-Muslims subjugated under Islamic rule, who are liable or indebted to pay the jizya tax, and responsible for meeting their obligations and observing various restrictions in accordance with the treaty of surrender, their violation of which would make them blameworthy or guilty.

(Sense 2)

The Quran and Islamic law indicate that the non-Muslims who have heard the message of Islam and who have been invited to embrace it but who reject it are "guilty" (see above references in this thread), sinners, wrong-doers, legally corrupt (fasiq), etc., for rejecting Islam, Muhammad, and the Quran. In the Quran, they are accused of having broken their covenant with Allah, and such an accusation in the Quran would be taken by pious Muslims as truth, i.e., the non-Muslims are not only accused but are rightly judged as guilty. The Quran accuses the non-Muslims of The Book of committing shirk (e.g., 9:30-9:31), and the Quran classifies shirk as worthy of reproof, blame, condemnation (madhmooman, 17:22). Dhimmis by definition are non-Muslims who, when offered the chance to embrace Islam, refused to accept it and retained their previous religions. In addition, T.P. Hughes wrote in his Dictionary of Islam, under his entry for zimmi (dhimmi), that the dhimmis of "The Book" are "...not guilty of an absolute denial, but only of a partial perversion of the truth, only part of the punishment for disbelief is their due, and it is imposed upon them in the shape of a tribute called poll- or capitation tax [JAZYAH], by means of which they secure protection for their property, personal freedom, and religious toleration from the Muslim Government..." Thus, the dhimmis are by definition considered "guilty" of at least a "partial perversion of the truth," and are therefore liable to punishments such as the jizya and numerous restrictions and obligations.

The dhimmis in question are considered guilty, and non-Muslims are the only ones who are called dhimmis. One important sense (within Sense 2) of the word mean (as in meaning) involves logical entailment. Since the dhimmis by definition are guilty of not accepting Islam despite having been given the opportunity to do so, and despite having the conscience and capacity, and responsibility to do so. Just as one can say "Dog means animal," because dog logically entails animal, one can say "dhimmi means guilty person," because dhimmi entails guilty person (i.e., guilty of refusing to embrace Islam). The guilt of refusing to embrace Islam remains an attributed property or trait of the dhimmi as long as he or she lives and remains a non-Muslim.

Related to the above sense of meaning through entailment is meaning through implication. For example, the fact that dhimmis are subject to punishment means (implies) that they are considered to be guilty people by the authority who presumes to punish them for their crime of failing to accept Islam.

There is also a poetic or symbolic sense in which dhimmis means guilty people. Consider "In this poem, the budding flower means youth." (American Heritage dictionary). There is another symbolic sense of meaning, as in indication, or signal, e.g., "A red sunset means fine weather." (msn Encarta). The symbolic meaning of dhimmis as guilty people is easily available because, in Sense 2, they are considered guilty of the worst type of crime in Islam.

Dhimmis also means "guilty people" in terms of association or accompaniment, e.g., "For Sam, summer meant golf." (msn Encarta). Or, For dhimmis, living under the dhimma conditions meant being treated as guilty of a crime.

Thus, dhimmis can, at the least, mean or imply "guilty people" in terms of entailment, implication, symbolism or signal/indication, and association.

++++++++++++

2. In his Part 2 "Intellectual Huckster" article, Danios, responding to Robert's rebuttal and my quote of T.P. Hughes, admitted that the word dhimma was associated with the root dh-m-m meaning blameworthy or guilty. However, in a strange twist, he bizarrely claimed that the sense of blame/guilt would only apply to the Muslim authorities if they broke the covenant (dhimma), and not to the non-Muslim dhimmis if they broke the covenant. Danios concluded that "It therefore cannot at all be said that dhimmi means (or even implies) “guilty people” or “guilty ones.””

Rebuttal: As I indicated from the beginning (May 27 posts), in Sense 1, a Muslim party would also be considered "to blame" or guilty if he or she violated the covenant (dhimma). But Danios is wildly incorrect when he claims, without evidence or support, that the non-Muslim would not be considered guilty for violating the covenant (dhimma). This is clear once we realize, as shown by scholars such as Senturk and Johansen (whom I cited above in previous posts), that the dhimma in question involves a contract for which "both sides" are accountable or responsible; and that "dhimma" also refers to a moral and legal responsibility that a person possesses regardless of "religious affiliation." Having this capacity, this responsibility, entitles one to certain rights but also incurs certain obligations and thus exposes one to the possibility of blame or censure. This is further supported by the many examples I cited of scholars describing the various obligations of the non-Muslim dhimmis and how they might be deemed to have violated the contract. In short, if the person has agreed to the dhimma contract, and is a free (non-slave) adult of sound mind, he or she is liable to blame (dhamm) if he or she violates the contract (dhimma). The quotes of Johansen and particularly of Senturk (re "both sides") clearly support my claims and falsify Danios' wild claim that dhimmis would not be to blame if they broke the covenant (dhimma).

There are absurd consequences to Danios' claim that need to be pointed out. If the non-Muslim dhimmi can't be "guilty" of violating the covenant, this would mean that a dhimmi of sound mind could carry out multiple murders and other serious crimes against law-abiding Muslims and not be considered "guilty" of violating the dhimma covenant--a covenant which actually obligates non-Muslims to maintain, and not disturb, the aman or security of Muslims. Danios would also be implying that the dhimmis have no conscience or responsibility, or not sufficient conscience or responsibility (dhimma), to be held liable for any of their violations of the covenant (dhimma). That is, "dhimmis" would have no (personal) dhimma or legal capacity; yet if they had no such legal capacity, it would not be possible or acceptable for them to engage in the dhimma contract. And Danios would be implying that there are two sides (i.e., two major parties, Muslims and non-Muslims) to the contract, but only one side, not the other, could be held liable for breaking the contract.

In conclusion, Robert and I have demonstrated that dhimmis means, connotes, or implies "guilty people." Danios' attempt to avoid this by claiming that non-Muslims wouldn't be considered guilty for violating the dhimma is unsupported, is directly refuted by the evidence above showing "both sides" were to be held accountable, and has absurd implications that Danios has failed to address.

p.s. The Quran refers to non-Muslims who (it alleges) are wrongdoers, evil, and transgressors who violated their dhimma (covenant, honoured agreement) with Muslims.

Quran (Pickthall),
9:8 How (can there be any treaty for the others) when, if they have the upper hand of you, they regard not pact nor honour* in respect of you? They satisfy you with their mouths the while their hearts refuse. And most of them are wrongdoers.

9:9 They have purchased with the revelations of Allah a little gain, so they debar (men) from His way. Lo! evil is that which they are wont to do.

9:10 And they observe toward a believer neither pact nor honour.* These are they who are transgressors.

*thimmatan or dhimmatan