For several years at this website it has been suggested that NATO must meet, or perhaps the Defense Secretaries of all NATO countries aside from Turkey must meet, to discuss the problem of Muslim infiltration of the military and spy agencies and other security services. NATO should scrutinize the supposed “integration” of Muslims and the ways in which those in charge of their vetting often rely on the advice of other Muslims. Those Muslims make assurances to them that often prove empty.
NATO should also examine the access of Muslims to Western weaponry and Western military secrets, as the Muslim population grows. It should study the possible effect of a takeover by Muslims of a Western country as that population grows, in two generations or perhaps earlier. What should then be the response of other Western countries still free of Muslim domination? Should they promptly expel their Muslim population to avoid the same fate? Should they invade the country that has been taken over, in order to rescue its art, its monuments, and the remaining Infidels — who might still be, in fact, close to a majority, or even a majority, of the population? Planning can only take place if the problem is recognized: see Lenin and the Bolshevik Revolution and the Russian Civil War; see Adolf Hitler and the ire of the Nazis; see global warming and possibly unstoppable and catastrophic climate change; see, see, see.
Infidels are going to have to rely for their knowledge of Islam not on what the Islamintern tells them, not what The Guardian or John Simpson or Edward Mortimer or John Esposito or a thousand others tell them that Islam is all about, but rather on those who are fully capable of studying the texts, studying the history, putting it together, and arriving at a view of Islam that both explains the previously accumulated data, and has predictive value about the behavior of Muslims in the future. Such a work, for example, is Islam and Dhimmitude by Bat Ye’or. Many of the articles at this website have made predictions, early on, about what would happen, what kinds of behavior could be foreseen — that is, were perfectly foreseeable although not foreseen — in Iraq, and then outside Iraq in response to events within Iraq. Predictions that became possible to be made because all the data was properly considered.
On the other hand are those who write books with such titles as After Jihad (Noah Feldman), with its obvious misunderstanding of what Jihad is. It does not “go away” but merely, in a sense, can be constrained. Jihad can exhibit the signs, in case of firm Infidel response and Muslim weakness (the kind that Muslims felt from the period 1830-1960) not of ideological change, but of quiescence. One must not allow oneself to be misled by this. It is not merely a disease, however dangerous, that can be treated.
Just as the civilian leaders are mostly Yesterday’s Men not up to the task of grasping, or even studying, the matter of Islam, the military leaders are similarly unfamiliar with the doctrines of this Total System, and of the peculiar hold it has on the minds of men. They may make judgments based on the exceptional Muslims, the one out of 1,000, rather than the other 999. This could be fatal. For reasons known only to them, a few prominent “Muslims-for-identification-purposes-only” Muslims — Fouad Ajami and Zalmay Khalilzad come to mind — will not announce their real views on Islam, and Ajami, in his books, stays carefully away from the subject, so that the value of his work has been, often, fatally vitiated by his refusal to confront the Matter of Islam. Perhaps he senses this, and believes he cannot do so for career reasons. Perhaps he believes it would interfere with his chances to continue to travel, say, to Kuwait (Behbehanis and all) to meet with that handful — it is a handful, only a handful — of the enlightened or quasi-enlightened. He has the same problem that Bernard Lewis has: wanting to speak to the Infidels, and wanting at the same time, with the same words, to try to move a potential audience of advanced Muslims along as well. And neither Ajami nor Lewis has been able to be the proper guide for policy partly for that reason — partly because Lewis has minimized, and Ajami ignored, the malevolence, and power, and menace of Islam. They can’t do it.
Others, however, can. And it is such people who should be consulted by the military and political leaders as they make plans to fulfill their primary task: to instruct, and to protect, those whom they presume to lead.
NATO must meet.