Gaza’s jihadists are only using the ceasefire as Islamic law intends it: to regroup and re-arm for the next round. “IDF doesn’t view rocket attacks as real escalation,” by Yaakov Katz for the Jerusalem Post, July 18:
[…] One of the main problems with Gaza today is that any future Israeli operation would likely have to be dramatically different than it was in 2009.
Then, the main strategy was to separate the southern part of the Gaza Strip from the North, to cut off arms supplies to northern Gaza — the location of most of the rocket launchers — and to hit Hamas infrastructure hard from the air throughout the Strip.
Today, Military Intelligence estimates Hamas and Islamic Jihad have obtained more than 10,000 rockets and missiles — including a large stockpile of Iranian Fajr-5 rockets that can reach Tel Aviv — close to what Hezbollah had on the eve of the Second Lebanon War in 2006. A year ago, the terror groups were believed to have just a few thousands rockets, but the revolution in Egypt has completely altered the balance of power between Israel and Gaza.
Practically speaking, this buildup has major operational ramifications for the IDF and means Palestinian terror groups now store their rockets and launchers throughout the region. In order to effectively stop rocket fire into Beersheba, Ashdod, Ashkelon and Tel Aviv, the IDF will have to operate throughout the entire Strip.
Israel is extremely concerned by the major increase in weapons and explosives smuggling into Gaza since Hosni Mubarak’s downfall in February. Already in April, The Jerusalem Post reported one of the first results of the revolution was the interim government’s decision to stop construction of a steel barrier that Egypt had been building along its border with Gaza in an effort to curb smuggling.
Instead, since the revolution, the IDF believes Hamas has smuggled in three times the amount of explosives it brought into Gaza in all of 2010. This is in addition to unprecedented amounts of anti-aircraft missiles and guided anti-tank missiles, like the Russian-made Kornet that hit the school bus three months ago.
Israel understands Egypt’s relationship with Hamas has changed since Mubarak’s departure and that the military rule is turning a blind eye to the increase in smuggling, and at the same time has also lost control over Sinai and the Beduin tribes there. The closer ties between Egypt and Hamas are understood by Israel as possibly connected to the upcoming elections in Egypt and a desire by the current leadership to align itself with the Muslim Brotherhood, which it understands will gain power in the vote.
There is much more; the content above is more or less the second half of a longer report.