Tech Central Station points out the dangers of a nuclear armed Iran:
While the “News Cycle” focuses its attention on a mid-level functionary’s startling revelation that, had only everyone listened to him, this whole terror thing could have been averted (that is, had they listened then to what he’s saying now, not to what he said before”¦ oh well, never mind), let us avert our eyes from the posturing and finger-pointing for a moment and consider what to do about the next threat: a nuclear-armed Iran.
For those who haven’t been paying attention to the danse macabre that has been going on between the Mad Mullahs and the International Atomic Energy Agency, a short review:
At Bushehr, they are building a light-water reactor with the aid of the Russians, which (even if our Slavic friends are sincere in their promise to monitor it faithfully and recover all spent fuel) will be a source of practical expertise for the Iranians and allow them to claim they need to have a uranium enrichment capability to ensure fuel supplies. (These reactors run on uranium that has been enriched from the natural 0.7% U-235 to 2-5%; but if you just keep running the same enrichment plant, you can keep going to above 80%, which will work as the core of a nuclear bomb.)
They’ve recently been caught red-handed and forced to admit that they have been developing two separate secret uranium enrichment programs for the better part of two decades.
At Natanz, a secret gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment plant has been discovered, and traces of highly-enriched (weapon-usable) uranium were found there.
At Arak, a secret (have you noticed the “secret” trend here?) heavy water production plant has been uncovered. Heavy water is used in the type of nuclear reactors that can run on natural, unenriched uranium (so if the enrichment part goes sour, they’re still in business), and which are especially suited to produce plutonium (which, of course, is the other potential nuclear bomb core.)
Iran has purchased parts for advanced uranium-enriching centrifuges and probably actual bomb designs from A.Q. Khan’s Pakistani Nuclear Warehouse.
As a matter of fact, it’s beginning to look like they have a club membership card and are eligible for discounts and special members-only offers.
The Iranians, of course, claim they have no plans to build nuclear weapons. No sir. They are merely spending billions of dollars to develop nuclear power as an alternative energy source for when their oil runs out, say, somewhere around the year 3015.
Meanwhile, the Jerusalem Post writes that Iran binds Hizbullah to Hamas.
With the assassination of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, history may repeat itself.
On October 26, 1995 in Malta, Israeli agents assassinated Fathi Shkaki, the secretary-general of Palestinian Islamic Jihad. He was replaced by Ramadan Abdallah Shallah, who was not as effective a leader.
As Islamic Jihad began to decline, Iran became its primary funder, and Islamic Jihad in turn became Iran’s proxy in the West Bank and Gaza.
With Sheikh Yassin, Hamas’s founder dead, Iran may again attempt to move into a power vacuum in order to extend the reach of its terror network both against Israel and worldwide.
The relationship between Hamas and Hizbullah, Iran’s leading terrorist proxy, dates back to the early 1990s. After being released from Israeli prison in 1997, Yassin visited Iran and secured a multimillion dollar annual Iranian contribution to Hamas. In the Aksa Intifada, Hizbullah has been generous in sharing its expertise, smuggling plans, equipment, and operatives with the Palestinian territories.
Hizbullah has helped Hamas build rockets based on Katyushas and bombs — including the device used in the March 27, 2002 Passover Massacre. Hamas has also carried out ambushes, such as a February 2002 attack that destroyed an Israeli tank, based on tactics Hizbullah honed in its long fight against Israel in Lebanon.
In the wake of Yassin’s assassination, Hizbullah shelled northern Israel, further demonstrating the expanding ties between the two organizations.