Walter Scott, The Talisman, the Crusades, Richard I of England and Saladin: Myths, Legends and History
by Ibn Warraq
Part 37
Part 1 / Part 2 / Part 3 / Part 4 / Part 5 / Part 6 / Part 7 / Part 8 / Part 9 / Part 10 / Part 11 / Part 12 / Part 13 / Part 14 / Part 15 / Part 16 / Part 17 / Part 18 / Part 19 / Part 20 / Part 21 / Part 22 / Part 23 / Part 24 / Part 25 / Part 26 / Part 27 / Part 28 / Part 29 / Part 30 / Part 31 / Part 32 / Part 33 / Part 34 / Part 35 / Part 36
C.3 ANDREW EHRENKREUTZ”S SALADIN.
At last, we come to Ehrenkreutz himself. In his introduction, Ehrenkreutz immediately sets out his thesis, and lays out his differences with Lane-Poole and Gibb, at the same time giving a survey of the field singling out historians who had anticipated his own conclusions. For example, in his article on the “Ayyubids” in the Second Edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam, distinguished French historian Claude Cahen [1909-1991] wrote, “[Saladin] adopted the idea (of the holy war), though it is not possible to discern to what extent ambition was combined with undoubtedly sincere conviction”. While Joshua Prawer in his magnum opus, Histoire du Royaume Latin de Jérusalem, Paris, 1969, complained that “ŸModern historians, seduced by Arabic sources, have sometimes been misled by their tendentious character”¦.There prevails among historians a tendency to attribute a single, dominating idea (une pensée directrice) to all of Saladin’s actions from the day he seized power in Egypt (1169) to his death, twenty-four years later (1193)”¦.A critical biography of the hero of Islamic history is still lacking”.
For Ehrenkreutz, it is obvious that “the political, social, and economic climate prevailing in the Near East in the second half of the twelfth century was not conducive to seeking power through the exercise of tolerance, magnanimity, chivalry, or any altruistic behavior. Besides suffering from the intrusion of the Crusaders, the Byzantines, and the Turkomans, Near Eastern society was torn asunder by factional infighting at all levels of the political hierarchy. In the merciless struggle — whether between the Sunni caliphate of the Abbasids and the Shiite caliphate of the Fatimids, the Saljuqid sultans and the Arab emirs, or between local dynasts and ambitious atabegs — all means were employed to achieve victory. Ideological or religious principles were readily compromised; the presence of the Crusaders primarily furnished an opportunity for expanding diplomatic intrigues, or for promoting selfish propaganda, rather than uniting the leaders in a sincere effort to defend Islam. Hence one finds Sunni vizirs and jurists in the service of the Shiite Fatimids, military assistance rendered by Arab tribes to the Crusaders, or an alliance between Muslim Damascus and and the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. In this dangerous political game there was no place for people lacking ambition or leadership qualities. To become a contender one needed the support of a family or a faction; to overcome other contenders one required proper military training, political and diplomatic skills, as well as a natural talent of charismatic leadership. Above all, one needed a lot of luck!” [pp.7-8]
SKEPTICISM OF LANE-POOLE – GIBB ACCOUNT OF SALADIN”S YOUNGER DAYS.
First, Ehrenkreutz carefully dismantles the idea that Saladin was a shy, retiring, unambitious goody-goody. We know from BahÄ” al-DÄ«n and Abu Shama that early in 1169, Saladin “renounced wine, gave up vain pastimes and donned the garments of seriousness and pious endeavour”. [1] Ehrenkreutz draws the obvious conclusion: “that until he turned thirty-one, Saladin had not always been averse to drinking and other worldly temptations. And it would indicate that the young officer was not too strongly influenced by the moral example of Nur al-Din, who was well known for his ardent attachment to religion and for his scrupulous observance of Islamic precepts. In any event, Saladin never performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, in spite of the fact that in 1157 Ayyub [his father] and 1160 Shirkuh [his uncle], each led a caravan of pilgrims from Damascus. In 1161 Shirkuh once again served as the leader of the pilgrim caravan which included the mighty Nur al-Din himself. In spite of these examples set by father, his uncle, and his influential superior, Saladin did not avail himself of those opportunities to fulfill the fundamental religious obligation incumbent on every Muslim” [pp 32-33].
[1] BahÄ” al-DÄ«n Ibn ShaddÄd, The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin or al-NawÄdir al-Sulá¹Äniyya wa”˜l-MaḥÄsin al-YÅ«sufiyya, trans. D.S.Richards, Ashgate:Aldershot, 2002,p.45.
To be continued.
Ibn Warraq is the author of numerous books, including Why the West Is Best and Why I Am Not A Muslim.