When the Joint Chiefs of Staff Determined That Israel Must Keep Control of the West Bank and Golan Heights

It was not Israel, but American officers who studied Israel’s security needs after the Six-Day War, who recognized how essential it was for Israel to keep control of the West Bank and the Golan.

In 1967, President Lyndon Johnson asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study what territorial adjustments would be necessary to meet Israel’s minimum defense needs. They duly presented their military assessment of what, for Israel, would constitute “secure and defensible borders.” Here is what they concluded:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

(JCSM-373-67)

Subject: Middle East Boundaries

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 19 June 1967, subjects as above, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, without regard to political factors, on the minimum territory, in addition to that held on 4 June 1967, Israel might be justified in retaining in order to permit a more effective defense against possible conventional Arab attack and terrorist raids. [emphasis added]

2. From a strictly military point of view, Israel would require the retention of some captured territory in order to provide militarily defensible borders. [emphasis added] Determination of territory to be retained should be based on accepted tactical principles such as control of commanding terrain, use of natural obstacles, elimination of enemy-held salients, and provision of defense in-depth for important facilities and installations. More detailed discussions of the key border areas mentioned in the reference are contained in the Appendix hereto. In summary, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding these areas are as follows:

a. The Jordanian West Bank. Control of the prominent high ground running north-south through the middle of West Jordan generally east of the main north-south highway along the axis Jennin-Nablus-Bira-Jerusalem and then southeast to a junction with the Dead Sea at the Wadi el Daraja would provide Israel with a militarily defensible border. The envisioned defensive line would run just east of Jerusalem; however, provision could be made for internationalization of the city without siginificant detriment to Israel’s defensive posture.

b. Syrian Territory Contiguous to Israel. Israel is particularly sensitive to the prevalence of terrorist raids and border incidents in this area. The presently occupied territory, the high ground running generally north-south on a line with Qnaitra about 15 miles inside the Syrian border, would give Israel control of the terrain which Syria has used effectively in harrassing the border area.

c. The Jerusalem-Latrun Area. See subparagraph 2a above.

d. The Gaza Strip. By occupying the Gaza Strip, Israel would trade approximately 45 miles of hostile border for eight. Configured as it is, the strip serves as a salient for introduction of Arab subversion and terrorism, and its retention would be to Israel’s military advantage.

e. The Negev-Sinai Border. Except for retention of the demilitarized zone around Al Awja and some territory for the protection of the port of Eilat, discussed below, continued occupation fo the Sinai would present Israel with problems outweighing any military gains.

f. The Negev-Jordan-Aqaba-Strait of Tiran Area. Israel’s objectives here would be innocent passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and protection of its port at Eilat. Israel could occupy Sharm ash-Shaykh with considerable inconvenience but could rely on some form of internationalization to secure free access to the gulf. Failing this, Israel would require key terrain in the Sinai to protect its use of the Strait of Tiran. Eilat, situated at the apex of Israel’s narrow southern tip, is vulnerable to direct ground action from Egyptian territory. Israel would lessen the threat by retention of ap ortion of the Sinai Peninsula south and east of the Wadi el Gerafi then east to an intersection with the Gulf of Aqaba at approximately 29° 20′ north latitude.

3. It is emphasized that the above conclusions, in accordance with your terms of reference are based solely on military considerations from the Israeli point of view.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Signed Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs thought Israel should retain Gaza; it did not. Gaza then became a terrorist center, lobbing missiles into Israel, which led to the Israeli incursion that defeated Hamas.

But Israel still retains, and likely will not give up, control of the “West Bank.” It needs a minimum of defensive depth – that nine-mile wide waist will simply not do — and needs to control the Judean and Samarian hills. Anyone reading the report of the Joint Chiefs, or simply looking at a map, would likely conclude that Israeli command of the “West Bank” is absolutely essential to its security. But, someone might object – say, Jimmy Carter — didn’t Israel win the 1967 war without that control? Yes, it did, but that was in a different world, before the OPEC trillions helped buy the Arab states, and Iran, hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of armaments; they now possess between ten and twenty times the weaponry that they had in 1967, and that includes advanced planes and missiles, that a half-century ago they did not possess. The element of surprise – and superb training – that allowed the Israelis to destroy the Egyptian air force in the first few hours of battle on June 4 is not something that Israel can count on ever again; nor should Israelis be asked to rely on such a near-miracle for their survival. The Israelis remember that the surprise Arab attack in October 1973 inflicted many casualties. The outcome was a near thing; the country held on by the skin of its teeth, thanks to American re-supplies of arms that, in a different political environment – with the leftward-leaning Democratic Party distancing itself from Israel– can not necessarily be counted on.

None of this Israeli need for “secure and recognizable boundaries” registers with Jimmy Carter. He thinks Israel should not only live permanently squeezed into the 1949 armistice lines, in a state of maximum peril, but should put their trust in guarantees by the Palestinian Arabs – the “peace-loving” Slow Jihadists of the Palestinian Authority, rather than the Fast Jihadists of Hamas. Is he aware of the blood-curdling statements Mahmoud Abbas makes about Israel to his own people? Has he ever watched the celebration of killing Jews on children’s programs broadcast by “Palestinian” television? Or noted the naming of streets and squares in the West Bank and Gaza after terrorists? Has he grasped in the meaning of the Pay-For-Slay program? No. And if you told him any of this he would refuse to believe it, or find some way of blaming Israel for Palestinian behavior. Do you think Jimmy Carter understands that the Muslim model for all treaty-making with non-Muslims is the Treaty of Al-Hudaibiyya, a treaty that Muhammad made with the Meccans in 628 AD, which was supposed to last for ten years? After only eighteen months, as soon as Muhammad felt that his forces were strong enough to attack, he did so, and was victorious. I suspect Carter has never heard of Al-Hudaibiyya, even though Yassir Arafat made clear reference to it in a speech to a Muslim audience in South Africa, as part of defending his “peace” with Israel. That allusion to Muhammad’s treaty-breaking indicated that he had no intention of observing that “peace” once Israel was weaker, and the PLO stronger.

In addition to their rights derived from the Mandate for Palestine, Israelis should not be prevented from exercising their right, under Resolution 242, not to give back “all the” territories it won by force of arms, but instead to keep territories needed for “secure and recognizable boundaries.” To be “secure,” those “boundaries” need to be “defensible.” Who will decide? Israel itself knows. Best what it needs by way of “defensible” borders. The Israelis have a perfect right – legally and morally – to hold onto those parts of Judea and Samaria that they now control. And they have a perfect right to build towns and villages (not “settlements,” for that word has come to imply both transience and illegitimacy) on “state and waste lands,” as the Mandate for Palestine specifically allows.